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Abstract 
DETERMINANTS OF THE NEW ENTRY OF HMOS INTO A MEDICARE RISK 
CONTRACT: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE-DIVERSIFICATION MODEL 
By Chih-Wen Pai, Ph.D. 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
Medical College of Virginia Campus, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1 996 
Major Director: Dolores G. Clement, Dr. P.H., Associate Professor 
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the new entry of an 
HMO into a Medicare risk contract using a resource dependence-diversification model. 
x 
This study is conducted through a non-experimental, panel design with one year time lag. 
An HMO's market is defined as the service area. The primary sample for this study is 
composed of 440 HMOs that do not have a Medicare risk contract as of January 1 994. 
Data for the variables are extracted from the 1 994 and 1 995 InterStudy and Group 
Health Association of America (GHAA) directories, the 1 996 Area Resource File, the 
1 994 County and City Data Book, the 1 993 County Business Patterns. Additional 
supplementary data on adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC) and county-level 
Medicare beneficiaries are obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration. 
xi 
The dependent variable is discrete indicating an HMO's market entry. Independent 
variables are grouped into four categories: market structure, resource munificence, market 
price, and organizational attributes. Twelve hypotheses are tested using multivariate 
logistic regression. 
This analysis reveals that HMO enrollment size is a predominant, positive factor 
in predicting a new market entry. HMOs are also sensitive to the level of AAPCC rates 
in making a market entry decision. Results from hypothesis testing suggest that 
competition encourages a new market entry. The importance of resource munificence is 
not statistically supported. 
This study demonstrates the appropriateness of a panel design to verify a cause­
effect relationship and the applicability of the service area as an HMO's market. This 
study also contributes to the theoretical understanding of an HMO's  market entry. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
As one effort to bring Medicare costs under control, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) has encouraged health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to 
provide Medicare coverage to emolled beneficiaries in return for fixed, prepaid 
premiums. HMOs are believed to affect the health care of the nonelderly. The 
conventional wisdom is that HMOs are able to provide comprehensive coverage at lower 
total cost while maintaining adequate quality of care (Luft, 1 988) .  Acting as both insurer 
and provider, HMOs have an incentive to provide care in the most cost-effective manner 
and reduce unnecessary services. The market power of HMOs also often enables them to 
negotiate favorable prices for provider services. HCFA's primary goal in establishing the 
risk program was to reduce Medicare costs, while maintaining or improving the quality of 
care (Brown, Clement, Hill, Retchin, & Bergeron, 1 993). In doing so, the objective is to 
offer Medicare beneficiaries access to managed care available to the younger population. 
HCF A also hoped that costs in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector in response to competition 
would decline as more Medicare beneficiaries emolled in HMOs. These expectations 
could not be realized without broad HMO participation. The HMO' s  decision to enter the 
high-risk Medicare market is of interest since the provision of Section 1 1 4 of the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1 982 (TEFRA) caps the net revenues allowed by 
contracting HMOs. 
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Converging Interest in Medicare Managed Care 
The Medicare program was created in 1 965 under Title XVIII of the Social 
Security Act. Since then, the growth of costs in Medicare became a dominant issue in 
federal health policy discussion. Beginning in 1 983,  the Medicare Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) was authorized to change the way Medicare paid for hospital services. 
Contrary to the retrospective, cost-based reimbursement system, PPS pays hospitals a flat 
amount for a given category of admissions based on Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) 
(Phelps, 1 992, p. 265). Hospitals were given a strong incentive to spend less. 
Subsequent to the implementation of the DRG system, declines in length of stay 
(Guterman, Eggers, Riley, Greene, & Terrell, 1 988;  Kahn, et aI . ,  1 990) and hospital 
admissions (Guterman, et aI . ,  1 988;  Rice, 1 99 1 )  have occurred. 
In a further effort to contain Medicare costs, the Congress approved the Medicare 
Physician Payment Reform legislation that established the Resource-Based Relative 
Value System (RBRVS) in 1 989 and implemented RBRVS in 1 992. RBRVS regulates 
physician expenditures under Medicare (Rice, 1 99 1 ). 
Despite progress in limiting Medicare spending, Medicare expenditures continue 
to increase. Between 1 984 and 1 993 Medicare expenditures rose at 7.7% annually, and 
its growth among federal spending programs is second only to net interest payment on the 
national debt (Physician Payment Review Commission, 1 996, p. 3) .  It is projected that 
Medicare expenditures will continue to rise at an annual rate of 1 0% through 2005. 
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Compared to Medicare spending, the growth rate in the private sector that rose 
faster than Medicare during the late 1 980s is below that of Medicare in the 1 990s. The 
Congressional Budget Office projected average annual growth rates of 6.9% in 2000 and 
6.4% in 2005 in the private sector (Physician Payment Review Commission, 1 996, p. 4). 
One possible explanation for this differential in growth rates between Medicare and the 
private sector is an innovation that the private sector has undertaken. The private sector 
has been in transition to an integrated, capitated system of care. 
With concern about the size of federal budget deficit, the success of managed care 
in the private sector has appealed to policymakers. The HCF A is aggressively promoting 
the Medicare risk program and is supportive of expanding other managed care options to 
Medicare beneficiaries, including point of service (POS) and preferred provider 
organizations (PPO) (Cunningham, 1 996). The HMO industry that has renewed interest 
in Medicare views it as the biggest unexplored growth market (Hurley, 1 996) and has 
responded favorably to the call from the HCF A in the 1 990s. With this converging 
interest in Medicare managed care, almost 70,000 new Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in 
Medicare risk plans each month during 1 995 (Cunningham, 1 996), and the number of 
HMOs with Medicare risk contracts grew more than 40% in 1 995. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend of HMO growth since 1 976. By 1 986, the first full 
year of TEFRA operation, there was a steady increase in the overall number of HMOs. 
The year 1 986 witnessed HMO growth, indicating perhaps a catalytic effect of TEFRA 
risk contracting on general HMO development. The late 1 980s and early 1 990s denoted a 
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slightly declining trend in the number of HMOs, likely due to consolidation and failure in 
the HMO industry. Feldman, Wholey, and Christianson ( 1 995) reported that 1 23 HMOs 
failed and 68 merged and then "disappeared" from 1 987 through 1 992. 
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Figure 2 depicts the number of Medicare risk-contract HMOs from 1 986 to 1 995 .  
It is interesting to  note the coincident growth in  the early years of TEFRA risk 
contracting implementation followed by a steady drop of HMOs in Medicare risk contract 
with the overall trend of HMOs in the early 1 990s. Beginning in 1 993, HMOs displayed 
an increasing interest in participating in a Medicare risk contract. As of January 1 995, 
there were 1 54 active risk contracts, representing a 4 1  % increase from 1 994. This 
increased rate of product development now outpaces the growth rate of total HMOs, 
which may be indicative of established organization diversification. As of March 1 ,  
1 996, there were 1 97 HMOs with Medicare risk contracts (Health Care Financing 
Administration, 1 996). 
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The number of HMOs with Medicare risk contracts as a percentage of total HMOs 
shown in Figure 3 manifests the same pattern observed in Figure 2 .  In the pre- 1 990 
period, the highest proportion of HMOs with risk contracts, 22.5%, occurred in 1 989.  
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The 1 995 value, 26. 1 %, exceeds this historical mark. The U.S .  population enrolled in 
HMOs, referring to both the number of HMO enrollees and as a percentage of the U.S .  
population, shows steadily increasing trends (Figures 4 and 5). As of October of 1 995, 
there were 56 million people, or 2 1 %  of the U.S. population enrolled in HMOs. 
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Figure 6 is a chart that reflects the increased trend of the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare risk HMOs. This trend reflects a continual, albeit 
slow, increase, in contrast to the decline reflected in the number of risk-contracting 
HMOs over the period of 1 988 through 1 992 (see Figure 2). This contrast indicates that 
HMOs that discontinued their Medicare risk contract only enrolled a very small number 
of Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare beneficiaries who were enrolled in HMOs were 
concentrated in a limited number of HMOs continuing their risk contracts. The rate of 
increase in the number of Medicare risk enrollees surpasses the rate of increase in the 
number of total HMO enrollees (Figure 4). Enrollment in risk-contract HMOs increased 
by almost 27% from 1 994 to 1 995.  
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Figure 7 illustrates the number of Medicare risk enrollees as a percentage of 
Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare risk penetration rate increased from 3 .2% in 1 988 to 
8 .8% in 1 995. 
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Figure 7. Medicare Risk HMO Enrollment Penetration in a Medicare Market, 1 988-
1 995.  
Definition of Health Maintenance Organizations 
The prepaid arrangement for health service has its roots in the efforts to provide 
care to isolated, industrial workers, through the group practice movement, and through 
employment-related health insurance mechanisms to render more extensive health 
coverage at a reasonable price (Gold, 1 99 1 ;  Mayer & Mayer, 1 985). The early form of 
prepaid group practice, not then known as HMOs, was initiated by employers to offer 
health care to their employees working in rural areas where medical care was 
unobtainable (Williams, 1 988). 
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In early 1 970, Paul M .  Ellwood, a Minnesota physician and the founder of 
InterStudy, proposed new entities called "health maintenance organizations" to 
restructure the health delivery system, and emphasize health maintenance as opposed to 
the neutral medical care or negative sickness care (Gruber, Shadle, & Polich, 1 988) .  The 
term HMO was created as part of a strategy to win Nixon administration's support for 
prepaid health care as an alternative to the predominant fee-for-service (Luft, 1 98 1 ,  p. 1 ) .  
Because of  its political origin, the term HMO i s  ambiguous, noninclusive, and not 
exacting in its definition which has evolved over time. Luft ( 1 98 1 ,  pp. 2-6) outlines five 
key features of the HMO concept that applies in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s: 
I. An HMO is contractually responsible for the provision of a stated range of health 
services; enrollees have the legal right to expect treatment from the HMO. 
2. An HMO serves a defined population enrolled in the plan; the demand for HMO 
service can be estimated for planning purposes. 
3. Enrollment is voluntary, meaning that the HMO is competing with other providers. 
4 .  Enrollees pay a fixed premium that is independent of the use of services. 
5. An HMO assumes at least part of the financial risk or gain in providing services. 
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In further updating the definition of an HMO, a related attribute that distinguishes 
a managed care plan from a traditional fee-for-service plan is the selection of network 
providers (Miller & Luft, 1 994b), or more specifically the relationship between an HMO 
and its providers, mainly physicians. With providers HMOs often have a close, selective 
relationship with a provider panel. Providers in an HMO panel are usually at direct or 
indirect financial risk for providing services. In contrast, health benefit fiscal or 
insurance intermediaries have distinct, nonexclusive relationships with virtually any 
provider. 
Another conventional distinction among HMO types is closed- versus open-panel 
HMOs from a physician's perspective. In contrast to physicians in closed-panel HMOs 
(staff and group models), physicians in open-panel HMOs (lPA and network models) are 
not affiliated full time with the HMO and still maintain their fee-for-service practice. 
However, as market forces drive HMOs to provide various product options, a 
single model definition is no longer able to accommodate the changing relationship 
between HMOs and physicians (Hamer & Porter, 1 993). Instead, the emergence of 
hybrid or mixed models confirms the blurring of model type definitions and indicates the 
increased complexity in delivering heath care. Especially when HMOs merge or expand 
geographically, they establish mixed models that contract with more than one type of 
provider organizations or networks (Miller & Luft, 1 994a). 
In 1 994 the Physician Payment Review Commission sponsored a telephone 
survey of managed-care plans including HMOs and PPOs (Gold, Hurley, Lake, Ensor, & 
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Berenson, 1 995). This survey discovered many common arrangements between the staff 
or group HMOs and the network or IP A HMOs in terms of physician recruitment 
procedures, methods to pay physicians, and the practice of quality and utilization control. 
These similarities in structure indicate less extensive distinction among the four HMO 
models than is traditionally assumed. 
Regulatory History of HMOs 
The HMO movement can be traced back to the early 1 970s when America 
witnessed social unrest on health care issues: skyrocketing costs in Medicare and 
Medicaid program, insufficient access to medical care, and mediocre quality of care 
(Gruber, et aI . ,  1 988). In 1 970 the federal HMO strategy was officially revealed in the 
statement by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) that HMOs 
could serve as a major component in the federal effort to restructure the health care 
system (Lavin, 1 970). In the following year the presidential Health Message to Congress 
and a DHEW White Paper reinforced the endorsement of the HMO concept (McNeil & 
Schlenker, 1 975). Accompanying this initiative were federal grant funds to assist HMO 
planning and development. In years 1 971  and 1 972, more than $ 1 0  million federal 
dollars were allocated (Cromley & Shannon, 1 983) and 79 organizations were awarded 
grant funds to develop HMOs (Strumpf & Garramone, 1 976). 
The HMO Act of 1 973 was signed into law by President Nixon on 29 December, 
1 973 . The passage of the HMO Act facilitated HMO development by making grants 
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available to federally qualified HMOs; 1 08 feasibility projects were funded in 1 975 
(Strumpf & Garramone, 1 976). This act also provided for a dual-choice mandate by 
which employers with 25 or more employees who offered health insurance benefits were 
required to offer an HMO option to their employees in areas where a federally qualified 
HMOs existed (Wrightson, 1 990, p. 27) . In addition, the act required employers to pay 
an equal dollar contribution for HMOs and other benefit options. 
Since the passage in 1 973 , the HMO Act has been amended six times (in 1 976, 
1 978, 1 979, 1 98 1 ,  1 986, and 1 988). The HMO Amendments of 1 976 liberalized 
requirements for federal qualification and increased the limits on financial assistance 
(Gruber, et a! . ,  1 988). Both 1 978 and 1 98 1  amendments further revised grant and 
contract financial limitations. The HMO Amendments of 1 979 merely corrected printing 
and other technical errors. The HMO Amendments of 1 986 served to modify some rigid 
portions of the law, reducing an HMO's administrative burden. The HMO Amendments 
of 1 988 were signed into law by President Reagan, allowing federally qualified HMOs to 
offer a limited self-referral, or open-ended, option of up to 1 0% of physician services. 
This self-referral option adds flexibility for enrollees to seek care outside the provider 
panel by self referral but requires additional cost sharing (Gold, 1 99 1 ) . The major value 
of this diversified strategy is the attractiveness to individuals and employers who want 
flexibility and greater provider choice. The 1 988 amendment also allows HMOs to 
determine premium rates based on "adjusted community rating" methods; federally 
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qualified HMOs can set rates on the prior cost and utilization experience o f  an employer 
group. 
Since the inception of Medicare program, HCFA has offered HMOs options to 
participate in the Medicare program. HMOs were first reimbursed on a cost basis under 
Section 1 833 of the Social Security Act ( McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975). This fee-for-
service based reimbursement method was antithetical to the HMO operational 
philosophies and policies of risk-based capitation mechanism and prospective budgeting 
procedures (Iglehart, 1 985). Few HMOs participated in Medicare. It was during the time 
when the Nixon administration was promoting HMOs that Section 1 876 of the 1 972 
Social Security Act first authorized risk-sharing reimbursement methods applicable to 
those HMOs that obtained federal qualification (Bonanno & Wetle, 1 984). However, 
restrictions and burdensome processes severely prevented HMOs from being able to 
qualify for the risk-sharing method (McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975). HMOs also had little 
incentive to join Medicare risk plans. Under the early risk-sharing rules which became 
effective in 1 976, HMOs had to bear all losses if they lost money on Medicare 
enrollment. If actual costs were less than payment, HMOs might keep 50% of the 
savings up to a maximum of 20% of the adjusted average per capita costs (AAPCC) and 
return the remaining saving to the Medicare Trust Fund. The profit sharing with 
Medicare stemmed from the concern of Congress that HMOs encouraged underuse and 
sought to enroll only beneficiaries with better risk (Iglehart, 1 985). Payment to HMOs 
was made retrospectively, and often not finally settled until two or three years after 
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services had been provided (Bonanno & Wetle, 1 984). Because only two HMOs 
acquired risk contracts under Section 1 876 through 1 982 (Rossiter, Friedlob, & Langwell, 
1 985), the HCF A initiated two sets of experiments to gain experience with risk 
contracting for Medicare services: the Medicare Capitation Demonstration and the 
Medicare Competition Demonstration. 
Recognizing that the provisions of Section 1 876 was not attractive to HMOs, 
eight HMOs in five market areas were solicited in 1 978 to participate in Medicare 
Capitation Demonstration and began enrolling Medicare beneficiaries in 1 980 (Rossiter, 
et aI . ,  1 985). TEFRA's 95% of AAPCC approach arises from these eight demonstration 
projects (Rossiter, et aI . ,  1 985). 
In the spring of 1 982, HCF A started the National Medicare Competition (NMC) 
demonstration and 21 organizations in 12 market areas were first awarded risk contracts 
(Rossiter, et al . ,  1 985). The first demonstration plans began enrolling Medicare 
beneficiaries in August 1 982. Only two HMOs from the Medicare capitation 
demonstration participated in the NMC (Adamache and Rossiter, 1 986). Additional 
organizations were granted permission in 1 984 and 1 985 and a total of 52 organizations 
were approved as demonstration plans. In the NMC demonstrations, HMOs operated 
under an 85% AAPCC contract and absorbed any loss as well as kept any savings. 
Before completing the evaluation of the demonstrations, especially the 
reimbursement methods, Congress enacted new legislation to legitimize prospective risk 
contracting with HMOs and competitive medical plans (CMPs) (Nycz, Wenzel, 
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Freisinger, & Lewis, 1 987) . Without a full evaluation of these early demonstrations, it 
was not clear whether HMOs actually saved Medicare any money. Operational 
demonstrations were notified that they would have to convert to the provisions of TEFRA 
after the enactment of the legislation. Section 1 1 4 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1 982 became effective in April 1 985 and authorized the 
current Medicare risk program. The delayed implementation of this policy was due to the 
concern of Reagan administration over short-term costs attached to the technical 
difficulties in determining reimbursement rates.  The short term inflationary issue was 
whether or not to convert to a risk contract from an existing HMO cost contract for which 
the reimbursement rate was below that of the risk-based level (Nycz, et al . ,  1 987) . 
Description of Medicare Risk Program 
The current Medicare risk program, which became operational in April 1 985 
under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1 982 (TEFRA), allowed all 
federally qualified HMOs and CMPs to participate in risk contracting for Medicare 
beneficiaries, provided that the plans satisfy the HCF A requirements. Before TEFRA, 
only federally qualified HMOs could sign Medicare contracts (Zarabozo & LeMasurier, 
1 993). Requirements for federal qualification include (Wrightson, 1 990, pp. 27-29) : (a) a 
contractual relationship between medical providers and the HMO, (b) designation of 
mandatory and optional health services, (c) community rating, (d) permissible cost-
sharing features, (e) allowable organizational forms, (f) quality assurance programs, and 
(g) financial solvency and fiscal soundness. 
1 7  
CMPs are state licensed organizations that are similar to HMOs but lack federal 
qualification. One major difference that distinguishes the CMP option from federally 
qualified HMOs is the level at which services can be provided through noncontracting 
providers. A CMP is required to provide at least 5 1  % of the services defined under 
HCF A policy through its contracting providers, and it allows preferred provider 
organizations to be CMPs (Zarabozo & LeMasurier, 1 993). Under the 1 988 HMO Act 
amendments, a federally qualified HMO is allowed to provide up to 1 0% of physician 
services outside the HMO, or through enrollee self-referral options. Additionally, 
experience-rated premiums, copayments, and deductibles imposed on beneficiaries are 
permitted for CMPs (Iglehart, 1 985). A federally qualified HMO, in contrast, may only 
charge copayments and deductibles for 1 0% of out-of-plan physician services. For the 
purpose of this study, the term HMO refers to both federally qualified HMOs and CMPs. 
Under the current Medicare risk program, HMOs offer a minimum package of 
full-service benefits normally covered by Medicare, which precludes a beneficiary 
incurring Medicare's  copayments and deductibles. The HMO receives a capitation 
payment consisting of 95% of the adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC) of serving 
fee-for-service beneficiaries in the same market county. Enrollment is strictly voluntary. 
Medicare beneficiaries can drop out of HMOs and return to the FFS sector at any time 
with 30 days notice. HMOs market the Medicare risk plans to individual beneficiaries. 
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HMOs are not permitted to prescreen beneficiaries' health status, and an individual HMO 
must charge all Medicare enrollees the same monthly premium. Each HMO may set the 
monthly premium that it charges enrollees as low as it likes, but the premium may not 
exceed an HMO's cost of covering Medicare deductibles and coinsurance plus the cost of 
any additional benefit covered by the plan beyond those covered by Medicare. Premiums 
must be approved by the HCF A. 
Medicare risk contracting offers HMOs a broad access to the elderly market on a 
very rapid basis .  The most impressive feature of HMOs is that they manage care. The 
elderly definitely need medical management. Participating in risk contracting has 
accelerated the development of comprehensive, coordinated HMO utilization control 
programs for the elderly (Hurley and Bannick, 1 993). The "forced" strengthening of the 
delivery system for the elderly would have a positive spillover into the whole HMO 
operation, such as referral management systems, utilization review systems, long-term 
care, and quality assurance mechanisms. Entering the Medicare market also provides 
HMOs an opportunity to expand and provide services that the elderly need. Incorporating 
with their non-Medicare business, HMOs could enjoy the economies of scale. An 
HMO's  income per member per month for the elderly may be four times that of the 
under-65 population providing financial appeal for the Medicare risk program, (Bell, 
1 987). Combining HCF A pre-payments and member premiums, there may be significant 
cash flow benefits to HMOs. An HMO's  image and publicity in the community as well 
as its negotiating power could be enhanced. An HMO that achieves a 1 5  to 20% 
Medicare market penetration should clearly be able to maximize its negotiating 
effectiveness (Bell, 1 987). 
In spite of the positive aspects, HMOs that participate in Medicare risk program 
lose control over benefit coverage, payment, profit retention, and enrollment growth. 
Medicare risk contracting requires that HMOs behave quite differently than they do in 
providing services to employee groups. The covered benefits are determined largely by 
HCF A, not through negotiations. The payment rates (AAPCC) are based on Medicare 
costs in the FFS sector, not on an HMO's experience. HMOs have no control over 
HCFA's payment, though they can charge a premium to support additional benefits 
provided. Actual payments to the HMO vary according to the individual enrollee's 
county of residence and personal risk factors (age, gender, reason for entitlement to 
Medicare, whether residing in a nursing home, and whether covered by Medicaid) 
defined by HCF A. 
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HCF A also requires that HMOs limit their Medicare enrollment to not more than 
half of their total enrollment. To be able to participate the Medicare risk program, an 
HMO must have at least 5 ,000 commercial enrollees, or 5 ,000 in a parent corporation and 
1 ,000 enrolled in the subdivision or subsidiary. If serving a rural area, 1 ,500 commercial 
enrollees have to be enrolled. In addition, HMOs must have an annual open enrollment 
period of at least 30 consecutive days for Medicare beneficiaries to reconsider enrollment 
in that organization. During an open enrollment period, HMOs have to enroll any 
Medicare beneficiary who resides in the HMO' s  service areas and is eligible for 
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enrollment. In one of following three circumstances may HMOs waive open enrollment 
requirement (Zarabozo & LeMasurier, 1 993): 
1 .  The HMO would exceed 50% of MedicarelMedicaid enrollment. 
2. The HMO would enroll a disproportionate percentage of beneficiaries in a specific 
AAPCC cell. 
3. The HMO does not have capacity to deliver service to any more members, either 
commercial or Medicare enrollees. 
Participating HMOs are not allowed to earn a higher rate of return on their 
Medicare risk plan than on their non-Medicare business. Otherwise, HMOs are required 
to add benefits, reduce monthly premiums to offset the surplus, return the excess to 
HCFA, or choose some combination of these options. Retainable profit from serving 
Medicare beneficiaries is regulated through adjusted community rate (ACR) regulations. 
The community rate is the premium charged for a commercial group. The ACR is a 
projected premium, or financial requirement for providing the same Medicare covered 
benefits to a community rated group, adjusted for the higher utilization and expenditures 
by Medicare enrollees relative to commercial enrollees (Zarabozo & LeMasurier, 1 993) .  
The ACR calculation includes the normal profit of a for-profit HMO. 
The HCF A's primary goal in establishing the risk program was to reduce 
Medicare costs by attracting HMOs to manage coverage of the elderly. The HCFA also 
pursued to provide more efficient health care while maintaining the quality of care 
(Brown, Bergeron, Clement, Hill, & Retchin, 1 993). The HCFA hoped that costs in the 
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FFS sector would decrease as more Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs. One 
recent study by Health Policy Economics Group ( 1 995) documented that the Medicare 
FFS cost per capita declined as the Medicare risk HMO penetration increased. It is 
apparent that the success of the Medicare risk program will rely largely on the eagerness 
of HMOs to enter into and maintain their risk contracts with Medicare (Porell and 
Wallack, 1 990). 
The HMO industry has responded with caution and concern to the opportunities 
and risks associated with Medicare participation. Nonrenewals of participating plans 
reflects this hesitancy (McCurren, 1 99 1 ) . The reliability of the public sector to pay an 
adequate rate for services covered is also questionable (Newhouse, 1 989). Another 
related negative of Medicare risk contracting is the growing "public sector risk factor" 
(Bell, 1 987), that is, what Congress will do if forced to reduce Medicare costs is highly 
unpredictable. Furthermore, the most significant assumption of risk is for inpatient 
utilization. If inpatient utilization is not effectively controlled, an HMO could find itself 
in serious financial trouble. 
Since 1 986 there had been early rapid growth in the number of HMOs 
participating in the Medicare risk program (see Figure 2). However, the initial growth 
after the TEFRA legislation was followed by a drop in the number of HMOs in Medicare 
risk contracts. There were more HMOs discontinuing their Medicare risk contracts than 
HMOs entering into new contracts by the end of the decade of the 1 980s (Porell & 
Tompkins, 1 993). This decline has been attributable to low AAPCC rates and adverse 
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selecting experienced by HMOs with Medicare risk contracts (Porell & Tompkins, 1 993) .  
Beginning in 1 993, the HMO industry has regained interest in entering into a Medicare 
risk market, though the concern about the AAPCC payment method remained unsolved. 
Purpose of the Present Study 
Most of the health services research on Medicare risk contracting has focused on 
whether risk plans achieved HCFA's objectives (for example, Brown, Bergeron, Clement, 
et aI . ,  1 993;  Carlisle, et aI . ,  1 992; Clement, Retchin, Brown, & Stegall, 1 994); why 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in or disenrolled from risk plans (for example, Dowd, et 
aI . ,  1 994; Feinson, Hansell, & Mechanic, 1 988 ;  Sofaer & Hurwicz, 1 993); whether 
Medicare beneficiaries were satisfied with risk plans (for example, Boles & Wan, 1 992; 
Rossiter, Langwell, Wan, & Rivnyak, 1 989); and whether risk plans experienced 
favorable or adverse selection (for example, Davidson, Sofaer, & Gertler, 1 992; Porell & 
Turner, 1 990; Riley, Rabey, & Kasper, 1 989). Reimbursement reform has also been 
widely discussed (for example, Anderson, et aI . ,  1 990; Dowd, Christianson, Feldman, 
Wisner, & Weiner, 1 992; Lichtenstein & Thomas, 1 987; Rossiter, Chiu, & Chen, 1 994). 
Relatively few studies that address the issue of why HMOs enter into or leave a Medicare 
market have been published (for example, Adamache & Rossiter, 1986 ; Porell & 
Tompkins, 1 993 ; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). 
Due to the environmental change that continues to occur, the relevance of these 
studies that analyze data collected in 1 985 or before the time period of the proliferation of 
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HMOs is not clear. Both the general health care industry and the HMO market have 
undergone dramatic changes. The competitive structure of the HMO market has changed 
as a result of growth in the number of HMOs and HMO enrollment (Christianson, 
Sanchez, Wholey, & Shadle, 1 99 1 ) . The factors that favor the entry of HMOs into 
Medicare market in the 1 990s differ from those in the 1 980s. In addition, prior studies 
have not explained HMO's  market entry from a perspective of organizational theories. 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the determinants of the new entry of an 
HMO into a Medicare risk contract utilizing resource dependence and diversification 
perspectives. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed: 
1 .  Given a certain level of environmental resources and HMO attributes, how does 
market structure affect the participation of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract? 
2. Given certain market structure and HMO attributes, how does munificence of 
environmental resources affect the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk market? 
3 .  To what extent is the market entry of HMOs sensitive to the variation in 
AAPCC rate? 
Conceptual Model 
The entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract can be rationalized from a 
resource dependence perspective. Resource dependence theory proposes that an 
organization has to interact with the environment in order to generate resources necessary 
for survival. One response that the organization adopts is diversification. The 
perspective of resource dependence is useful in explaining why an organization 
diversifies into a market in which the loss of autonomy is inevitable. 
Resource dependence argues that an organization's  dependence is related to 
importance, availability, and concentration of the resources. A dependence situation 
encourages diversification. A general model of diversification categorizes factors that 
influence a diversification decision as a strategic response to resource dependence into 
three groups: resources in the general environment, competitive market structure, and 
organizational attributes. 
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Based on resource dependence-diversification arguments, a conceptual model is 
developed in this analysis to explain why an HMO diversifies into a Medicare risk market 
in response to environmental munificence, competition, and organizational strengths. As 
shown in Figure 8, HMO market entry is examined by four groups of variables: (a) 
competitive market structure; (b) resources in the general environment; (c) market price; 
and (d) firm characteristics. 
Significance of the Present Study 
This investigation differs from previous studies on the entry of an HMO into a 
Medicare risk contract in four areas: theoretical framework, measurement of independent 
variables, study design, and market definition. 
Studies conducted in the 1 980s (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 
1 990) employed an economic model to examine the entry of an HMO into a Medicare 
risk contract. In contrast, this study examines the market entry from a resource 
dependence-diversification perspective. This organizational framework helps identify 
theoretical dimensions which are important to a market entry decision. Moreover, 
variables with better measurement is solicited based on the theoretical framework. 
Local Market Environment 
Competitive Market Structure 
Market Price 
General Environment: 
Resources Availability .. 
���------t� Firm Characteristics I 
Diversification Decision: 
Entry into a Medicare risk Contract 
Figure 8. Simplified Conceptual Model: the Entry of HMOs into a Medicare Risk 
Contract. 
One major limitation of prior studies (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & 
Wallack, 1 990) exists in the employment of the cross-sectional study design. A cross-
sectional design is subject to endogeneity bias which confounds the internal validity of 
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study results. Another limitation is the inclusion of HMOs that either start or renew their 
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Medicare risk contracts, resulting in a dissimilar study sample. This "indifferent" 
inclusion of HMOs might be due to a relatively small number of new market entrants by 
its nature. Recognizing these weaknesses in prior studies, the present study employs a 
panel design to verify cause-effect relationships. In addition, the study sample is more 
homogeneous, since only HMOs that did not have a Medicare risk contract at time one 
are included. The separation of new market entrants from renewing HMOs is feasible 
without compromising the statistical power to some extent because of the increased 
number of the initial market entrants since 1 993 . 
The present study also differs from prior empirical work in market definition. 
HMO market was defined as county (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986) or Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) (Porell & Wallack, 1 990). Both definitions may either understate 
or overstate the market that an HMO serves. In this analysis, an HMO's market is 
defined as all counties served by the HMO. The definition of service areas as an HMO' s  
market may better approximate the HMO's true market area. 
The results of this study may have several implications. Research on Medicare 
risk contracting has not focused on what motivates an HMO's  entry into this market. The 
few empirical studies that addressed this issue in the 1 980s suffer certain methodological 
weaknesses (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Tompkins, 1 993 ; Porell & Wallack, 
1 990). This research proposes to enhance an understanding of the determinants of the 
entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract. This information is important from the 
HCF A's perspective, since realizing what determines the Medicare HMO market entry 
will help shape policy that could encourage broader HMO participation in the TEFRA 
program. The information is also important to those HMOs considering the option to 
risk contract with the HCFA for coverage of the elderly. 
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This analysis is timely. Since the implementation of risk contracting in 1 985 ,  
HMOs demonstrated a fluctuating interest in  Medicare coverage. The number of  
Medicare risk HMOs steadily declined after an initial offering and began to  increase in 
1 993 . The factors behind a market entry decision in a managed care era of the 1 990s may 
differ from those in a time when managed care still struggled for its legitimacy. This 
analysis will compare and contrast results from studies done in the 1 980s and 1 990s. 
Finally, this analysis expands upon previous studies and adds to the theoretical 
understanding of HMOs' market entry. It empirically operationalizes a resource 
dependence-diversification framework in HMO research and demonstrates the utility of 
the organizational theory in describing HMO behavior. 
Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
This chapter has defined the concepts of a health maintenance organization, 
provided the background of the HMO movement, and historically traced Medicare HMO 
contracting since the 1 970s. It also has described risk contracting of HMOs with the 
HCFA for coverage of the elderly u.S .  population. It has briefly introduced the purpose 
and significance of the analysis of determinants of new market entry for Medicare risk 
contracting. 
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Chapter 2 reviews and critiques the literature on HMO development and the entry 
of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract. Studies on the supportiveness of three 
stakeholders (buyers, payers, and suppliers) for HMO growth are summarized. Chapter 3 
first develops a resource dependence framework and conceptualization of environmental 
resources. A modified diversification paradigm from Ramanujam and Varadarajan's  
work ( 1 989) is  then illustrated. A review of the literature on organizational 
diversification is also presented. A conceptual model and hypotheses based on these 
theoretical deliberations are proposed for examining an HMO's  new market entry 
considering four categories of determinants. 
Chapter 4 describes the methods that will be used to assess the determinants of the 
new entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. Chapter 5 presents the results of this 
analysis. Chapter 6 summarizes the study results with regard to hypothesis testing. 
Implications from this analysis are then explored. Finally, limitations of this study and 
directions for future studies are discussed. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are relatively few studies that address the issues of why HMOs enter into a 
particular market and what influences their subsequent growth. Even fewer studies 
examine the determinants of an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk contract. These earlier 
studies vary in terms of their analytical approaches, unit of analysis, definition of HMO 
market, and research focus. They also span the period from the early 1 970s to the late 
1 980s during which the overall health care industry and the legislative climate facing the 
HMO sector have witnessed tremendous changes. It appears important to link 
background information on HMO related legislation and policies to HMO studies at 
corresponding points in time. Regulatory history of the HMO movement was described 
in Chapter 1 .  This chapter will summarize previous studies on HMO development and 
HMO's market entry. Literature on the importance of stakeholders to HMO development 
will also be reviewed. 
Literature on HMO Development 
McNeil and Schlenker ( 1 975) examined the importance of market conditions in 
influencing HMO growth during the period of 1 970- 1 973 period. Compared to states 
without HMOs, states with HMOs had higher mean family income, larger total and 
urbanized population, more physician per capita, higher hospital costs per day and per 
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capita, and greater insurance expenditure. However, these results from the descriptive 
statistics cannot be conclusive. At the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) 
level, regression analysis indicated that SMSA population size and hospital expenses per 
day were significantly and positively associated with the probability of new HMO 
formation in an SMSA. In a quite qualitative manner they concluded that favorable 
federal policy encouraged HMO development during the 1 970- 1 973 period, but state 
regulations were generally unimportant. In their survey of operational HMOs, HMO 
administrators cited factors they perceived as significant barriers to HMO's formation 
and growth, including gaining access to employer and other potential member group, 
obtaining financial support, provider opposition, and expanding physician staff. 
In examining why federal granted organizations in the early 70s terminated HMO 
development activities, Strumpf and Garramone ( 1 976) summarized 12 studies and found 
that most frequently mentioned conditions as the essential requirement for the 
development of prepaid plans were an adequate population base, a favorable legal 
environment, provider availability, sufficient capital for planning and early operational 
deficits, and physician support and community receptivity. Though the significance of 
the descriptive information from studies in 1 970s is far from decisive without empirical 
support, it provides a sound starting point to investigate employing more sophisticated 
analysis. 
Goldberg and Greenberg ( 1 9 8 1 )  analyzed why HMO enrollment and growth 
varied greatly among states. The unit of analysis was state, with which the problem of 
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low degrees of freedom could not be avoided. Two types of factors were examined: 
market and legal conditions. Market factors included economic and demographic 
variables that affected the demand and supply of HMO services. Legal conditions that 
might have hindered the development of HMOs were reflected by six state-specific 
policies regarding the governing body of HMOs, form of HMOs, regulation of reserves 
and capital, employment of physicians, prohibition of advertising, coverage of HMOs 
under certificate of need. The results from a Tobit analysis supported the hypotheses that 
a high proportion of transit population who changed county of residence was associated 
with high HMO market share as well as positive growth of HMO market share. Greater 
union strength, measured by unions as a percentage of nonagricultural employment, was 
also associated with greater HMO development. Cost per episode of hospital care was 
consistently found to impose a significant, positive effect on HMO development. The 
assertion that the existence of extensive group practices facilitated HMO development 
was partially supported. None of legal conditions were found to be statistically 
important. 
Built on Goldberg and Greenberg' s  work that state regulation had little or no 
effect on HMO enrollment and growth, Morrisey and Ashby ( 1 982) turned attention to 
the effects of market condition in determining the presence of an HMO in 1 978, using 
several data bases for the years from 1 975 to 1 979. For the linear probability model that 
estimated the presence of an HMO, three of 1 6  variables were significant at the 95% 
confidence level. The proportions of physicians aged 45-64 as a proxy measure of 
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physician opposition to  HMO development had a negative coefficient as  predicted. It 
was hypothesized that physicians with well-established practices would lose most from 
the development of alternative delivery modes and thus strive to prevent HMOs from 
entering into the market. Population size in the SMSA was positively associated with 
HMO formation, since the probability of attracting sufficient enrollees to cover cost 
increased. The demand for HMO service was expected to be associated with the low 
income level if HMOs were inferior goods. Not as expected, per capita income had a 
positive effect on HMO development. It was hypothesized that large net migration and 
high physician/population ratio resulted in a greater probability of HMO development. 
However, these two variables were found to have negative, though not significant, 
coefficients. Along with the observation that the coefficient magnitude for two variables, 
percentage of employers with 250 or more employees and physician-population ratio, is 
small relative to their corresponding standard error, multicollinearity is speculated on, but 
was not addressed by Morrisey and Ashby. 
Cromley and Shannon ( 1 983) employed discriminant analysis to assess 
characteristics of SMSAs developing HMO from the period of initial federal involvement 
in 1 972 through 1 980. Presence of a medical school, binary geographic variable (one for 
Northeast, North, Central, Middle Atlantic, or Pacific census region), and SMSA 
population size were the most significant variables positively associated with new HMO 
establishment in SMSAs. The presence of a medical school was perceived as an indicator 
of availability of needed manpower and facilities; binary geographic variables indicated 
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legislative attitude toward health care regulation. Population to  physician ratio and 
presence of HMOs in the SMSA prior to 1 972 both had moderate influence on HMO 
development and carried expected signs. The former had a negative effect and could be 
considered as a measure of either resource richness or competition among physicians; the 
latter factor might reflect community receptivity, or information for spatial development 
of HMOs. 
Welch ( 1 984) employed an econometric model to estimate the determinants of the 
existence of prepaid group practice (PGP) and the enrollment size of prepaid group 
practices in a given SMSA from 1 976- 1 980. For the equation that estimated the 
probability for an SMSA to have an enrollment of at least 5 ,000, the Probit analysis 
indicated that population size (p < 0.05) and median years of education (p < 0. 1 )  were 
positively associated with observing a viable enrollment level; per capita income (p < 
0. 1 )  imposed a negative effect. For the enrollment equation, ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimates suggested that enrollment level be a positive function of education and hospital 
cost per day, and a negative function of income. One can argue that PGP enrollees faced 
a tradeoff between the limited choice of physicians and the lower price of PGPs. Since 
the freedom to choose one's  physician was assumed to be a normal good, higher income 
enabled consumers to stay in the fee-for-service sector. Education might enhance a 
consumer' s  comprehension of HMOs as a novel, uncommon alternative and thus increase 
the probability of PGP joining. State regulations were generally insignificant except the 
prohibition of the direct employment of physicians. This regulation denied the staff 
model and put restrictions on the group model. 
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Along with the line of income effect, immigrants would incur higher costs in 
searching physicians than long-time residents and might be more likely to join PGPs 
(Welch, 1 984); however, the result was opposite to what was expected. A weak 
explanation was provided that net immigration was correlated with some excluded factors 
and length of residence was a better predictor of enrollment decisions. It was not clear 
how immigrants were defined: those who changed their residence within America (in­
migrants) or those who migrated into their current residence from outside America 
(immigrants). One limitation of this study was that the study HMOs only included viable 
PGPs that had at least an enrollment level of 5 ,000, since the research interest was the 
formation of semi-permanent organizations that were less likely to fail than were small 
PGPs. No individual practice associations (lPAs) were included. External validity was 
lessened. 
Under the 1 973 HMO Act, 20% of the Office of Health Maintenance 
Organization's  budget was set for HMO development in rural areas. By 1 979, 42 rural 
projects were granted funding; 22 of these projects failed to develop further. To explain 
the lack of availability of HMOs in rural areas, Christianson, Shadle, Hunter, Hartwell, 
and McGee ( 1 986) established a framework identifying several barriers to rural HMO 
development in 1 970s, including inability to acquire start-up financing, opposition of 
rural physicians, inability to contain costs, and limited population in rural areas. Based 
on the framework, these scholars undertook an intensive case study of seven HMOs 
serving rural areas in an attempt to understand the increasing availability of HMOs in 
rural areas since 1 980. 
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The perception o f  rural hospitals that urban HMOs attracted rural emollees to use 
urban hospitals facilitated rural hospitals '  sponsorship of rural HMOs which were 
identified as one approach to protect their patient base (Christianson, et a! . ,  1 986). Along 
with the HMOs' effort to gain cooperation, or to reduce the hostility of rural physicians, a 
sense of competition from urban physicians undermined the historical reluctance of rural 
physicians who participated in an HMO in order to control patient flow. 
Despite several general approaches to develop a positive community image that 
enhanced the potential for HMO emollment, the relatively limited population and a small 
number of large employers in the rural areas remained a natural limitation on emollment 
(Christianson, et a! . ,  1 986). To achieve a financially viable emollment level, all of the 
rural HMOs in this study offered Medicare supplemental policies, but they were cautious 
about entering into any contract with the HCFA. 
Consumers, employer groups, and providers (hospitals and physicians) were 
critical of rural HMO development. A perception of competition among providers 
facilitated their participation in rural HMOs (Christianson, et aI . ,  1 986). Though the 
study rural HMOs were not representative of all rural HMOs or HMO universe, findings 
from this case study can be viewed as interpretive and hypothesis generating. 
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In  studying how hospital expenses influenced HMO development, McLaughlin 
( 1 987) critiqued that previous studies on this issue were subject to endogeneity bias, since 
they adopted single-equation specification assuming that HMO activities did not affect 
hospital expenses. The author applied a two-stage least-square simultaneous-equation 
technique to five models; each of five models had the same set of predictors except an 
unique variable measuring hospital expenses. The unit of observation was the SMSA. 
Of five hospital expense variables, three were found to impose negative effect on 
HMO growth; of those three, hospital expenses per capita and hospital admission rates 
were significant at the 0.95 confidence level. Average area length of stay was positively 
associated with HMO growth. As to physician supply, increased HMO growth was 
associated with a higher level of patient care physicians per 1 ,000 population and a lower 
percentage of patient care physicians who were specialists. Two other variables on 
education level and size of elderly population had positive relationships with HMO 
growth (McLaughlin, 1 987). 
Due to data availability, the study sample consisted of 25 SMSAs that were 
exclusively large by population size. Thus, the study results might not be generalized to 
smaller SMSAs. Though pooling annual data from 1 972 to 1 982 yields a sufficient 
sample size, model overfitting was still highly possible because of the large number of 
predictors ( 1 5  variables plus 24 dummy variables). In addition, data pooling raised a 
technical concern, that is, multicollinearity for predictors measured over the I I -year time 
period, and which might be manifested by the larger standard error estimate relative to 
the corresponding regression coefficient estimates for some predictors. 
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Wholey, Christianson, and Sanchez ( 1 990) questioned the policy relevance of the 
studies (Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 ;  McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975; Welch, 1 984) on the 
effect of state regulation because the time period covered predated the dramatic changes 
that occurred in the HMO industry during the 1 980s. In their study covering the years of 
1 982 through 1 988, they used a Probit analysis to estimate the effects of state regulations 
on the probability that an HMO entered or exited a community. Among the six 
regulatory factors, only one factor (employers required to offer HMOs) was found to be 
significantly and positively related to the probability of both market entry and exit. 
Community factors such as MSA population and large establishments per capita also had 
positive effects on market entry/exit. Physician resistance, measured by population per 
physician, discouraged HMO formation. 
Summary of Literature on HMO Development 
These previous studies tend to define the MSA as the HMO market and then treat 
MSA as the unit of analysis. They either do not distinguish HMO development by model 
type (Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 ;  McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975;  Morrisey & Ashby, 
1982) or only focus on prepaid group practices (PGP) (McLaughlin, 1 987; Welch, 1984). 
There is lack of attention to HMO market entry by model type, though some effort has 
been made to examine HMO failures by model type in a descriptive manner 
(Christianson, Wholey, & Sanchez, 1 99 1 ;  Feldman, et al. ,  1 995) or in an analytical way 
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(Christianson, Sanchez, et aI. ,  1 99 1 ;  Wholey, Christianson, & Sanchez, 1 992) . A s  to 
HMO's  market entry and market share, the significance of some factors is consistently 
found across the studies. As Table 1 indicates, a large population base, education, and 
community receptivity are positively associated with HMO development; state regulation 
appears to have no significant influence (Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 ;  McNeil & 
Schlenker, 1 975; Welch, 1 984) or have contradictory effects (Wholey, et aI . ,  1 990). 
Other variables such as income, physician-population ratio, migrant population, and 
hospital costs generate mixed results. Multicollinearity among predictors and model 
overfitting may lead to insignificant coefficients for some variables. In addition, 
employment of a cross-sectional design is subject to "endogeneity bias", which 
confounds the validity of study results. Moreover, much unknown remains regarding 
HMO development in rural areas. 
Nonetheless, these early studies in the HMO sector provide a starting point of 
examining the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk market, especially with respect to the 
importance of environmental resources. Two groups of variables that are frequently 
excluded from the HMO growth literature are HMO organizational attributes and HMO 
competitive market structure, probably because of their irrelevance to research interest 
that focuses on the establishment of a new HMO and the nature of relatively new or 
immature HMO market. Also, the importance of employer groups on HMO development 
has not been considered substantially significant nor empirically proved in the 1 970s and 
early 1 980s (McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982), but received some support 
from a study in the late 1 980s (Wholey, et aI . ,  1 990). As will be discussed below, the 
propelling force that urges the growth of managed care since the 1 980s is employers. 
Table I 
Summary: Resources Important to HMO Development and Growth 
Population 
Education 
Income 
Provider 
Medical 
school 
Population size (+) 
(Christianson, et a! . ,  1 986; Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ; McNeil & 
Schlenker, 1 975;  Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984; Wholey, et ai, 
1 990) 
% population nonwhite (0), female (+, 0) or black (-) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982) 
% population aged 65 or over (0, +) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982) 
Net migration (+, - , 0) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984) 
% of population not changing county of residence (-) 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 9 8 1 )  
Median years o f  education (+), % o f  high school graduate (+) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; Welch, 1 984) 
Per capita income (+, - , 0) 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 
1 982; Welch, 1 984; Wholey, et a! . ,  1 990) 
% of physicians aged 45-64 (-) 
(Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982) 
Physicians-population ratio (+, 0), % specialists (-) 
(Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ; McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil & Schlenker, 
] 975; Wholey, et a], 1 990) 
Percentage of patient-care physicians in group practice (+, 0) 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 9 8 1 )  
Presence o f  medical school (+) 
(Cromley & Shannon, 1 983) 
3 9  
Table I (continued) 
Summary: Resources Important to HMO Development and Growth 
Bed-population ratio (+) 
(Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982) 
Employment % employers with 250 or more workers (0), large employers per capita(+) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Wholey, et aI. , 1 990) 
Union 
Unemployment rate (0) 
(McLaughlin, 1 987) 
Unions as a percentage of nonagricultural employment (+) 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 )  
4 0  
Health care Hospital costs per diem (+, -), cost per episode (+) admission rate (-), LOS cost 
(+), insurance expenditure (+) 
1m itation or 
receptivity 
Legal 
Unit of 
analysis 
Dependent 
variable 
(McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil  & Schlenker, 1 975;  Welch, 1 984) 
HMO presence (+), age of oldest HMO (+) 
(Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ; McNeil  & Schlenker, 1 975;  Morrisey & 
Ashby, 1 982) 
State policies (+, 0) 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 ;  McNei l  & Schlenker, 1 975;  Welch, 1 984) 
SMSA 
(Cromley & Shannon, 1 983;  McLaughlin, 1 987; McNei l  & Schlenker, 
1 975; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984; Wholey, et aI., 1 990) 
State 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 1 )  
HMO presence 
(Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984) 
Number of new HMOs established 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 98 I ;  Wholey, et aI., 1 990) 
HMO market share, change in market share of HMOs; enrollment size 
(Goldberg & Greenberg, 198 I ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 
1 982; Welch, 1 984) 
Note . + indicates positive results; - indicates negative results; 0 indicates no association. 
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Literature on the Entry o f  HMOs into a Medicare Risk Contract 
Rossiter et al. ( 1 985) examined, in an anecdotal and descriptive manner, the 
strategies adopted by 2 1  demonstration HMOs for Medicare market. Noted by HMO 
managers, being the first entrant into the Medicare market was a worthy consideration. 
However, there existed two primary concerns. First, the Medicare population was not 
familiar with the HMO concept. Second, the elderly had established strong ties with their 
fee-for-service physicians. Demonstration HMOs considered Medicare supplemental 
insurance offered by traditional insurers, especially Blue Cross and Blue Shield, as a very 
important competitive force. Compared to traditional Medicare supplemental insurance, 
demonstration HMOs tended to offer expanded benefits at a lower premium and reduced 
cost sharing. In addition to competing with traditional Medicare supplemental insurers, 
demonstration HMOs in the same market also competed among themselves on generosity 
of benefits and premiums. These scholars concluded that it was difficult for a 
demonstration HMO not to model itself after the most generous benefit package already 
available in the market. 
Ellwood ( 1 986) provided descriptive information on HMOs participating in 
demonstrations. It was found possible that risk enrollees switched, or "rolled over" from 
employed members to Medicare beneficiaries in the same health plan, and Medicare 
enrollees switched to risk option because it was less expensive for them. In addition, 
participating health plans tended to be established with a strong commitment to serving 
health care consumers. 
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In examination of the National Medicare Competition (NMC) demonstration 
experience, Adamache and Rossiter ( 1 986) applied a behavioral market entry equation to 
assess the determinants of an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk market. In addition to 
market and demographic characteristics that were often considered important in previous 
studies on HMO development and growth, they incorporated HMO's organizational and 
operational characteristics into three Probit models with somewhat different specification. 
The unit of analysis was the individual HMO and market was defined as the county 
where an HMO's main office was located. Regardless of the model specification, the 
AAPCC rate and the proportion of population aged 65 or over always had positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. Prior Medicare experience was also consistently 
positive (p < 0. 1 ) . The overall accuracy rate of prediction ranged from 62.6% to 79.4 %.  
To study factors related to enrollment success one year after the risk contracts 
were implemented, Harrington, Newcomer, and Moore ( 1 988) conducted interviews in 
1 986 with 16 HMOs with risk contracts in the four areas: Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. 
Paul, New York, and Portland, Oregon. It was reported by IPA HMOs that a large 
number of associated physicians offered greater geographical distribution, that is, a wider 
range of options to attract purchasing groups and individual seniors, and provided a core 
element in their advertising. Large, well-established multi specialty group practices were 
primarily targeted since they already served many patients, and some of whom could 
switch to HMO membership. 
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HMOs reported that they were able to retain members enrolled before their 
retirement, since relationships with HMOs and physicians had been established 
(Harrington, et a! . ,  1 988). HMOs with large commercial enrollment benefited from 
greater name recognition and word-of-mouth advertising. Plan longevity was also often 
used to denote security to the elderly. HMOs with early demonstration projects tended to 
have larger risk enrollments probably because they had more marketing experience with 
seniors. As indicated by HMOs or consumer representatives, the distinction between 
non-for-profit and proprietary ownership was not crucial in marketing HMO risk products 
to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Either large metropolitan or state-wide areas were defined by almost all of the 
HMOs as in which to develop risk markets. Large service areas provided access to large 
employed and retiree groups. Risk contract HMOs usually set their premiums below 
those of Medicare supplemental insurance policies in the area in 1 986 (Harrington, et a! . ,  
1 988) .  The consensus was that price was a major factor for the elderly selecting a health 
plan. This price competition may have led to the perception that HMOs identified 
Medicare supplemental insurance carriers as their primary competitors. 
Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) examined the determinants of an HMO's  entry into a 
Medicare risk contract in 1 985,  the first operational year of the TEFRA program. HMO 
market areas were defined as metropolitan statistical areas. Nonmetropolitan markets 
were defined as the major county of HMO non-risk contract operation. In the first model 
that included 372 TEFRA-period entrants and excluded 38 pre-TEFRA entrants, HMO 
44 
market entry was a positive function of total HMO enrollment size, prior Medicare 
experiences, wage-adjusted AAPCC and a negative function of HMO age, HMO market 
growth rates, and percentage of population aged 65 or over who were below the poverty 
level . The competitive market structure, defined as HMO market share and Herfindahl 
Index, was moderately associated with HMO market entry (significant at the 0 . 1 level) . 
A large HMO market share was inversely related to the probability of a Medicare risk 
market entry, while a high Herfindahl Index of HMO concentration was positively related 
to the entry of a HMO into a Medicare risk contract. The second model that included 
both pre-TEFRA and TEFRA-period entrants generated similar results in terms of the 
effect of HMO attributes, market area attributes, and competitive market structure on a 
Medicare risk market entry. 
Porell and Wallack' s  models consisted of a comprehensive set of variables that 
were considered relevant to a market entry decision. The sample size was large relative 
to the number of independent variables in the model. The predictive accuracy was greater 
than 80% for nonentrants, but less than 50% for market entrants.  The overall model 
predictive accuracy was above 70%. A major limitation of their study is the adoption of a 
cross-section study design in which dependent and independent variables are measured at 
the same time point. One of three criteria that must be satisfied to establish a causal 
relationship is time ordering: causes must proceed effects in time. With regard to 
Medicare risk contracting, one can expect that it takes time for an HMO to reach a market 
entry decision, prepare legal documentations, and wait for the HCFA's approval. A study 
design in which the measurement of the dependent variable (i .e . ,  market entry) lags 
behind that of independent variables could better verify causal effects. 
In a study of why HMOs discontinued their Medicare risk contracts in 1 988 ,  
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Pore II and Tompkins ( 1 993) shifted attention to the effects of an HMO's  structure and 
financial performance in Medicare business on a non-renewal decision. The effects of 
market characteristics were not examined and not included in the models as control 
variables. It was found that two variables, percentage of disabled enrollees and a dummy 
variable of dropping drug benefit, was positively related to market exit. It was explained 
that prescription drug benefits attracted less healthy beneficiaries. The withdrawal of 
prescription drug benefits and eventually market exit reflected responses to perceived 
adverse selection. An HMO's  projected average payment rate (APR) was used to 
indicate the HMO's market entry AAPCC rate. A strong interaction term between the 
regional component dummy variable and AAPCC level was suggestive of a deficiency in 
the AAPCC level for market exit. 
The effective sample size of the Porell and Tompkin' s  study ( 1 993) was 125  
HMOs and 20 predictors were included in  the logit model. Model overfitting may 
explain why only four variables were statistically significant at the 1 0% or lower level .  
Irrespective of overfitting, the predictive accuracy was very high: 99% for renewed 
HMOs and 77% for discontinued HMOs. 
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Summary of Literature on the HMO's  Entrv into a Medicare Risk Contract 
Over the past ten years, although many studies have been done of the HMO risk 
market development and growth, little effort has been devoted to understanding an 
HMO's  decision to participate in the Medicare risk program. Empirical studies on 
Medicare market entry examine the significance of HMO attributes and HMO 
performance as well as competitive market structure, in addition to environmental factors 
on which early HMO development research places focus. These studies utilize the 
individual HMO as an unit of analysis. However, the definition of HMO market varies 
from county to state by study. Depicted in Table 2, an AAPCC rate is consistently found 
to impose a positive effect on market entry. Model type does not have distinguishing 
importance on the decision to risk contract. 
Due to inconsistency among prior studies in model specification, variable 
definition and measurement, the effect of other variables observed is not conclusive. 
Similar to studies on HMO development, one major limitation of market entry analysis 
results from the application of a cross-section study design. In addition, the "indifferent" 
inclusion of HMOs which either participate in Medicare risk program for the first time or 
renew their risk contracts leads to a somewhat dissimilar study sample. A limitation of 
all of these studies is an omission of variables measuring the effect of an HMO's  
performance in  a Medicare risk contract. Omission of  important variables would generate 
biased results. Thus, it would be better to separate initial contractors from renewing 
HMOs unless it can be proven that initial market entry and the decision to renew are 
influenced by similar factors. 
Table 2 
Summary: Factors Related to the Entry of HMOs into a Medicare Risk Market 
HMO Attributes 
Age Age (+, -, 0), less than 3 years (+) 
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(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Harrington, Newcomer, & Moore, 1 988;  Porell  & 
Tompkins, 1 993;  Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Size 
Model type 
Ownership 
Affiliation 
Other 
HMO enrollment (+, 0) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Dummy variables (0) 
(Adam ache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Tompkins, 1 993 ; Porell & Wallack, 
1 990) 
Profit status (0) 
(Adam ache & Rossiter, 1 986) 
Chain member (0), entry of central HMO of chain (+) 
(Pore II & Tompkins, 1 993 ; Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Any Medicare enrollees (+), federal qualification (+) 
(Adam ache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
HMO Performance 
Growth HMO net enrollment increase (0) 
(Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Revenue 
Util ization 
HMO net revenue PMPM (+) 
(Pore I I  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Hospital days per 1 ,000 members (-, 0), physician visits per enrollee (+, 0) 
(Adam ache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) 
Market Resource 
Population % population aged 65 or over (+) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986) 
Table 2 (continued) 
Summary: Factors Related to the Entry of HMOs into a Medicare Risk Market 
Income 
% white elderly (-, 0), elderly female (+,0), elderly black (-) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) 
Immigrant population aged 65 or over (+) 
(Porell & Wallack, 1 990) 
In-migrant per 1 ,000 population (0) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986) 
% aged population below poverty level (-) 
(Pore II & Wallack, 1 990) 
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Provider Physician per capita (-, 0), large group practice (descriptively reported) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Harrington, et a! . ,  1 988;  Porell & Wallack, 1 990) 
Receptivity Weighted average age of HMOs (-), non elderly HMO penetration (+), % growth 
in total HMO enrollment (-) 
(Pore II & Wallack, 1 990) 
Market Structure 
Market share Plan share of HMO market (-, 0) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Concentration Herfindahl Index of HMO concentration (+) 
(Porell & Wallack, 1 990) 
Market 
growth 
Medigap 
Market price 
Unit of 
analysis 
Definition 
of market 
HMO market growth rates (-) 
(Pore I I  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Medicare supplementary insurance (descriptively reported) 
(Harrington, et a! . ,  1 988;  Rossiter, et a! . ,  1 985;  Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Wage-adjusted AAPCC (+) 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Wallack, 1 990) 
Individual HMO (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell  & Tompkins, 1 993 ;  Porel l  
& Wallack, 1 990) 
County (Adam ache & Rossiter, 1 986); MSA (Harrington, et a!., 1988 ;  
Porell & Wallack, 1 990); state (Harrington, et  a! . ,  1 988) 
Note. + indicates positive results; - indicates negative results; 0 indicates no association. 
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Literature on HMO Enrollment: Stakeholder Analysis 
In developing a strategic vulnerability model for HMO analysis, Whitehead, Blair, 
Smith, and Savage ( 1 989) identified three types of stakeholders of HMOs:  buyers, payers, 
and suppliers. Buyer stakeholders are HMO enrollees as well as potential enrollees who 
are presently in the fee-for-service sector. Payer stakeholders include employers, federal 
government (Medicare HMOs), and state governments (Medicaid HMOs). Supplier 
stakeholders consist of physicians who are contracting with HMOs and those who are 
involved only in FFS practice. Support of stakeholders determines the strategic 
vulnerability of HMOs that depend on the relative strength of the market to survive. 
Early studies also descriptively confirm the significance of these stakeholders to HMO 
development (Christianson, et aI. ,  1 986; Morrisey, Gibson, & Ashby, 1 983 ; Office of 
Health Maintenance Organizations, 1 980). Thus, the following will focus on how these 
stakeholders influence HMO development. 
Buyer: Enrollment Decision by Medicare Beneficiaries 
This section on buyer stakeholders will review the literature on HMO enrollment 
choice by Medicare eligible elderly. In order to be successful in a Medicare risk market, 
Medicare HMOs have to attract Medicare beneficiaries who are entering retirement or in 
the FFS sector. To attract new enrollees, Medicare HMOs tend to provide a service 
spectrum beyond traditional Medicare insurance coverage and charge no additional 
premium for the basic option offered (Ellwood, 1 986). In 1 994, 56% of Medicare risk 
enrollees incurred zero additional premiums for HMO coverage. Medicare beneficiaries 
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are still assessed a premium for Part B coverage. Fifty percent of  risk contracts charge no 
additional premium (Health Care Financing Administration, 1 995). In addition, 96% of 
risk contracts provide routine physicals. Almost 50% of HMOs with risk contracts cover 
outpatient drugs. From the viewpoint of out-of-pocket expense and service coverage, 
Medicare risk HMOs act like "true" Medigap carriers. In reality, Medicare HMOs also 
perceive Medicare supplementary policies (Medigap), mainly Blue CrosslBlue Shield 
plans, as a primary competitive force (Feldman, Wisner, Dowd, & Christianson, 1 993 ; 
Harrington, et aI . ,  1 988;  Langwell, et aI. ,  1 987; Rossiter, et aI . ,  1 985), or vice versa 
(Clement, Brown, Retchin, Stegall, & Thompson, et aI . ,  1 992; Goldberg & Greenberg, 
1 980). The impact of Medicare supplementary insurance on the entry of HMOs into a 
Medicare risk market has been qualitatively documented but not empirically examined 
due to data limitations (Clement, et aI . ,  1 992; Harrington, et aI . ,  1 988;  Porell & Wallack, 
1 990; Rossiter, et aI . ,  1 985). 
In addition to Medicare beneficiaries who have individually purchased Medigap 
policies, another target population is retirees who receive an employer-sponsored group 
retirement benefit. The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) conducted in 
1 99 1  observed that 38% of surveyed Medicare elderly had employer-sponsored 
supplementary health insurance. Of those with supplemental coverage, 42% purchased 
individual Medigap policies; 1 2% qualified for Medicaid; and 2% received coverage 
from other sources. Approximately 1 1  % had no supplemental coverage (Chulis, Eppig, 
Hogan, Waldo, & Arnett, 1 993). 
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In one study on choice of health plans in the Medicare Capitation Demonstration, 
Garfinkel et al. ( 1 986) conducted a survey of aged Medicare beneficiaries in three sites 
(Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Worcester, Massachusetts; and Marshfield, 
Wisconsin). Two types of beneficiaries were distinguished: (a) rollover, who would not 
have to change providers to enroll in the demonstration; (b) switcher, who would have to 
change providers to enroll. Beneficiaries with supplementary insurance were found 
significantly less likely to participate in a capitation program in two of six equations . 
Beneficiaries in a family in which any household member belonged to an HMO were 
more likely to join a HMO (p < 0.05). HMO enrollment was also a positive function of 
several information sources, including friend or relative, HMO meeting, media, and 
medical profession. In general, medical risk measured by perceived health status, 
functional limitations, and chronic condition was not statistically significant in an 
enrollment choice. None of the personal characteristics (age, gender, and education) were 
systematically important to choice behavior. Satisfaction with prior usual source of care 
was in general negatively related to HMO enrollment for switchers but positively related 
to HMO enrollment by rollovers. 
Siddharthan ( 1 990) conducted a telephone survey of elderly aged 60 or over in 
Southeast Florida in 1986 to determine HMO enrollment by Medicare beneficiaries. 
Because of the nature of heterogeneous communities, the study sample was broken down 
to two groups: native and foreign-born population. For both U.S . -born and foreign-born 
elderly, the probability of enrolling in an HMO significantly declined as income 
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increased (p < 0.05) .  Problems with physical access to health care providers were also 
positively related to HMO enrollment. Discrimination with respect to gender (female= l )  
in selecting health plans was moderate for U.S . -born elderly (p < 0. 1 ), but did not occur 
for immigrants. Younger immigrants were somewhat more likely to choose an HMO (p 
< 0. 1 ) . Employment status was not statistically important in either elderly population. 
Davidson et al. ( 1 992) evaluated the relationship between health insurance 
knowledge and the demand for Medicare supplementary coverage. The study sample was 
a group of Medicare beneficiaries participating in an educational workshop held between 
October 1 986 and May 1 987 about their insurance options including the basic Medicare, 
private supplementary policies, and Medicare HMOs. Data collected before and after the 
workshop were pooled for analysis. In the Medicare HMO versus Medicare-only 
comparison, better health status and higher Medicare knowledge were significantly 
related to HMO enrollment. This observation indicated that Medicare HMO experienced 
favorable selection. However, healthier beneficiaries with a higher level of Medicare 
knowledge were less likely to join HMOs than to have basic Medicare coverage. This 
finding was reflected by a significant, negative interaction term between health status and 
Medicare knowledge. Surprisingly, a long-term physician relationship significantly 
encouraged HMO enrollment by sicker beneficiaries. This may be due to no 
differentiating between rollovers and switchers in the study sample. A negative 
interaction term between physician relationship and health status was also significant. 
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Healthier beneficiaries with a longer physician relationship were less likely to  have HMO 
membership. 
In private supplementary policies versus basic Medicare comparison, having a 
private supplement was a positive function of better health status but a negative function 
of higher Medicare knowledge. An insulated interaction term between health status and 
Medicare knowledge were significantly negative. A negative interaction term between 
physician relationship and health status was also observed. In the Medicare HMO versus 
private supplement comparison, neither health status nor Medicare knowledge was an 
important factor. Two interaction terms, Medicare knowledge-health status and physician 
relationship-health status, were negative but not significant. In the three comparison 
pairs, none of personal characteristics (age, gender, race, year of education) was 
significant except that the female beneficiaries were more likely to choose a Medicare 
HMO over private supplement policies.  
Dowd et al . ( 1 994) examined the relationship between characteristics of Medicare 
beneficiaries and their choice of health plan in the Twin Cities in 1 988 .  In the equation 
for the aggregate FFS sector (the basic FFS with or without a supplementary policy) and 
TEFRA risk contract HMOs, beneficiaries who significantly favored HMO plans were 
those who were employed during the past year (p < 0.05), lived alone (p < 0 .0 1 ) ,  and had 
family income between 1 0,000 and 20,000 ( p  < 0 .0 1 ) .  However, beneficiaries who 
purchased any of their coverage through a group policy or received a premium subsidy 
were more likely to have FFS plans than to join TEFRA-risk HMOs (p < 0.0 1 ) .  This may 
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be due to the fact that employment-based supplemental arrangements were historically 
limited to traditional insurance options, exclusive of HMO options. Age and gender were 
not related to choice behavior. Though statistically not significant, "mobile" 
beneficiaries, that is, those who did not live in the Twin Cities all year, seemed to have 
enough income to reside elsewhere during the winter and preferred FFS sector to HMOs, 
since FFS sector provided an easier access to nationwide physicians. Only one of 1 8  
variables measuring health conditions of Medicare beneficiaries was significant in 
choosing a health plan. 
Garfinkel et al . ( 1 986) found that having supplementary insurance coverage 
discouraged enrollment in HMOs by Medicare beneficiaries. Thus, Wilcox-G6k and 
Rubin ( 1 994) shifted focus to decisions to purchase private health insurance by elderly 
Medicare beneficiaries. The study sample was derived from wave 3 ( 1 984) of the Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Beneficiaries who were white, female, 
younger, and had higher household income held higher probability of having private 
health insurance. In contrast to what would have been expected, the presence of an 
employed family member was significantly and negatively related to the probability of 
having private health insurance. 
SummarY of Buyer: Enrollment Decisions by Medicare Beneficiaries 
To summarize, an HMO enrollment decision is conditioned by economic risk. 
HMOs attract low income Medicare beneficiaries. The obverse of this relationship can be 
demonstrated by the fact that beneficiaries with high household income are more likely to 
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have private supplementary health insurance coverage (Wilcox-Gok & Rubin, 1 994) and 
those with supplementary insurance are less likely to emoll in the HMOs (Garfinkel, et 
ai . ,  1 986). Beneficiaries with insurance purchased through a group policy or subsidized 
by another source are less likely to join HMOs (Dowd, et ai . ,  1 994), probably because of 
the fact that HMOs were less likely to be offered to retirees by employers. In addition, an 
employer-sponsored retiree health benefit is usually cheaper and more generous than an 
individually purchased policy. Word-of-mouth advertising for HMO coverage definitely 
encourages HMO emollment (Garfinkel, et ai. ,  1 986). 
A possible explanation of a positive effect of physician relationship on HMO 
emollment (Davidson, et aI . ,  1 992) is the matter of lack of differentiation between 
rollovers and switchers. If a beneficiary with a long-term relationship with his physician 
who is on HMO panel, the beneficiary does not have to change providers in order to 
emoll in the HMO. Better understanding of the Medicare program promotes HMO 
emollment. Medicare HMOs experience either neutral selection (Dowd, et ai. ,  1 994; 
Garfinkel, et ai. ,  1 986) or favorable selection (Davidson, et ai. ,  1 992). With a higher 
level of Medicare knowledge, however, healthier beneficiaries are less likely to have 
HMO membership than to have basic Medicare coverage. In general, other personal 
attributes (age, gender, race, marital status, education) indicate no, or mixed influence. A 
summary of empirical results for studies related to HMO emollment choice is listed in 
Table 3 .  
Table 3 
Summary: Factors Related to HMO Enrollment Choice by Medicare Beneficiaries 
(Compared to FFS Enrollment) 
Personal Characteristics 
Age Age groups (0), age in year (0) 
(Davidson, et a! . ,  1 992; Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et a! . ,  1 986) 
Gender Female (0,+) 
(Davidson, et a! . ,  1 992; Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et a!. ,  1 986; 
Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Race White vs. Asian (0), black vs. Asian (+), White vs. nonwhite (0) 
(Davidson, et a! . ,  1 992; Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Education Years of school complete (0), education level (0) 
(Davidson, et a!. ,  1 992; Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et a! . ,  1 986) 
Knowledge Medicare knowledge (+) (also see interaction terms) 
(Davidson, et a! . ,  1 992) 
Marital Married (0,+) 
status (Davidson, et a!. ,  1 992; Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et a! . ,  1 986) 
Live Live alone (0,+) 
(Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et a! . ,  1 986; Siddharthan, 1 990) 
MD Physician relationship > 5 years) (+) 
relationship (Davidson, et a! . ,  1 992) 
Migration Foreign-born (+) 
(Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Living in the area all year (0) 
(Dowd, et a! . ,  1 994) 
Information Friend, relative, medical profession, HMO meeting, media (+) 
source (Garfinkel, et a!. ,  1 986) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Summary: Factors Related to HMO Enrollment Choice by Medicare Beneficiaries 
(Compared to FFS Enrollment) 
Household member who belong to an HMO (+) 
(Garfinkel, et aI . ,  1 986) 
Economic Risk 
Income Family income below $ 7K vs. other income groups (+), below $ 1 0,000 
vs. $ l OK-20K (+) 
(Dowd, et aI . ,  1 994; Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Employment Being employed (0, +) 
Insurance 
coverage 
Medical Risk 
Health 
status 
Utilization 
(Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994; Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Covered by supplemental insurance (-) 
(Garfinkel, et aI. ,  1 986) 
Insurance purchased through a group policy (-) 
(Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994) 
Contribution to premium by others (-) 
(Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994) 
Perceived better health status (0,+), functional limitations (0), chronic 
condition (0 ) (also see interaction terms) 
(Davidson, et aI. ,  1 992; Dowd, et aI . ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et aI. ,  1 986) 
Office visit (0) 
(Siddharthan, 1 990) 
Interaction Term 
(better health status better) x (Medicare knowledge) (-) 
(Davidson, et aI. ,  1 992) 
(better health status) x (physician relationship > 5 years) (-) 
(Davidson, et aI. ,  1 992) 
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Note . + indicates positive results; - indicates negative results; ° indicates no association. 
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Payer: Employer 
Noted in the first chapter, HMOs have their origin in industry efforts to deliver 
broad and affordable health services. Since the second World War, employees in the U.S .  
have obtained their health insurance through voluntary, employer-sponsored group 
insurance. Under the 1 973 HMO Act, employers were required to offer their employees 
with HMOs options if they had more than 25 employees and offered health insurance, 
and there was a federally qualified HMOs in their market. This law attempted to provide 
HMOs increased market access to employer groups. However, empirical studies of HMO 
development in the 1 970s and early 1 980s did not observe a significant effect through 
employer groups (McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982). During the recession in 
1 98 1 - 1 983,  many employers either shifted to self-insurance through the provisions of the 
Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1 974 (McDonnell, 
Guttenberg, Greenberg, Arnett, 1 986) or began to require higher cost sharing from their 
employees (Gabel, Jajich-Toth, deLissovoy, Rice, & Cohen, 1 988) .  ERISA exempts 
employers that choose to self-insure from state regulation of health insurance. Thus, 
employers could offer lower cost coverage that excludes otherwise mandated benefits. In 
response to rising medical claims cost from 3 . 1  to 7 . 1  % of total compensation between 
1 970 to 1 990, employers, particularly large ones, increasingly encouraged their 
employees to join managed care plans (Miller & Luft, 1 994a). To sustain their market 
share, indemnity insurance intermediaries that served these large employers have become 
increasingly involved in managed care health care, including HMOs, preferred provider 
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organizations (PPO), point-of-service (POS), or  managed fee-for-service plans. In  spite 
of the lack of empirical studies, information obtained from the survey tends to link HMO 
enrollment growth to changes in employer-sponsored health benefits (Gabel, et a! . ,  1 988) .  
Taylor and Kagay ( 1 986) summarized a poll conducted by Louis Harris and 
Associates in 1 984 attributing the growth of HMOs and HMO membership to substantial 
improvements in HMO image with employers and physicians. Among corporate 
employers who offered an HMO option to their employees, employers who reported that 
at least 1 0% of their employees were enrolled in HMOs changed from 26% in 1 980 to 
45% in 1 984. The perception of the cost-effectiveness of HMOs by employers was the 
main reason reported for HMO growth over this period of study. Taylor and Kagay 
suggested an increasing attractiveness of prepaid practice to consumers during a period of 
rising health insurance premiums and cost sharing. 
Gabel et a! . ( 1 988) analyzed the data from the Health Insurance Association of 
America (HIAA) survey conducted in 1 987. These scholars discovered that among 
employees with group health insurance, 1 6% were enrolled in an HMO and 1 1  % were 
enrolled in a PPO, compared to 4% of the enrollees in either an HMO or a PPO plan 
surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1 98 1 .  Managed care enrollment growth 
was attributable to (a) an increasing number of employers who offered a choice of 
managed care plans to their employees; and (b) an increasing and substantial proportion 
of employees selected managed care plans when making selection among choices .  As to 
firm size, public and larger employers were more likely to offer an HMO option to their 
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employees. Over 62% of large firms offered an HMO plan, compared to 1 4% of small 
firms and 33% of mid-sized firms. As firm size increased, employees were less likely to 
select an HMO plan when it was offered along with conventional and PPO plans. In 
addition, HMO enrollees were found more concerned about the cost of health care, while 
conventional subscribers valued their relationship with their physician. As to favorable 
selection, the HlAA survey in 1 988 found that the proportion of employers who thought 
HMOs enroll younger, healthier population was substantially higher than in 1 987 (Gabel, 
DiCarlo, Fink, & deLissovoy, 1 989). 
The HIAA survey in 1 99 1  (Sullivan, Miller, Feldman, & Dowd, 1 992) 
documented that more employees were enrolled in managed care plans than in 
conventional health plans. Fifty-four percent of employees joined managed care plans 
(25% in HMOs, 22%t in PPO, and 7% in POS), compared to 49% (20% in HMOs, 24% 
in PPO, and 5% in POS) in 1 990, 33% in 1 989, and 29% in 1 988 .  The proportion of 
employers who offered HMO or managed care plans was higher among large firms. In 
contrast to the finding in 1 987 (Gabel, et aI. ,  1 988), employees in larger firms were more 
likely to select HMOs. KPMG Peat Marwick' s 1 992 survey also found that a majority of 
employees in firms with 200 or more workers joined a managed care plan (Gabel, 1 992). 
A 1 985 study of strategies for controlling health benefit costs adopted by 
employers in Minnesota (Gifford, Feldman, Dowd, & Finch, 1 99 1 )  used a two-stage least 
squares model to examine the probability of offering an HMO plan as one health benefit 
option. Consistent with the prior survey information (Gabel, et aI. ,  1 988 ;  Sullivan, et aI . ,  
1 992), larger firms were significantly more likely to offer an HMO plan (p < 0 .0 1 ) .  
Unionized firms and firms with high health care premiums also carried significant and 
positive coefficients, indicating a higher probability of offering an HMO option. 
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Despite the fact that employers offered post-retirement health insurance to their 
retirees, it was unknown how many workers were promised benefits in the future, or the 
number of workers that actually received promised benefits. The issue here is called 
vesting, that is, the conditions under which a worker becomes eligible for retiree health 
benefits. Morrisey, Jensen, and Henderlite ( 1 990) used the 1 988 Employer Survey and 
Retiree Follow-up Survey conducted by HIAA to explore the above questions. By firm 
size, more than 60% of firms that had more than 1 00 workers offered post-retirement 
health benefits, compared to 2 1  % of firms that had fewer than 1 00 workers. About 69% 
of employees in firms of 1 00-999 workers and 80% of those in firms of 1 ,000 or more 
workers were promised retiree coverage. Among all retirees covered by employer­
sponsored post-retirement health insurance, 94% had retired from a firm with 1 ,000 or 
more employees. Almost 80% of retirees promised post-retirement health insurance had 
benefits' pledges identical to the coverage for active workers. One may expect that if 
HMO options are offered to active workers, the same options would be made available to 
retirees, in spite of retiree mobility. For a Medicare risk HMO, retirees promised post­
retirement health insurance by companies which offer HMO options to their active 
workers represent potential to increase the number of enrollees under risk contracts. 
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Based on a 1 993 survey conducted by Hewitt Associates, Greenwald ( 1 994) 
observed that 91 % of 1 23 major U.S .  companies offered gatekeeper plans (POS, HMOs, 
POS-HMOs) to active employees, only 63% offered these options to early retirees, and 
5 1  % offered them to retirees aged 65 or over. Only five companies in the survey reported 
that their largest number of post-65 retirees were in gatekeeper plans. The survey also 
found that fewer companies than expected were aware of HMO programs aimed at 
retirees. Companies with more than 1 0,000 employees were more familiar with Medicare 
risk contracts. 
In addition to pressure from skyrocketing health care costs and a growing pool of 
retirees, the new Financial Accounting Standards Board rule, No. 1 06 (F AS 1 06) has 
pushed employers to reconsider and ensure funding of their retiree health benefits (Barr, 
1 993 ; Koco, 1 992). As of January 1 ,  1 993, F AS 1 06 requires that employers who offer 
retiree health care benefit set aside funding for the projected health care costs of their 
future retiree population as well as to cover eligible retirees. This new regulation has 
imposed a greater degree of financial burden on giant companies who have a larger 
employee/retiree pool with future-promised health benefits. 
Companies are making changes in their retiree benefit policies by requiring their 
retirees to pay more of the premium (Shea & Stewart, 1 994) or expand the use of 
managed care plans (Morrisey, 1 993 ; Wise, 1 995). Responding to this regulation change, 
some HMOs have expanded to the retiree health care market (Koco, 1 992). Medicare 
risk HMOs declare their ability to reduce employer' s  cost and liability under F AS 1 06 
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(Hammer, 1 995), which appears to be the biggest lure of a Medicare risk HMO. It is 
believed that more companies, especially big ones, will look at coverage under risk 
contracts as an optimal supplement for their pensioners (Greenwald, 1 994; Wise, 1 995).  
Though it is far from clear to determine, merely based on anecdotal evidence, what the 
combined impact of rising health care cost and F AS 1 06 will have on employer­
sponsored retiree health benefits or on HMO emollment, the future looks promising that 
more companies will offer managed care plans to their retirees. 
Summary of Payer: Employer 
To summarize, several trends are observed. Larger firms are more likely to offer 
an HMO option to their active employees (Gabel, et a!. ,  1 988 ;  Gifford, et a! . ,  1 99 1 ;  
Sullivan, et a! . ,  1 992), and employees in larger firms are more likely to emoll in an HMO 
plan if offered (Sullivan, et a!. ,  1 992). Emollment in HMO plans by employees with 
group health insurance is increasing (Gabel, et a! . ,  1 988). As to post-retirement health 
insurance, larger firms are more likely to offer retirement benefits (Morrisey, et a! . ,  
1 990). The majority of retirees who actually receive retirement benefits have retired from 
larger firms. Compared to benefits offered to active workers, managed care plans are less 
available to retired workers. However, a legitimate expectation is that F AS 1 06 opens a 
door for HMOs to employer-sponsored retirement health insurance business (Greenwald, 
1 994; Wise, 1 995). 
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Supplier: Physician 
The third group of HMO stakeholders is physicians. Physicians control 80% of 
the resource input decisions in the health care industry (Eisenberg, 1 986, p. 3) and are 
definitely pivoting players. Historically, HMOs have experienced difficulty in recruiting 
physicians because of the perception of inferior quality care rendered by HMOs (Taylor 
and Kagay, 1 986). In addition, a significant loss of professional autonomy and 
independence in organized settings such as HMOs has been perceived by physicians 
(Linn, et aI . ,  1 985;  Lichtenstein, 1 984). Though the concept of managed care is still 
unpleasant to and not philosophically supported by physicians, physicians feel forced to 
associate with managed care organizations out of financial survival (Berenson, 1 99 1 ;  
Jensen, 1 99 1 ) .  Contracting physicians have begun to accept reduced reimbursement in 
exchange for increased numbers of patients. Physician recruitment remains a challenge 
confronting HMOs (Fisher, Smith, & Pasternak, 1 993). This section will discuss the 
supply and demand sides of physician-HMO dynamics, though limited research is 
available. 
As part of a comprehensive effort to analyze the development of HMOs, one 
research team interviewed physicians and representatives of HMOs to understand the 
interaction in the Twin Cities, Minnesota (Kohrman, 1 985) .  It was recognized that the 
impact of physicians and HMOs on each other was reciprocal. In other words, resistance 
from physicians was partly responsible for the slow growth of HMOs; yet, as more 
physicians were associated with HMOs, the HMOs gained more competitive power and 
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then more physicians joined. In general, primary care physicians felt more powerless and 
confronted irresistible pressures to join HMOs. Specialists were less cooperative because 
they knew that their services were needed. One important source of strength for an 
HMO's  growth was the development of strong multi specialty group practices which 
socialized physicians to work cooperatively and offered a simultaneous source of 
leadership and competition. Proactive physician leadership alleviated among physicians 
the worry of bureaucracies managed by nonphysicians. In spite of the concern regarding 
potential change in practice behavior and decline in income, physicians who joined 
HMOs were unwilling to leave HMOs because of the competitive pressure (Kohrrnan, 
1 985) .  Additionally, it was noted that the greater the HMO penetration, the greater the 
impact on physicians. One should be cautious regarding the generalizability of these 
findings from a case study, especially in Minnesota where HMOs have early development 
compared to the rest of country. 
Goodman and Swartwout ( 1 984) assessed socioeconomic differences between 
four physician practice modes: solo FFS, group FFS, IPA, and prepaid group practice 
(PGP). HMO practice modes included IPA and PGP. It was found that physicians in 
PGPs were younger than their FFS counterparts. There were twice as many female 
physicians in a PGP as in any other practice form. Three fourths of physicians in group 
FFS, IPA, and PGP practices were board-certified, compared to 55% of the physicians in 
solo FFS practice. It was observed that HMO physicians were in the areas with a high 
physician-to-population ratio and high per capita income, suggesting that physicians 
responded to supply surplus by joining HMOs. 
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In the early 1 980s, Wisconsin experienced a dramatic change in how the state 
sponsored employee health insurance benefits. With the fear of losing patients, the 
majority of physicians in Dane County formed new HMOs or joined existing HMOs. 
Schulz, Scheckler, Girard, and Barker ( 1 990) directed a survey in Dane County to 
examine what factors affected the level of support for HMOs among physicians. 
Compared to specialists, primary care physicians was more supportive of HMO 
development (p < 0.05). The finding that a large number of HMO patients treated by a 
physician was positively related to HMO support (p < 0 .0 1 )  was expected, since surveyed 
physicians declared the main reason for associating themselves with HMOs was to keep 
their patients. 
Jacobs and Mott ( 1 987) conducted a survey in February 1 986 to determine the 
physician characteristics HMOs considered important in recruiting and hiring. Board 
certification and/or eligibility was considered very or somewhat important by all of the 
respondents. Over 90% of the respondents indicated the following criteria very or 
somewhat important: the physician's motivation and bedside manner, adaptability to the 
changing environment, ability to work in a team, the reputation of residency program, 
being trained in an American medical school, and ability to relate to nonphysician staff. 
The least important were the physician's age and gender balance on the HMO staff. 
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To study HMO physician staffing patterns, Dial, Palsbo, Bergsten, Gabel, and 
Weiner ( 1 995) surveyed staff or group model HMOs in December 1 993 which were 
members of Group Health Association of America (GHAA). IPA and network model 
HMOs were excluded because obtaining accurate data on both clinical staffing and the 
population they served were difficult. HMOs that held any Medicare contract were found 
to have lower full-time-equivalent (FTE) median physician-to-member ratios and FTE 
primary care physician-to member ratios than those that did not. An explanation may be 
that Medicare members only constituted a smaIl share of total enrollment of HMOs that 
had Medicare contracts. However, Medicare enrollment as a percentage of total 
enrollment was correlated with the number of FTE physicians per 1 00,000 members 
(correlation r = 0.55) .  Medicare HMOs maintained a much higher ratio of FTE primary 
care physician to total FTE physicians than non-Medicare HMOs. HMOs added about 
one and a half to two times as many primary care physicians to care for Medicare 
members as for an equal number of non-Medicare members. The other finding related to 
staffing patterns was that an inverse relationship was found between nonphysicians per 
primary care physician and primary care physicians per 1 00,000 members. The use of 
nonphysician providers, especially advanced practice nurses (APNs) and physician 
assistants (PAs), was one HMO strategy to control costs. No further exploration was 
done regarding the use of nonphysician providers and Medicare contracts. In addition, a 
main criterion that HMOs used to determine clinical staffing needs was planned 
enrollment growth. 
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Summary of Supplier: Physician 
Partly due to physician's self interest and partly due to an HMO's  recruitment 
efforts, physicians who join HMOs are younger and board-certified and practice primary 
care. Participation in HMOs could be the response to competition resulting from a 
physician surplus. It is expected that the growth of managed-care organizations will 
result in increased job opportunities for primary care physicians and fewer positions for 
specialists (Physician Payment Review Commission, 1 995). A recent trend also 
suggested that senior medical students expressed increased interest in primary care. Age 
and gender are not important attributes of physicians when being recruited by HMOs. As 
to provider composition, nonphysician providers are used by HMOs as physician 
substitutes. To accommodate Medicare beneficiaries, HMOs with any Medicare contract 
have more primary care physicians as a percentage of total physicians. Only descriptive 
trends have been studied which leaves the importance of group practice open to empirical 
testing. 
Summary 
Literature on HMO development constantly finds that a large population base and 
high community receptivity significantly favor HMO development (Christianson, et aI. ,  
1 986; Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; 
Welch, 1 984). Built on the research of HMO development, few studies have been done 
to investigate factors related to the entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract and 
confirm the significance of the general elderly population and the elderly immigrant 
population on an HMO's  market entry (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 
1 990). One study of HMO enrollment choice found that foreign-born Americans are 
more likely to join HMOs (Siddharthan, 1 990). The importance of HMO attributes and 
market structure have also been explored but are not constantly found to be influential, 
which may be due to a small sample size and inconsistency in model specification. 
However, a high AAPCC rate is invariably an encouraging factor for market entry 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Tompkins, 1 993 ; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). 
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Though in the literature on both HMO development and the entry into a Medicare 
risk contract the effect of the income level is contradictory (McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey 
& Ashby, 1 982; Porell & Wallack, 1 990; Welch, 1 984), empirical studies of HMO 
enrollment choice by Medicare beneficiaries tend to suggest that low income 
beneficiaries are more likely to be HMO members (Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994; Siddharthan, 
1 990). This disparity may occur because the variability of the income measured on the 
individual beneficiary level declines when aggregated to a higher, market level, resulting 
in an insignificant coefficient. It is also possible that the relationship between income 
level and HMO enrollment is bimodal. Low income beneficiaries are covered under 
Medicaid and high income ones can afford supplemental insurances. Both have less 
financial incentive to join HMOs, and historically the Medicaid-eligible elderly have not 
had an option to choose an HMO. 
The effect of employer group has not been considered substantially nor 
statistically important on both HMO development and market entry studies done in the 
1 970s and early 1 980s. However, descriptive survey results provide indirect evidence 
that large employers are critical to HMO emollment. Large firms offer HMOs a 
potentially sizable population of emollees or rollovers after becoming eligible for 
Medicare, especially with F AS 1 06 accountability (Gabel, et ai, 1 988;  Gifford, et ai, 
1 99 1 ;  Morrisey, et ai, 1 990; Sullivan, et ai, 1 992). 
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Descriptive information tends to suggest that competition among physicians force 
them to affiliate with HMOs and, in turn, contribute to HMO growth (Goodnam & 
Swartwout, 1 984; Kohrman, 1 985 ;  Schulz, et ai, 1 990), though it is not consistently 
supported by empirical studies (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  
McLaughlin, 1 987; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). The influence of  physicians or, 
particularly, group practice, on an HMO's  market entry requires further empirical 
investigation. 
No single study is able to include a comprehensive set of factors affecting a 
market entry or diversification decision partly because of data limitations and research 
interest. Chapter 3 will develop a resource dependence framework to identify 
theoretically important dimensions for the entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. 
Due to insufficient empirical exploration in an HMO's  strategic planning, literature on 
diversification will be reviewed to help understand the factors influencing an 
organization's strategic response to resource dependence, that is, decision for the entry of 
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an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. This resource dependence-diversification 
conceptual model is used to formulate hypotheses, incorporating measures that reflect the 
consistent or contradicting findings from studies reviewed in this chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework for this analysis is based on a resource dependence 
perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1 978) and a general framework of diversification 
(Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1 989). The resource dependence perspective contends that 
organizations are dependent on environments for obtaining resources to survive. The 
aspiration of survival compels organizations to respond to environmental changes 
through internal or external adjustments, though they desire to sustain their autonomy. 
This aspect of resource dependence is particularly relevant in explaining why, in response 
to the dynamics of a competitive market structure, an HMO diversifies into a Medicare 
risk market in which HMOs confront many constraints to provide coverage for the 
elderly. A general model of diversification is modified to complement the resource 
dependence perspective in order to explain how environmental munificence and 
organizational strengths can affect a decision of an HMO to diversify into a Medicare risk 
market. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory proposes that an organization' s  survival is 
contingent upon its ability to gain control over environmental resources. A major 
assumption in resource dependence theory is that organizations cannot internally generate 
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all the resources necessary to accomplish the tasks of the organization. Therefore, 
organizations must interact with the environment in order to generate resources needed 
for survival. 
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From the resource dependence perspective, organizations are viewed as being able 
to change to meet environmental requirements, or act to alter the environment so that it 
fits the organization's capabilities (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1 978, p. 1 06). For the first type of 
adaptive changes, one key question is how organizations can achieve stability and reduce 
uncertainty without increasing dependency on other organizations (Gray & Wood, 1 99 1 ) . 
Thompson ( 1 967, pp. 66-82) argues that organizations behave rationally and seek to seal 
off, or buffer their technical core from environmental influences. Such 
intraorganizational responses include several buffering strategies that are aimed at 
reducing uncertainty for the technical core (Scott, 1 992, p. 1 95). 
F or the second type of adaptive changes, the key question asked is under what 
circumstance organizations will adopt external linkages (Gray & Wood, 1 99 1 ) . Different 
from intraorganizational responses, interorganizational responses, or bridging strategies, 
involve establishing external linkages with other organizations to modify the 
organization' s environment. These adaptive responses are viewed as organizations' 
attempt to strategically manipulate their environment. Another form of environmental 
transformation (or modification) occurs through the development of diversification. 
Pfeffer and Salancik ( 1 978, p. 1 07) view diversification as a more radical form of 
avoiding dependence Cook, Shortell, Conrad, and Morrisey ( 1 983) develop a similar 
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argument that faced with regulation hospitals have incentives to reduced the use of 
"taxed" resource by making compensatory changes in the unregulated resources. The risk 
of remaining in existing markets in which resources are relatively scarce increases the 
need to expand operations into new markets to reduce dependencies on existing domains 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1 977). Thus, organizations engage in diversification into markets 
with more munificent environments, or excess capacity in order to balance overall risk 
(Thompson, 1 967, pp. 46-47). 
Kotter ( 1 980) asserts that external dependence can be managed through 
organizational choice of what outputs to produce. Organizations can carve out 
environmental niches where little or no competition exists. They can also diversify their 
current domains in the form of vertical integration, geographical expansion, or 
development of new products and services. Kotter also recognizes that not all 
organizations use the same approach to managing external dependence due to internal or 
external constraints. For example, some organizations maintain more resources that can 
be used to expand or change a domain. 
While organizations desire to maintain their autonomy and remain relatively 
independent of their environment, they also recognize the need to form certain networks 
to pool resources. The disadvantage of developing an interdependent relationship is loss 
of autonomy. Thus, organizations only develop interdependencies that are necessary for 
survival. If the expected benefit from resource exchange outweighs the loss of autonomy, 
organizations will enter into exchange. Entering into exchange relationships is one 
method of acquiring needed resources. 
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Resource dependence argues that environmental pressure, such as competition, 
regulation, and social forces, will lead organizations to pursue extemal linkages (Boyd, 
1 990). When the environment is considered as a stock of resources, the basic concept is 
dependence (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1 976). An organization' s dependence on the 
environment is determined by several factors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1 978, pp. 46-5 1 ) .  One 
factor is the importance of the resource to organization' s  operation. A resource that is not 
important to the organization cannot be considered part of a situation of dependence. The 
availability of resources is a second factor determining the organization's dependence on 
the environment. Organizations that require scarce resources are very dependent on the 
environment. If there is a large supply of the needed resources from a variety of 
organizations, the focal organization will not be particularly dependent upon any of them. 
Along with the availability of resources, the third factor is the concentration of control 
over the resources. If resource allocation is controlled by few organizations, or the extent 
to which input or output transactions are made by a relatively few significant 
organizations, which have a monopoly of it, the dependence of the focal organization on 
the environment is great. General propositions state that an organization' s dependence 
is positively related to increased importance, decreased availability, and increased 
concentration of the resource. Furthermore, Cook ( 1 977) adds that the availability of 
alternative resources increases an organization's power and autonomy by decreasing its 
dependence upon other organizations. 
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In the HMO sector, if resources in traditional markets are relatively scarce or the 
competition is perceived high, an HMO's  dependence on its environment is high. 
Resource concentration in commercial markets also leads to a dependence situation. To 
avoid environmental dependence, HMOs could diversify into a Medicare market, 
especially when resources in the Medicare market are perceived as abundant in relation to 
the commercial market. 
Conceptualization of Environment as a Pool of Resources 
Resource dependence theory views the environment as a pool of resources, and 
the degree of resource abundance is called environmental munificence. Specht ( 1 993) 
provides an extensive review of environmental resources cited in the organization 
formation literature. Along with the following discussion on diversification that can be 
defined as the entry of a firm or business unit into new lines of activity, it is justified to 
apply Specht's work to resource conceptualization on the issue of diversification or 
market entry. 
Specht ( 1 993) summarizes environmental resources into five categories : social, 
economic, political, infrastructure development, and market emergence. Firm formation 
is a positive function of social factors such as network, support of sociopolitical elites, 
and cultural acceptance. Under economic categorization, industrialization and household 
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income have positive effects on firm formation. Government support as a political force 
is found to have positive association with industry development. Education level, 
community size, and accessibility of suppliers and customers tend to support positive 
relationships with organizational infrastructure formation. Market emergence, such as 
niche development, and technological innovation also influence firm formation 
positively. Table 4 presents limited examples of description or operationalization for 
these factors from both empirical and descriptive literature (Bar-El & Felsenstein, 1 989;  
Boyd, 1 990; Bull & Winter, 1 99 1 ;  Gartner, 1 985 ;  Hamilton, 1 989; Keats & Hitt, 1 988 ;  
Manning, Birley, & Norburn, 1 989; Romanelli, 1 989; Whittington, 1 984). 
Conceptualization of Diversification 
There does not exist a general theory of diversification. Diversification as a 
corporate strategy appears to be justified based on some related themes. Diversification 
is considered as a means to achieve growth in profits, size, sales, and assets (Chenhall, 
1 984; McDougall & Round, 1 984); it enables firms to capitalize on economies of scales. 
Another motivation in pursuing diversification activities is to reduce an organization' s  
susceptibility to the risks inherent i n  its current line o f  activities (Ward & Krentz, 1 988) .  
Through diversification an organization' s  resources can be allocated to new activities 
which, either directly or indirectly, contribute to the mission of the organization. Thus, 
diversification should ensure the stability of the organization' s  overall cash flows. 
Table 4 
Examples of Environmental Resources 
Social : community attitude (Bull & Winter, 1 99 1 ;  Gartner, 1 985) 
number of survey responses 
number of days until the survey response 
number of related articles in newspaper 
Economic (Bar-EI & Felsenstein, 1 989; Bull & Winter, 1 99 1 ;  Hamilton, 1 989; Whittington, 
1 984) 
unemployment rate 
percentage change in unemployment rate over the previous year 
per capita income 
capital per worker 
Political (Gartner, 1 985) 
support of government 
Infrastructure Development (Bar-EI & Felsenstein, 1 989; Boyd, 1 990; Bull & Winter, 1 99 1 ;  
Gartner, \ 985;  Hamilton, 1 989; Keats & Hitt, 1 988;  Romanelli, 1 989; Whittington, 1 984) 
% of population by race 
% of 65 years of age or over 
% of migrants, % of immigrants 
% of population with 12 years or more 
% of highly educated and skilled labor to total labor 
% of firms by size 
proportion of expenses on R & D  from total revenue in the industry 
Market opportunity/competition 
the presence of large local organization 
the growth in industry sales over a 5-year period 
the three-year average of percentage changes in sales 
the Herfindahl Index 
the three-year average of percentage changes in four-large firm sales 
concentration ratio 
Market Emergence (Bull & Winter, 1 99 1 ;  Gartner, 1 985;  Manning, et a! . ,  1 989; Romanell i ,  
1989) 
niche emergence 
market segments engaged (specialist vs. generalist) 
Technological innovation 
presence of high quality universities, research institutes 
number of 4-year colleges within 20 miles 
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There is a great deal of variation in how diversification is defined. In research 
done three decades ago, industry or market boundaries are used to conceptualize 
diversification. For example, Gort (1 962) defines diversification as heterogeneity of 
products in terms of the number of markets served by that product. Two products are 
considered to serve different markets if their cross-elasticities of demand are low. 
According to Berry ( 1 975, p. 37), diversification is perceived as an increase in the 
number of industries in which firms operate. Kamien and Schwartz ( 1 982, p. 74) define 
diversification as the extent to which firms classified in one industry have products 
classified in another industry. 
In contrast to these early definitions of diversification, Pitts and Hopkins ( 1 982) 
use "business" to define diversification as the extent to which firms are active in different 
businesses simultaneously. Three different approaches to defining business are resource 
independence, market discreteness, and product difference. Abell ( 1 980, p. 1 69) uses a 
different three-dimensional framework to define business: customer functions (needs) a 
firm seeks to satisfy, customer groups it targets, and technologies it uses to satisfy the 
customer function. 
In the view of Ansoff ( 1 957), diversification represents the entry of firms into new 
markets with new products. A broader definition of diversification is inclusive of the 
goals of diversification, its direction, and the means by which it is achieved. A Booz, 
Allen, and Hamilton study (Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 1 985) incorporates the 
multidimensional nature of the diversification phenomenon and defined diversification as 
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a means that firms adopt to  improve growth and/or reduce overall risk. Diversification 
may take the form of new products, services, customer segments, or geographic markets. 
It may be accomplished, for example, by internal development, acquisitions, joint 
ventures, or licensing agreements. 
Most health care organizations when seeking to diversify still focus on health 
related activities. A similar purpose of diversification within the health care industry is to 
obtain more control over entry points (Ward & Krentz, 1 988). Hospitals, for example, 
are traditionally involved in acute, inpatient business. Diversified businesses, such as an 
ambulatory care center, subacute care units, and home health care, help hospitals assure 
efficient throughput in the acute care segment and then control patient flow. 
Likewise, HMOs may diversify in order to cover more lives. HMOs have 
developed an integrated set of managed care options incorporating self-referral options 
(Gold, 1 99 1 ) . HMOs also have engaged in geographical diversification, expanding from 
urban to rural areas (Christianson, et aI . ,  1 986). On the dimension of the product or 
service package, HMOs can penetrate into a long-term care business through social 
HMOs (SIHMOs) (Taylor, 1 993), or diversify from a non-Medicare market to a Medicare 
market through a risk or cost contract. 
Ramanujam and Varadarajan ( 1 989) define diversification as "the entry of a firm 
or business unit into new lines of activity, either by processes of internal business 
development or acquisition, which entail changes in its administrative structure, systems, 
and other management processes." These scholars develop a framework for classifying 
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research on diversification. Only elements of their original framework which are relevant 
to a diversification decision are depicted in Figure 9. Boxes 1 to 3 portray general 
environment, market structure, and firm characteristics. Boxes 4 through 6 denote the 
diversification decision, choice of diversification direction, and mode choice of 
diversification. Box 7 represents firm performance. Four elements that reflect diversity 
status and diversity management are excluded from Figure 9, since these elements are 
subsequent to the choice to diversify. 
The starting point of research on diversification is to understand the factors that 
influence a firm's decisions to diversify (box 4). As shown in Figure 9, four categories of 
factors have received particular attention in the literature: the general environment (legal, 
political, economic, technological, social, or ecological), the industry' s  competitive 
environment, a firm's characteristics, and a firm's performance. Once a firm decides to 
diversify, the next issue is in which direction to diversify (box 5). Diversification that is 
aimed at realizing technological and marketing synergies is commonly described as 
related diversification. Diversification that is to obtain vertical economies or reduce cost 
is considered unrelated diversification. Hill and Hansen ( 199 1 )  define related 
diversification as operation in several segments within an industry; unrelated 
diversification is operation across industries. Salter and Weinhold ( 1 98 1 )  state that 
related diversification through acquisition' involves entering into new markets where a 
firm is able to use its existing resources, while unrelated diversification engages in new 
business with key factors unrelated to existing activities. 
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Figure 9. Research on Diversification: Themes and Linkages. 
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Box 6 concerns the mode of diversification. Two extreme modes are internal 
development versus acquisition or merger. In developing an acquisition screening 
system, Salter and Weinhold suggest that acquisition is more attractive unless firms have 
both organizational and technological features for successful diversification through 
internal development. 
Only boxes I to 4 are included in this analysis, reflected by solid lines in Figure 9 .  
An HMO's  diversification into a Medicare risk market (box 4)  is influenced by resource 
availability in the general environment and capitation rate (box 1 ) ,  competitive structure 
in both non-Medicare and Medicare markets (box 2), and the HMO's  attributes (box 3) .  
Literature on Diversification 
Few empirical examples of diversification exist in health care, and none relate to 
the discussion of HMOs to diversify into new product lines such as Medicare risk 
contracts. This section will review literature on diversification in non-health care 
industries. 
To understand the formation of diversifying strategy, mainly acquisition, in the 
tobacco industry in the United States, Miles ( 1 982, pp. 1 54-1 95) conducted interviews 
with three tobacco companies in the mid- 1 980s. Catalytic factors in the strategy to 
diversify indicated by executives included a decline in industry growth rate, market-share 
erosion in traditional business, and risk from smoking-and-health controversy. Tobacco 
companies also mentioned a need to reinvest excess cash from traditional business. As to 
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acquisition criteria, two types of businesses were most often targeted:  those growing and 
profitable in the industry and businesses that promoted synergies or economies. Though 
qualitative information obtained from an interview study is limited in establishing 
association between motives and diversification decisions, it provides a sound foundation 
on which future empirical study can be based. One can expect that market structure such 
as growth opportunity across the industry and market share of the individual organization 
would influence diversification decisions. 
In an effort to compare diversifying and nondiversifying Australian firms, 
McDougall and Round ( 1 984) asked firms to identify the major reasons behind their 
diversification decisions. The most popular reasons cited were "reduction in firm's  risk" 
and "suitable opportunity arising." Other common motivating factors included "poor 
growth prospects in traditional markets," "strong cash flow from traditional activities," 
and "difficulties in maintaining market share in traditional markets."  This qualitative 
study suggests that both market opportunity and the perception of "risk" encourage firms 
to diversify. However, operationalization of these motivators requires empirical 
exploration. 
Chenhall ( 1 984) interviewed senior executives based on a structured format and 
applied a liner discriminant model to investigate the extent of diversification among 75 
Australian manufacturing companies. A factor analysis was employed to derive latent 
constructs. High diversification was significantly related to several organizational 
attributes such as large firm size and sophisticated marketing. It was explained that firm 
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size acted as  a surrogate for a wide variety of factors such as  economic power, innovative 
efforts, or an ability to attract resources and to enter capital intensive industries. 
Marketing strength enhanced a firm's capacity to develop new products. A firm's age 
also served as a surrogate variable, reflecting managerial conservatism or stocks of 
knowledge and experience. Because of these counterbalancing interpretations, an 
association between firm's age and diversification was not observed. 
Organizational goals were also significantly associated with high diversification, 
especially those goals that achieved favorable portfolio risk adjustment and concerned 
product innovation in the area where potential demand for new products were promising. 
One unexpected finding was that goal of growth in size did not appear influential. As to 
strategic orientation, a proactive-aggressive orientation, as opposed to a reactive-
defensive mode, was related positively to high diversification. A restricted environment 
induced firms to search for alternatives. Contrary to the expectation that unpredictable 
environmental conditions urged organizations to diversify, an association between 
environmental uncertainty and high diversification was not evident. 
This study pointed out the differential importance of various organizational goals 
as well as strategic planning orientation (proactive versus reactive) on the extent of 
diversification. However, information on both organizational goals and strategic 
orientation is not generally available unless a specific survey is conducted. Lack of such 
information may explain the exclusion of these two sets of variables from most of the 
empirical studies on diversification. 
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Mitchell ( 1 989) examined the probability of diagnostic imaging manufacturers ' 
entry into emerging industrial subfields such as nuclear medical imaging. The study 
sample consisted of 436 firms manufacturing x-ray and electrodiagnostic instruments 
before the emergence of the nuclear medical imaging subfield. A firm that possessed 
more industry-specialized assets was hypothesized to have competitive advantages over 
firms lacking them. The specialized firms would be more likely to enter an emerging 
subfield. Three variables reflected industry-specialized assets: possession of a direct 
distribution system, industry experience, and industry market share. The direct­
distribution-system was 1 if a firm used direct distribution, and 0 if it used independent 
sales representatives. To measure industry experience, the year that a firm began its 
diagnostic imaging business was subtracted from the year that products in a new subfield 
were first sold. Industry market share was measured by the firm's  share of sales during 
the year before a new subfield emerged. The results from a logistic regression confirmed 
the predicted positive association; the coefficients of firm's market share (p < 0.05) and 
possession of direct distribution system (p < 0.0 1 )  were statistically significant. 
Compared with firms that used independent sales representatives, firms with a direct 
distribution system were 1 9  times more likely to enter into new imaging-industry 
subfields. 
A second hypothesis concerned the effect of competitors on market entry 
(Mitchell, 1 989). It was predicted that the more firms that possessed industry-specialized 
assets in the market, the less likely an industry incumbent was to enter an emerging 
subfield. Potential rival was defined as the number of multiple-subfield incumbents 
during the year before a subfield emerged, since this measure was positively correlated 
with possession of specialized assets. A significantly negative coefficient (b = - 0 .48,  
p < 0.05) was observed. 
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Several covariates were also included. The size of  market for imaging products 
was measured by aggregate sales in the first seven years and had a statistically significant 
and negative effect. Firm size was recorded as the natural log of firm sales during the 
year before a subfield emerged. The negative, though insignificant, effect of firm size 
seemed to confirm that a large firm sustained bureaucratic inertia (Mitchell, 1 989). One 
opposite argument was that by entering into a subfield large firms could reduce their risk 
through obtaining diversification economies or spreading costs. The coefficient of 
experience with similar products was found to be positive but not significant. 
Hill and Hansen ( 1 99 1 )  adopted a risk avoidance view of diversification to 
examine the cause of change in diversification in the U.S .  pharmaceutical industry. A 
pooled time-series methodology was used to analyze the data. The change in 
diversification was measured by the ratio of the entropy indices of diversification at two 
points in time. The entropy index was comprised of two components, related and 
unrelated diversification. A firm's asset beta reflected its business risk; a high asset beta 
indicated that a larger proportion of a firm's income depended on few major products. 
Current ratio represented a firm's ability to afford diversification. These two variables 
were found to be positively significant at the p value of 0.05 or lower. Diversification 
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was also a negative function of  the market to book value ratio. A low ratio conveyed a 
negative signal and motivated the firm to diversify. These results suggested that 
diversification by pharmaceutical firms was an attempt to reduce risk. Both R & D  
intensity (measured by R & D  expenditure divided by total firm sale) and advertising 
intensity (measured by advertising expenditure divided by total firm sale) were 
anticipated to impose competing claims on the funds available for investment and proved 
to have a negative sign ( p  < 0.0 1 ). 
To investigate the entry of United Kingdom banks into a wide range of financial 
service markets after the financial system was deregulated, Ingham and Thompson ( 1 995) 
took a resource-based view of the firm to establish an entry model. The resource-based 
theory argued that the extent of diversification was related to the relative abundance of 
firm-specific assets relevant to the provision of the new products. Forty-seven banks and 
1 3  new financial products yielded 6 1 1 entry decisions as the study sample. A set of firm­
specific assets were anticipated to produce economics of scope and then generated 
positive coefficients. Firm size was measured by total assets and carried a significantly 
positive sign. However, the square of size had a significantly negative coefficient. This 
finding reflected an inverse U-shape relationship between firm size and diversification 
decision. 
Other firm-specific assets such as brandname capital (measured by advertising 
expenditures divided by size) and branch network (measured by number of branch 
divided by size) attracted significantly positive coefficients, indicating that possession of 
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these assets encouraged diversification. Human capital asset, another variable for firm­
specific assets, was measured by headquarters employee numbers divided by size and 
carried a statistically significant and negative sign. It was possible that headquarters staff 
numbers failed to be a good proxy for relevant human capital assets (Ingham & 
Thompson, 1 995). 
This banking study sheds light on the significance of firm-specific assets on 
diversification. Firm-specific assets are defined by several variables, some of which are 
pertinent to the health care industry or, particularly, the HMO sector. Brandname capital 
may be parallel to the community receptivity of an HMO concept, or specifically 
analogous to an HMO's commercial emollment. The size of the physician network in an 
HMO shares a similar meaning with the size of the branch network that represents selling 
force. 
Summary of Literature on Diversification 
To summarize, a firm's diversification or entry into a new market is a strategic 
response in order to spread or reduce a perceived risk such as a decline in industry 
growth, market to book value, and market share in traditional activities, or increased 
concentration of income sources. Internal specialized assets such as general experience 
(measured by age of a firm), experience in similar product/market, direct distribution 
system, sound financial performance, brandname capital, and branch network enhance a 
firm' s ability to afford diversification and enable firms to capitalize on economics of 
scope (Hill & Hansen, 1 99 1 ;  Ingham & Thompson, 1 995 ;  Mitchell, 1 989). Depending on 
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the driving force behind diversification, diversification is found to be a positive function 
of a firm's market share (Mitchell, 1 989), while McDougall and Round ( 1 984) and Miles 
( 1 982, p. 1 63) reported that market share erosion encourages diversification. Firm size, 
measured by total sales or total assets, has a positive, negative, or an inverse U-shape 
relationship with diversification decision (Chenhall, 1 984; Ingham & Thompson, 1 995 ;  
Mitchell, 1 989). An aggressive strategic orientation is positively associated with high 
diversification (Chenhall, 1 984). As to new market entry, firms tend to target a growing 
and profitable industry. Competition which is measured by the number of incumbents in 
the targeted industry discourages market entry in that industry. 
Based on these diversification studies, one can expect that an HMO's  entry into a 
Medicare risk contract will be motivated by a decline in enrollment growth rate across the 
HMO sector. A growing Medicare population enrolled in HMOs represents an 
opportunity and encourages an HMO's  market entry. However, the high number of 
HMOs with Medicare risk contracts in the local market may discourage market entry. An 
HMO's  market share in a non-Medicare market will be related to the market entry 
decision. Specialized assets, particularly those relevant to Medicare such as federal 
qualification and Medicare non-risk contracts, will influence an HMO's  market entry 
favorably. 
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Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
The focus of this study will be placed on what factors influence HMOs to 
diversify their current operation in a commercial market to a Medicare risk market (boxes 
1 -4 in Figure 9). An assumption is made through this study that HMOs choose to remain 
independent. Only situations that threaten their survival and acquisition of resources in 
doing non-Medicare business will lead them to seek contractual relationships with 
Medicare as a diversification strategy. Meanwhile, abundance of resources in a Medicare 
market encourages an HMO's  entry into a Medicare market. That is, the decision to 
participate in the Medicare risk program is conditioned on both an HMO's  dependence on 
the non-Medicare environment and resource availability in the Medicare market. HMO 
characteristics also influence the diversification decision. Once participating as a risk 
contractor, the regulatory intensity for HMOs is considered great and the loss of control 
and autonomy is inevitable. HMOs have no control over basic service coverage and the 
reimbursement method for the risk contract portion of their business. They are restricted 
both in the premiums they are allowed to charge, and profits they are allowed to make in 
a Medicare business. In addition, administrative requirements and marketing activities of 
a Medicare business are very different from the commercial business. Furthermore, 
HCFA's oversight is burdensome in relation to patient control. Considering the 
differences in customers, control for reimbursement, administration, and regulatory 
process, the entry into a Medicare risk contract is not merely market expansion. Instead, 
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it is a different product targeted to a different consumer group. That is, HMOs decide to 
diversify into an elderly market as a new line of business. 
In the HMO industry, members, including both the elderly and nonelderly, are 
definitely a critical resource for managed care survival. Other resources, such as capital 
for expansion to serve Medicare beneficiaries and favorable regulation, are also 
important. The decision to participate in Medicare risk contracting is rooted in the 
HMO's  expectation of direct benefits from resource exchange, such as cash flow, 
enhanced image and negotiating power, and potential expansion, especially when HMOs 
face resource scarcity and uncertainty as well as competition. In the current investigation, 
HMO market entry is examined in terms of four dimensions : (a) competitive market 
structure, (b) resources in the general environment, (c) market price, and (d) firm 
characteristics. Figure 1 0  pictorially presents the conceptual model. In the subsequent 
sections of this analysis, the hypotheses, drawn from the literature and the model, are 
presented for these four areas. 
HMO Competitive Market Structure 
From the perspective of resource dependence, an organization's decision 
to enter a contractual arrangement will depend on the stability and availability of the 
environmental resources. Favorable market conditions such as those that promote stable 
and available resource supply will allow the organization to remain self-sufficient and 
autonomous (Alexander & Morrisey, 1 988) .  Environmental capacity (Aldrich, 1 979, p .  
63), or  munificence labeled by Dess and Beard ( 1 984), refers to  the availability of 
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Diversification Decision : 
Entry into a Medicare risk Contract 
Figure 1 0. Conceptual Model of the Entry of HMOs into a Medicare Risk Contract. 
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environmental resources to support growth. According to Boyd ( 1 990), munificence is 
defined as the relative level of resources available in an environment and is measured by 
growth at the industry level. Keats and Hitt ( 1 988) used five-year average growth in net 
sales and operating income to measure munificence. They found that growth in existing 
markets had a negative, though insignificant, effect on diversification strategy. Boyd 
( 1 990) employed the same measure of munificence in 9 different industries and observed 
a significantly negative effect on environmental linkage activities. A decline in industry 
growth rate was earlier cited as one of facilitators to diversify (Miles, 1 982, p. 1 63) .  
Regarding an HMO's decision to participate in Medicare risk contract, there are two 
types of markets in which HMOs are operating and may consider to enter: commercial 
and Medicare markets. These are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
Commercial or Non-elderly Market 
Traditionally, HMOs have operated in the non-elderly market. Favorable 
conditions in this market can lead to industry-wide growth in HMO total enrollment. If 
the enrollment growth in the HMO industry as a whole is slow, the opportunities for an 
individual HMO to grow is limited so that the HMO is motivated to undertake strategic 
changes. One strategy HMOs can adopt is to modify their current domain by seeking 
other environment's  niches (Kotter, 1 980). The Medicare market provides them an 
opportunity to increase the lives to cover. Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) found a low HMO 
market growth rate encouraged the entry into a Medicare risk contract. The hypothesis is, 
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HJ : Holding other variables constant, in a service area with low growth rate of HMO 
enrollment, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
The overall market penetration reflects community receptivity, where many 
persons in communities have been exposed to HMOs. The concept of HMO care is more 
accepted by community members who are likely to consider HMOs when getting old 
through their experience with HMOs, or, due to word-of-mouth advertising (Garfinkel, et 
a! . ,  1 986; Harrington, et a! . ,  1 988) .  With different interpretation for HMO penetration, 
Wholey, Feldman, and Christianson ( 1 995) argue that as HMO market penetration 
increases, competition among HMOs intensifies, since the HMO could not avoid 
competing with other HMOs in addition to the competition with indemnity insureres. 
u.s .  General Accounting Office ( 1 996) reported that HMO overall market penetration 
appeared to influence the market entry by HMOs, though exceptions existed. In either 
interpretation of HMO penetration (community receptivity or competition), high market 
penetration would encourage HMOs to enter into a Medicare risk market. Indirect 
evidence from Welch's ( 1 996) study indicated that general HMO market penetration was 
the most important, positive factor in predicting HMO penetration in the Medicare 
market. 
H2 : Holding other variables constant, in a service area with higher HMO penetration, an 
HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
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Market competition can be operationalized as resource concentration. According 
to Aldrich ( 1 979, p. 68), concentration, as one of six dimensions of organizational 
environments, is the degree to which resources are evenly distributed over the 
environment. Competitive concentration will be interpreted as dominance by a local 
HMO over resources due to the definition of HMO's  operating area used in this study, 
which will be explained in Chapter 4. A high level of competitive concentration reflects 
that, given the existence of other HMOs, a local HMO would be more dominant in its 
service area, and thus will be less motivated to diversify. The hypothesis follows that, 
H3 : Holding other variables constant, in a service area where enrollment concentration 
is high, an HMO is less likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
The effect of market share of the individual organization on an organization' s  
diversification decision has also been investigated (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Miles, 
1 982, p. 1 63 ;  Mitchell, 1 989; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). Results from empirical studies on 
the individual organization' s market share are mixed. One study in the diagnostic 
imaging industry (Mitchell, 1 989) found a significant, positive effect of a firm's market 
share on diversification, while two studies in Medicare risk HMOs (Adamache & 
Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) reported a negative effect, insignificant or 
moderately significant. Thus, the significance of the individual HMO's  market share 
rather than its sign is hypothesized. 
H4 : Holding other variables constant, an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk contract is 
associated with its market share. 
Medicare Market 
In addition to non-elderly market structure, participation in the Medicare risk 
program also depends on the relative attractiveness of the Medicare market. The 
following discussion will focus on the competitive structure of a Medicare market. 
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Similar to a non-elderly market, the appeal of the Medicare risk market to HMOs depends 
on the growth of HMO elderly enrollment across the market. A positive growth rate 
implies that HMOs can expect more Medicare beneficiaries to switch from the fee-for-
service sector to an HMO plan. One descriptive study suggested that organizations 
targeted a growing business as one diversification criterion (Miles, 1 982, p. 1 90). 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that, 
H5: Holding other variables constant, in a service area where the growth rate of HMO 
Medicare enrollment is higher, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk 
contract. 
Competition measured by the number of incumbents in a markct discourages the 
entry of organizations into the market (Mitchell, 1 989). Similarly, HMOs in a market 
where there already exist Medicare risk contractors are less likely to enter the market. In 
addition, the first HMO entering into the local Medicare market may enjoy a competitive 
advantage of establishing its niche and credibility (Bell, 1 987; Langwell, et al . ,  1 986). 
With different explanation, Wholey et al . ( 1 990) argue that the number of HMOs reflects 
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the legitimacy of HMOs in the community. Along with this interpretation, the greater 
number of risk plans indicates a higher level of acceptance of the Medicare risk program 
by Medicare beneficiaries, and would encourage market entry. Since the expected effect 
is opposite from different interpretations, the relevance of the number of Medicare risk 
plans is hypothesized but not the direction of its effect. 
H6 : Holding other variables constant, the number of Medicare risk plans in a service 
area is associated with an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk contract. 
Resource Availability 
The abundance of resources in a new market encourages diversification, or entry 
into the market. This section will focus on resources important to HMOs:  buyers, payers, 
and suppliers (Whitehead, et a! . ,  1 989). 
Buyer: Availability of Eligible Elderly Population 
As the population ages, Medicare beneficiaries as a group will consume more 
health resources and dominate the health care market. The Medicare market could 
provide a huge pool of potential enrollees, which is important to an HMO's survival. 
Early studies documented that the proportion of the population aged 65 or over in an area 
was positively associated with an HMO' s  entry into a Medicare market (Adamache & 
Rossiter, 1 986). Therefore, the hypothesis is :  
H, : Holding other variables constant, in a service area where the size of elderly 
population is large, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
Despite the existence of an eligible elderly population, whether the elderly 
population will enroll in HMOs is subject to several factors, such as physician-patient 
relationship, health status, migration activity, income level, and other personal 
characteristics. The following will discuss the relative choice of Medicare beneficiaries 
to join HMOs. 
Physician-patient relationship. The conventional belief is that people are less 
willing to switch their physicians to enroll HMOs if they are satisfied with their current 
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physician (Garfinkel, et aI . ,  1 986). Davidson et al . ( 1 992) observed a positive effect of a 
long-term physician relationship on HMO enrollment, which might be due to a rollover 
effect when enrollment occurred with a physician joining an HMO. Three factors that 
moderate a physician-patient relationship are discussed below: health status, gender, and 
migration activity. 
Health status. There is research evidence showing that HMOs experience 
favorable selection in their enrollment of the general population (Luft, 1 98 1 )  and among 
Medicare beneficiaries under a risk contract. (Brown, Bergeron, Clement, et aI . ,  1 993 ; 
Davison, et aI . ,  1 992; Eggers, 1 980; Lichtenstein, et aI. ,  1 992; Wilensky & Rossiter, 
1 986), or neutral selection (Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994; Garfinkel, et aI. ,  1 986). Favorable 
selection might result from a patient decision or an HMO' s  skimming, that is, the HMO 
targets healthy segments of the Medicare market. Two conflicting arguments regarding 
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the effect of health status prevail. Persons who are in worse health and expect high 
utilization of medical care are more likely to enroll in HMOs with the desire to minimize 
their out-of-pocket expenses. Alternatively, individuals in poor health are more likely to 
have a consistent relationship with their physicians that they want to preserve. Due to 
data limitation on health status, no hypothesis regarding the effect of Medicare 
beneficiary' s  health status is proposed. 
Gender. Past research also suggests that women are more likely to have a regular 
physician (Wilensky & Cafferata, 1 983) .  Therefore, it would be expected that with a 
higher proportion of elderly women in a market area, the less likely HMOs will enter into 
Medicare market. However, gender has not been consistently found important in an 
enrollment decision among health plans (Davidson, et aI . ,  1 992; Dowd, et aI . ,  1 994; 
Garfinkel, et aI . ,  1 986; Siddharthan, 1 990), nor in the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). Though inconclusive, the affect 
of gender should be controlled. 
Migration activity. Another indicator of established ties to existing FFS 
physicians is the proportion of immigrants in a service area. Depending on time since 
immigration, an immigrant population that migrate from other countries to America is 
less likely to have a regular source of care due to sociocultural and language barriers 
(Chavez, Cornelius, & Jones, 1 985 ;  Quesada & Heller, 1 977). Chi-square statistics 
indicated that among Medicare beneficiaries a higher percentage of foreign-born 
American or immigrants enrolled in HMOs (Siddharthan, 1 990). Porell and Wallack 
( 1 990) also asserted a positive association between immigrant population and HMO' s  
entry into a Medicare risk contract. The hypothesis is :  
Hg :  Holding other variables constant, in a service area where immigration activity is 
higher, an HMO is more likely to enter into Medicare risk contract. 
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It i s  also anticipated that in-migrants, that is, those who move from places outside 
the focal market but within America, are less likely to have a regular physician, at least in 
a short term period and thus face relatively lower costs of switching physicians. 
However, previous studies generate mixed results regarding the effect of in-migration 
activities on HMO development (Adamache and Rossiter, 1 986; Goldberg & Greenberg, 
1 98 1 ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984). One possible 
explanation is that mobile elderly who can afford to move temporarily are attracted to the 
FFS sector due to its unrestricted choice of physicians (Dowd, et aI. ,  1 994). Another 
barrier for HMOs to attract mobile Medicare beneficiaries exists in the current 
requirement that Medicare beneficiaries must disenroll if they leave the service area for 
more than three months. New features of HMO products that make benefits portable for 
their senior members who travel may counterbalance FFS superiority and encourage 
these beneficiaries to join HMOs (Jaklevic, 1 995). Nonetheless, much unknown remains 
to be empirically tested on reasons that may impede the entry of HMOs in certain 
markets.  
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Income effect. Medigap policies have been descriptively recognized as a primary 
competitive force to Medicare HMOs (Feldman, et aI. ,  1 993;  Harrington, et aI . ,  1 988 ;  
Porell & Wallack, 1 990; Rossiter, e t  aI . ,  1 985) .  In order to  attract the elderly as  an 
important resource to HMOs, Medicare HMOs must compete with Medigap insurers by 
setting monthly premiums for enrollees lower than those of rival insurance firms. It is 
speculated that a higher premium charged by Medigap insurers has a positive impact on 
HMO enrollment. Because of lack of consistently available Medigap premium 
information, however, the direct impact of Medigap premium rates on HMO's  market 
entry cannot be incorporated in this analysis. Instead, the focus is on beneficiaries' 
ability to purchase Medicare supplemental insurance. The income effect on their choice 
among health plans is investigated in this analysis. 
In 1 99 1 ,  about 38% of Medicare beneficiaries purchased individual Medigap 
policies (Chulis, et aI . ,  1 993). Beneficiaries with an average higher household income 
were found to be more likely to have private insurance coverage (Wilcox-Gok & Rubin, 
1 994) and those who were covered by supplemental insurance were found to be less 
likely to enroll in HMOs under the Medicare Capitation Demonstration (Garfinkel, et aI . ,  
1 986). Thus, there seems to be  an indirect linkage between income level and HMO 
enrollment. 
Given the fact that 69% of Medicare beneficiaries have annual incomes less than 
$20,000 in 1 990 (Darnay, 1 994, p. 4), one might expect that part, if not all, of the senior 
population are cost conscious. Evidence from the previous survey indicated that 
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compared to conventional insurance subscribers, HMO emollees were more concerned 
about costs (Gabel, et a! . ,  1 988), and that low out-of-pocket costs were one of the most 
attractive features to HMO members (Taylor & Kagay, 1 986). One empirical study 
observed that disemollment from the HMO was associated with increases in premiums 
charged by HMOs (Long, Settle, & Wrightson, 1 988) .  Beneficiaries who were poor but 
not eligible for Medicaid had a higher probability to emoll in HMOs (Dowd, et a! . ,  1 994; 
Langwell & Hadley, 1 990; Siddharthan, 1 990). 
From a macro perspective, firm formation is positively associated with the level 
of average household income in a firm's market (Specht, 1 993). However, empirical 
studies of the effect of per capita income on HMO establishment do not generate 
consistent results (Juba, Lave, & Shaddy, 1 980; McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 
1 982; Welch, 1 984). Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) used another measure, percent of 
population 65 years of age or over below poverty level and found that a higher percentage 
of the elderly population below poverty level was significantly associated with a higher 
probability of an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk market. It is possible that the 
relationship between the income level and the market entry is non-linear, or inverse U-
shaped. Poor beneficiaries are covered by Medicaid and those with higher income can 
afford a supplemental insurance. These two segments of Medicare population are less 
likely to join HMOs. The hypothesis is: 
H9 : Holding other variables constant, the income level in a service area is non-linearly 
related to the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract. 
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Payer: Employers 
Studies in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s do not find a significant effect of large 
employers on HMO development (McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982). 
However, information obtained from a survey conducted in late 1 980s and early 1 990s 
tends to suggest that large employers are more likely to offer an HMO plan to their active 
employees; workers in larger firms are more likely to join an HMO plan if it is offered as 
a benefit (Gabel, et a! . ,  1 988 ;  Sullivan, et al. ,  1 992). One empirical result that the 
possibility of HMO disenrollment by active employees declined as length of enrollment 
increases (Long, et aL 1 988) might indirectly suggest that active employees who 
currently enroll in an HMO have a higher probability to stay in the HMO after becoming 
eligible for Medicare, or roll-over to the Medicare risk program if their physician joins an 
HMO that develops a risk contract, regardless of whether employers offer HMOs as an 
option for retirement health insurance. From this perspective, HMOs appeal to large 
employers who are able to provide a large pool of a potential roll-over population. 
Another phenomenon attributable to large employers is that they are more likely 
to promise retirement health benefits (Morrisey, et a!. ,  1 990). HMO options, being 
relatively new, are not frequently offered to retired employees (Greenwald, 1 994), and 
not chosen by Medicare beneficiaries whose health insurance is employer-sponsored and 
may not include HMO options (Dowd, et a! . ,  1 994). This lower choice of HMOs by 
employers and their retired employees might be altered due to the new F AS 1 06 which 
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requires the accounting of future retirement benefits as liabilities in the balance sheet. 
This requirement especially concerns large employers who have a sizable retiree 
population eligible for health insurance benefits. Along with the rising health care costs, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that employers, particularly large ones, will seek HMO risk 
coverage for their retirees (u. S. General Accounting Office, 1 996; Greenwald, 1 994; 
Wise, 1 995). Thus, attracted by both the potential roll-over effect and an employer' s  cost 
conscious response to new regulation, HMOs are anticipated to be likely to enter a 
Medicare risk market. 
HlO : Holding other variables constant, an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk contract is 
positively associated with the existence of large employers in the service area. 
Supplier: Physicians 
Descriptive case studies suggested that primary care physicians were more 
supportive of HMO development (Schulz, et al . ,  1 990) and were more likely to join 
HMOs (Kohrman, 1 985). Competition among physicians compels them to join HMOs. 
However, empirical studies on either the HMO development (Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  
McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975) o r  the entry of  HMOs into a Medicare 
risk contract (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) do not generate 
consistent results. As survey information indicates that HMOs with any Medicare 
contract have a higher primary care physicians-total physician ratio (Dial, et a! . ,  1 995), 
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abundance of primary care physicians as an important resource will encourage the market 
entry of HMOs. Thus, the hypothesis is, 
HI 1 :  Holding other variables constant, an HMO's entry into the Medicare risk contract 
is positively associated with primary care physicians per 1 ,000 population in the 
service area. 
Market Price 
One important factor affecting a participation decision is the payment rate, 
AAPCC, that an HMO will receive for coverage. The AAPCC reflects both the costs of 
medical resources and service use rates of the FFS elderly population of an area. Markets 
with high AAPCC rates may indicate high discretionary medical care use in local 
Medicare FFS delivery systems and, subsequently, may afford great savings opportunities 
for HMOs. This expected profit where the AAPCC rate is high is anticipated to have a 
positive effect on market entry. In addition, high AAPCC rates represent a high federal 
cost control priority, thus, participation in these areas as a risk contractor should facilitate 
competition which in turn could reduce geographical variation in Medicare costs (Nycz, 
et aI . ,  1 987) and is encouraged by HCFA. One can expect that the processes for 
obtaining HCF A approval in these areas may be expedited relative to areas with low 
AAPCC rates.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that, 
H12 : Holding other variables constant, an HMO in a service area with higher AAPCC 
rates is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
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Firm Characteristics 
As Table 2 indicates, the effects of HMO attributes on market entry are not 
necessarily determinant. In addition, it is very possible that there is high correlation 
among several HMO characteristics. As to a market entry decision, two contradictory 
arguments are presented below. Note that the main purpose of including HMO attributes 
into the conceptual model is to control their effect, rather than for hypothesis testing. 
Opportunity versus Buffer 
Given the fact that a high proportion of Medicare expenditures is attributable to 
inpatient hospitalization, effective utilization control should enable HMOs to realize 
expected cost-savings benefits from entering into a risk contract. Financially strong plans 
may be more prone to enter the Medicare market, since they can generate necessary 
capital for expansion and absorb the risks of serving the Medicare population. Since the 
profit from serving Medicare emollees cannot not be greater than profit for HMO' s  
commercial business a s  restricted by ACR regulation, higher profit i n  the commercial 
market means more retainable profit in a Medicare market. Literature on diversification 
suggests that the abundance of internal resources affords a firm the opportunity to 
diversify (Ingham & Thompson, 1 995;  Mitchell, 1 989). One study on HMO's  entry into 
a Medicare risk market partially confirms that the relationship between effective 
management control of hospital utilization and high revenue per commercial emollee is 
positive and related to market entry (Porell & Wallack, 1 990). 
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A relevant counter-argument is related to organizational slack. Although 
organizational slack makes it easier to implement change, it lowers the motivation to 
undertake changes (Hedberg, 1 9 8 1 ), since organizations with slack resources are 
cushioned from the factors that might compel change. An abundance of slack resources 
can breed contentment and limit the range of problematic search and incentives for 
improvement. Excessive slack tends to dull an organization's sensitivity to environmental 
variance and discontinuity, and tends to strengthen resistance to change (Thompson, 
1 967). In one study of HMOs' response to the termination of federal assistance, Ginsberg 
and Buchholtz ( 1 990) found a demotivational response of HMOs with efficient 
utilization. For an HMO that has a prepayment arrangement, the level of resources used 
directly contributes to organizational slack. Additional use of resources does not bring in 
additional revenues, but only adds costs. Alexander and Morrisey ( 1 989) contend that 
organizations with more slack choose to remain independent and autonomous, instead of 
getting involved in an interorganizational exchange. 
The above two competing arguments show that the effect of an organization 's  
slack on market entry is ambiguous. Evan and Klemm ( 1 980) suggest that if  growth i s  
not an organizational goal hospitals pursue, hospitals will not respond to  environmental 
"opportunities and needs" but maintain their autonomy as a primary strategy. S imilarly, 
if the concern for organizational autonomy outweighs an HMO's  goal for market 
expansion, an HMO that has more organizational slack is less likely to enter the Medicare 
market. In contrast, if a goal of an HMO is to expand its market, the HMO that exhibits 
better financial performance is more likely to enter into Medicare risk contracting. 
Since an organization' s  goal and strategic planning orientation is a matter of 
managerial value, the lack of survey effort will avoid direct measurement of an 
organization' s goal and orientation. No hypothesis is proposed in this analysis to test 
how organizational slack influences an HMO' s  market entry. 
HMO Model Type 
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Compared to open-panel HMOs such as IP A and network models, staff and group 
models are more likely to have effective organizational structures for controlling 
utilization. Open-panel HMOs traditionally have greater problems of internal control 
over utilization since resources can be less effectively controlled. As discussed above, 
the effect of organization's slack on market entry is not definite. However, closed-panel 
HMOs face the greatest entry barriers, since most persons joining them would have to 
change their personal physicians. Open-panel HMOs could have members enrolled 
without switching their personal physicians. One would anticipate that open-panel 
HMOs are more likely to enter into a Medicare risk market. However, studies found that 
HMO model type had no effect on market entry (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & 
Tompkins, 1 993;  Porell & Wallack, 1 990). 
Additionally, HCFA has authorized pilot point-of-service plans, which would 
allow seniors to use providers outside an HMO network. Several HMOs are also creating 
strategies that make benefits portable or transferable for their senior enrollees. Some 
HMOs are accommodating different model types or transforming to a mixed model, 
reflected in the surveys conducted by InterStudy and Group Health Association of 
American. These changes blur the distinction of model type, and nullify the effect the 
variable might have on market entry. Many similarities in HMO structures are also 
observed (Gold, et aI . ,  1 995). Thus, it is anticipated that model type will have no effect 
on the entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. 
Organizational Age 
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Presumably, older HMOs are able to benefit by their experience to control 
utilization, possess a number of cost advantages, and consequently, retain more slack 
resources. Young HMOs may view an entry into a Medicare risk market as a means to 
expand their overall market share, though they are less experienced in utilization control .  
The same opportunity-versus-buffer argument made above applies here. Effect of age on 
market entry, or diversification, is not necessarily consistent across empirical studies. 
One study in the imaging industry (Mitchell, 1 989) documented a positive coefficient of 
age, while two studies in an entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract (Adamache & 
Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) reported a negative effect. Porell and Tompkins 
( 1 993) found a positive effect of HMO's  age on market exit. Thus, no hypothesis is 
proposed. Instead, the effect of organizational age should be controlled. 
Size 
Size of an organization is usually considered an important factor determining an 
organization's response to the environmental change. Resource dependence theory 
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proposes that the need for environmental linkage will increase as a direct function of firm 
size . However, empirical results related to size have often been contradictory (Allen, 
1 974; Boyd, 1 990; Ingham & Thompson, 1 995;  Mitchell, 1 989; Pfeffer, 1 972), and such 
contradiction may be due to different operationalization of the variable reflecting size. 
Jackson, Morgan, and Paolillo ( 1 986, p .  2 1 6) suggest that the measure of size should 
depend on the subject of an investigation. 
Enrollment size is most often used to measure HMO size (Adamache & Rossiter, 
1 986; Clement, 1 995; Ginsberg & Buchholtz, 1 990; Porell & Wallack, 1 990; Wholey, et 
aI . ,  1 992). Existing enrollees are an important resource in that they have regular sources 
of care from an HMO and may be more likely to choose HMOs as they age into 
Medicare. 
Ginsberg and Buchholtz ( 1 990) used the logarithm of the number of members 
enrolled in an HMO to measure HMO's size and found that large HMOs responded to 
environmental changes quicker than small HMOs. Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) found a 
positive effect of HMO's enrollment size on risk contract participation. They argued that 
larger HMOs could capitalize on the economies of scale if they entered into a Medicare 
risk market. However, Adamache and Rossiter ( 1 986) found a negative effect of 
enrollment size on an HMO's entering Medicare Competition Demonstration, a finding at 
odds with the requirement that before they can do risk contracting HMOs have to reach a 
minimum size of commercial enrollment (at least 5 ,000 commercial enrollees if serving 
an urban area and 1 ,500 commercial enrollees if serving a rural area) and that can take 
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years (Serafini, 1 995). From this aspect, young and small HMOs are legally prevented in 
effect from market entry, despite their intention for market expansion. 
Size may also represent other dimensions such as amount of slack resources 
(Alexander & Morrisey, 1 989). In the HMO industry, large nonprofit HMOs have a 
greater debt capacity and are somewhat cushioned from the influence of low access to 
capital (Birnbaum, 1 987). Enrollment size of HMOs could also be correlated with how 
long they stay in the market. Thus, no specific hypothesis regarding the effect of 
enrollment size is proposed, but the effect of size will be controlled. 
Physician Pool 
Physicians have been thought to be valuable liaisons for the sales force (Jaklevic, 
1 995). Evidence indicates that medical professional knowledge of the Medicare HMO 
program promotes HMO enrollment for rollovers (Garfinkel, et aI . ,  1 986). Some health 
plans use personalized letters from their physicians to encourage senior patients to enroll, 
or rollover, in the HMO in which the physician joins. One way to ease the transition to 
an HMO for Medicare beneficiaries is to expand its physician pool . Though evidence on 
the significance of physician pool tends to be anecdotal and nonempirical, one may 
expect that HMOs that have a larger physician pool can better benefit from the rollover 
effect, and could encourage the entry into a Medicare risk market. However, it is  worthy 
of note that the size of an HMO's  physician pool could be positively correlated with 
enrollment size and thus, a concern regarding collinearity arises. 
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Other Organizational Characteristics 
Profit status of HMOs is not found to be statistically significant in HMOs' 
participation in the Medicare risk program (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986). It  is worth 
noting that for-profit institutions are thought to be cost efficient and have access to capital 
at lower costs (Schlesinger, Blumenthal, & Schlesinger, 1 986). For-profit HMOs 
typically own plans in several areas and are pressured by stockholders to achieve growth 
goals. They have been able to enter lucrative AAPCC markets (Iglehart, 1 995). 
If an HMO already has a Medicare contract, either on a cost or Health Care 
Prepayment Plan (HCPP) basis, marketing HMO products to the potential risk enrollees 
would be easier and less expensive. Entry barriers are at least partially overcome. Early 
studies demonstrate that experience in similar products is directly associated with 
diversification or market entry (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Mitchell, 1 989). Hence, 
prior favorable Medicare experience should increase the likelihood that an HMO will 
enter into the risk contracting. It is also interesting to examine the effect of an HMO' s  
involvement i n  Medicare, o r  the size o f  Medicare enrollment a s  a percentage o f  total 
HMO enrollment. In contrast, for health plans such as Blue Cross with huge Medigap 
market, one might expect an opposite effect. 
Federal qualification involves establishment of insolvency insurance, quality 
assurance procedures, insurance and other arrangements against loss and liability, 
community rating within risk categories, and submission of quarterly reports to the 
governrnent (Wrightson, 1 990, p .  27-29). HMOs that hold federal qualification have 
overcome entry barriers and established their credit in dealing with HeF A, minimizing 
the regulatory impact. Thus, federally qualified HMOs should be more likely to enter 
into the Medicare risk contracting. 
Summary 
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This chapter develops a resource dependence framework and a modified 
diversification paradigm. Based on the theoretical structures and the literature on the 
HMO development and market entry, supportiveness of stakeholders, and diversification, 
hypotheses regarding the new entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract are 
proposed under three major dimensions: competitive market structure, resources in the 
general environment, and market price. Firm characteristics are included in this analysis 
mainly as control variables. 
The first research question inquires how the market structure influences the entry 
of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. Hypotheses 1 to 4 explore this issue proposing 
that the lack of favorable conditions in the HMO's  traditional market encourages an 
HMO to participate in the Medicare risk program. Hypotheses 5 and 6 predict that an 
attractive Medicare market encourages the market entry. 
The second research question is raised to explain the affect of the environmental 
resources on the market entry. The environmental resources important to an HMO's  
survival are conceptualized in  terms of  three stakeholders, that is, the elderly population, 
employers, particularly the large ones, and physicians. It is hypothesized that a large base 
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of the elderly population (Hypothesis 7) and a high level of immigration activity 
(Hypothesis 8) are associated with the high probability of the market entry. Hypothesis 9 
suggests that the average income level in the market might have an inverse, U-shape 
relationship with the market entry. Hypotheses 1 0  and 1 1  propose that resource 
munificence, such as the existence of the large employers and more primary care 
physicians per capita, are associated with the entry into a Medicare risk contract. 
The third research question is important, particularly in the policy aspect, to 
understand how the market entry is influenced by the level of the AAPCC rate. 
Hypothesis 1 2  addresses this issue proposing that an HMO is more likely to enter into a 
market in which the AAPCC rate is higher. 
The affect of gender of the elderly population and organizational attributes are 
inconclusive, or ambiguous, and no hypothesis is proposed. Instead, these factors will be 
incorporated in the proposed analysis as control variables. Due to data limitation, two 
factors, health status of the elderly popUlation and the level of Medigap premiums, are not 
included in this analysis. 
Chapter 4 introduces the research design, data sources, and variable measurement 
used in this investigation to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the results of this 
analysis. Chapter 6 discusses the findings and implications. 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
This chapter discusses the research design of this analysis. Data sources are 
enumerated and discussed. The measurement of the study variables is presented. The 
analytical methods used to test the hypotheses are described. 
Research Design 
The purpose of this study is to identify factors associated with an HMO's  decision 
to participate in a Medicare risk contract. The unit of analysis is the individual HMO. 
The entry into a Medicare risk contract involves a process that occurs over a period of 
time, rather than a discrete event marked by the HCFA's approval, and which makes 
inappropriate the use of the cross-sectional design. This investigation uses a non­
experimental, retrospective, time-lagged panel design. The measurement of the 
independent variables precedes that of the dependent variable, that is, the entry of an 
HMO into a Medicare risk contract. Though causal effect can be best illustrated in an 
experimental study, the approach of a time-lagged, panel design used in this analysis can 
better assess association of cause compared with a cross-sectional study design. 
Additionally, the theory-based nature of this study and multivariate analytic strategies, 
which are commonly used in organizational research, enhance verifying cause-effect 
relationships (Veney & Kaluzny, 1 984, pp. 56-59). 
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Definition of Market 
In the previous studies of HMO development done in the late 1 970s and early 
1 980s (Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975; 
Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Welch, 1 984) and other HMO studies conducted with data 
collected prior to 1 99 1  (Schlesinger, et aI . ,  1 986; Wholey, et aI. ,  1 992), market area for an 
HMO was defined as the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). It was believed 
that most HMO activities were focused in cities and suburbs, and an SMSA better 
approximated the true market for an HMO's  services than counties (Morrisey & Ashby, 
1 982). 
Two empirical studies of the entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract 
defined HMO market area variously. In examining the Medicare Competition 
Demonstration, Adamache and Rossiter ( 1 986) defined the market as the county in which 
an HMO's  main office was located. Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) defined HMO market 
areas as metropolitan statistical areas (MSA); nonmetropolitan markets were defined by 
the major county of HMO operation. 
Harrington et al . ( 1 988) reported that almost all of the Medicare risk-contract 
HMOs included in their study targeted services in large MSAs or a state-wide area. In a 
study of an HMO's conversion to for-profit status, Ginsberg and Buchholtz ( 1 990) argued 
that it was not necessary to restrict an HMO's  operation to one community or 
metropolitan area. Instead, they measured task and institutional environment variables on 
a state level. Each HMO was assigned to the state in which its headquarters were located. 
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The definition of the major county of HMO operation as market area may be too 
narrow. The great majority of HMOs serve more than one county. Only 33 ,  or 6% of 
535  HMOs in this study sample served one county. Another definition of the HMO 
market area is an MSA. It was found that over 85% of all HMO members resided in the 
57 largest MSAs, while 56% of the nation's  total population resided in these 57 MSAs in 
1 99 1  (Bergsten & Palsbo, 1 993). Of all HMOs in the InterStudy census as of January 
1 995, 22% HMOs reported that they served rural counties only. About 44% of all HMOs 
served more than one MSA and operated as a single entity. The definition of a single 
MSA as the market area is not appropriate for HMOs that serve multiple MSAs or a 
primarily rural area. 
It is clear that the definition of the HMO market as one county or MSA may either 
understate or overstate the service area of an HMO. The predominant employment of 
single MSA (Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil & Schlenker, 1 975 ;  
Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Schlesinger, et  aI. ,  1 986; Welch, 1 984; Wholey, et  aI . ,  1 992) or  
multiple MSAs (Christianson, Sanchez, et  aI . ,  1 99 1 ;  Feldman, et  aI . ,  1 993;  Wholey, et  aI . ,  
1 990) as  an HMO's market in HMO studies based on data before 1 99 1  may be in part 
due to the historical way HMO information was summarily reported. Before 1 99 1 ,  only 
the MSA in which the HMO was headquartered was reported by the InterStudy Census. 
Since 1 99 1 ,  InterStudy has listed all counties which an HMO claims to serve. In one 
study of HMOs' premiums for Medicare supplementary benefits, Feldman et al . ( 1 993) 
adopted the concept of market area, or all counties in which the HMO had Medicare 
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enrollees to measure some variables. In a serial of longitudinal studies of HMOs (for 
example, Feldman, et aI . ,  1 995;  Feldman, Wholey, & Christianson, 1 996; Wholey, et aI . ,  
1 995), researchers used lists of  an HMO's  claimed counties to  define the HMO's  "market 
area," or "operating locations" since 1 989. The use of multiple MSAs as an HMO's  
market area is closer to  the concept of  a service area than prior measurements. However, 
there may be some bias against HMOs that serve primarily rural counties or urban-rural 
mixed areas, though it can be argued that separate analysis of these areas is needed 
irrespective of designated service area. 
In this analysis, an HMO' s  market is defined as all service counties reported to 
InterStudy as an HMO's  self-declared service area. The unique market or service area for 
an organization has been employed in hospital studies (for example, Melnick & 
Zwanziger, 1 988;  Melnick, Zwanziger, Bamezai, & Pattison, 1 992). This definition of 
service area as the HMO market is not without problem per se, but may be a better 
approximation of an HMO's  true operating area than prior definitions (see Appendix A). 
Morrisey and Ashby ( 1 982) argue that no operational definition of HMO market is 
appropriate for all purposes. The purpose of this study is to examine how resource 
availability or dependence influences the market entry of an HMO. The service area of 
an HMO is the environment from which the HMO obtains resources such as enrollees and 
employer group. In addition, the HMO forms its network of providers who provide 
services to those who reside in the service area. From this perspective, the employment 
of service area as an HMO's  operating locations is legitimate for this study. 
Sample 
The study population includes all HMOs responding to the semi-annual census 
conducted by InterStudy. In 1 98 1 ,  the federal government gave InterStudy the 
responsibility for conducting a census of HMOs. Since then, InterStudy has been an 
official source of information about the HMO industry. 
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For any given year, the total number of HMOs with risk contracts consists of 
HMOs that renew a risk contract and those that start a risk contract. In this analysis in 
which a time-lagged, panel design is applied, it is appropriate to include only those 
HMOs without a risk contract at the first time point, and examine factors measured at the 
first time point which are associated with their initial risk contract identified at a second 
time point. Therefore, the study sample includes HMOs that do not have a Medicare risk 
contract at the first time point, and still remain in business at the second time point. The 
next section on time window will discuss the length of time lag for measuring the study 
variables. 
Time Window 
The process of contracting with the HCF A starts with an HMO's  decision to 
participate in risk contracting. This decision is followed by preparation of legal 
documentation and applications to obtain the HCFA's approval before an HMO can 
enroll Medicare beneficiaries. It usually takes about two weeks for an HMO to 
investigate market and organizational factors before making a market entry decision, and 
the HMO spends about two months to prepare legal documentation (C. Thomas, personal 
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communication, April 1 ,  1 996). J .  LeMasurier (personal communication, April 1 ,  1 996) 
in the Office of Managed Care, HCFA, indicates that on average it takes HCF A 25-26 
weeks to review and approve an HMO's  application. An estimate of the length of the 
entire application-approval process would be more than 6 months. A one-year time lag is 
adopted in this analysis to allow for the application-approval process. Recognizing the 
continuous growth of Medicare business for HMOs since 1 993, it will be of most interest 
to analyze the most recent data available for market entry. The most recent data which 
are available, to some extent, can also obviate the analytical limitation of a small number 
of HMOs with risk contracts during the time period of the late 1 980s and early 1 990s. 
Considering the data limitations, the time window of January 1 994-January 1 995 is 
selected for this analysis. The study sample consists of HMOs that did not have a 
Medicare risk contract as of January 1 994 and still remained in business as of January 
1 995 .  That is, January 1 995 is the time point to measure the entry of an HMO into a 
Medicare risk contract, and the independent variables will be measured using data for 
1 994 or before. 
Data Sources 
Data are extracted from several sources. The details of each data source are 
discussed below. 
InterStudy Competitive Edge (as of January 1 994- 1 995): HMO Directory 
This is the primary source of data for measuring HMO-specific attributes.  
1 22 
InterStudy conducts semi-annual surveys with a mailed questionnaire. The response rate 
is around 95% (S. D. Schwartz, personal communication, April 22, 1 996). InterStudy 
contacts state insurance departments to get partial information for HMOs that InterStudy 
fails to contact by either mail or telephone. The HMO Directory contains information on 
HMO characteristics, service area, and enrollment size. 
Group Health Association of America Directory of HMOs (1994, 1 995) 
Group Health Association of America (GHAA), now named the American 
Association of Health Plans (AAHP) after merging with American Managed Care 
Review Association (AMCRA), is a national organization for HMOs. Each year GHAA 
IAAHP contacts all member HMOs included in the previous year 's  directory by mail for 
annual updated information, with telephone follow-up if necessary. The GHAA 
directories for 1 994 and 1 995 are used to supplement and validate information obtained 
from the InterStudy survey. 
Other Data Sources 
Environmental resource data are from the 1 996 Area Resource File (ARP), the 
1 994 County and City Data Book, and the 1 993 County Business Patterns (CBP) . The 
ARF is a compilation of county-based information on health professions, health facilities, 
income statistics, demographics broken down by gender, race, and age groups, and vital 
statistics. The County and City Data Book contains information on county-based 
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migration activities and foreign-born population (U.S .  Department of Commerce, 1 994). 
The CBP includes state- and county-level mid-March employment data (U.S .  Department 
of Commerce, 1 993). 
Additional supplementary data are obtained from the HCF A. AAPCC data are 
from the Office of Managed Care, HCF A. Data on county-level Medicare beneficiaries 
are obtained from the Office of the Actuary, HCF A. 
Measurement of Variables 
Variables for this analysis are selected based on the literature and theory. The 
definitions and measurement of the study variables are discussed in this section. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is an HMO's  market entry into a Medicare risk contract 
during 1 994. It is coded as 1 for Medicare market entry and 0 for others (denoted as 
RISK95). Having a risk contract as of January 1 ,  1 994 is reflected by the variable 
RISK94. The decision to enter a market is viewed as a function of four groups of 
independent variables (competitive market structure, resource availability, market price, 
and organizational attributes), which is specified by the following model: 
Market entry ( l ,  0) = f (CMS, RA, MP, OA) 
where, 
eMS is a set of variables representing competitive market structure; 
RA is a set of variables measuring resource availability; 
MP is a variable indicating market price; and, 
OA represents variables measuring organizational attributes. 
Independent Variables 
Independent variables are grouped into four categories: competitive market 
structure, resource availability, market price, and organizational attributes.  Most of the 
variables in the first three categories are measured at the level of service area which is 
unique to each HMO, and the last category is HMO-specific data. 
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A list of study variables with their definition is presented in Table 5 .  Since data 
used to measure most of the variables are originally available at county level, the method 
of data aggregation from county level to an HMO's  service area is explained in Appendix 
B. It should be noted that if calculating the weighted average of the variables is 
necessary, county population is used as the weight, unless otherwise mentioned. The 
process of prorating an HMO's  enrollment over counties in its service area is illustrated 
in Appendix C. After prorating, HMO enrollment in the county is then treated like other 
county-level data in calculating market share for each HMO, HMO penetration, and 
resource concentration in the service area unique to each HMO. 
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Table 5 
Definition of Independent Variables, Data Sources, Expected Effects on Market Entry 
Variable 
(data source) 
Definition 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-Elderly Market 
Growth in A three-year average of percentage change in HMO 
enrollment (e) enrollment 
HMO 
penetration (e) 
Total HMO enrollment in the service area divided 
by the total population in the same service area 
Market dominance The sum of the squared market share for all HMOs 
index (a, e) in the service area 
Market share 
(a, e) 
The individual HMO's  enrol lment divided by the 
total HMO enrollment in the service area 
Competitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
Growth in A three-year ( 1 992, 1 993, 1 994) average of 
Medicare percentage change in Medicare HMO enrollment 
enrol lment (t) under risk contracts 
Number of risk 
plans (a, h) 
The number of HMOs with Medicare risk contracts 
in the service area 
Resource Availability 
% of elderly Percentage of population 65 years old or over in the 
population (e) service area 
Notation Hypothesis 
(exp. sign) 
GROW H I (-) 
PENE 
MDI H3 ( -) 
SHARE 
G MCR H5 (+) 
OLD 
% of foreign-bom Percentage of foreign-bom population in the service FOREIGN HS (+) 
population (d) area 
% of female 
elderly (e) 
% of in-migrants 
(d) 
Income (e) 
Income2 (e) 
Large 
employers (c) 
Percentage of female population aged 65 or over in 
the service area 
Percentage of population aged 5 or over living in 
different states 
Per capita income ($ 1 ,000), adjusted for wage index 
(adjusted per capita income)2 
OLD F 
MOVER 
A INCOME 
Proportion of employers with 250 or more employees EMPLOY H I 0 (+) 
in the service area 
Table 5 (continued) 
Physician per 
1 ,000 population 
(e) 
Market Price 
AAPCC (f, g) 
Primary care physicians per 1 ,000 population in the 
service area 
(Part A aged AAPCC) + (Part B aged AAPCC), 
adjusted for wage index 
MD]OP 
AAPCC 
Organizational Attributes: Control Variables 
Model (a, b) Two dummy variables for open-panel and mixed types OPEN 
Age (a, b) 
Size (a) 
(closed-panel HMO as reference group) MIX 
The number of years in business AGE 
Total HMO enrollment SIZE 
Physician pool (a) The number of physician contracts (both for primary DOC EN 
care and specialty service) per 1 000 enrollees 
Profit status (a) Dummy variable: profit HMOs ( 1 ); others (0) TAX STAT 
Prior Medicare (a) Dummy: having cost contract or HCPP ( 1 ); ROLLCARE 
experience others (0) 
Continuous:  the number of Medicare enrollment MCR P 
as the percentage of total HMO enrol lment 
Medigap policy (a) Dummy: having Medigap ( 1 ); others (0) MEDIGAP 
Federal 
qualification (a) 
Dummy variable: federally qualified ( 1 ); others (0) FEDQUAL 
Chain member (c) Two dummy variables indicating the BClBS and other AFFIL l 
national managed care firms ( 1 ); others (0) AFFIL2 
Noncontiguity of Dummy variable indicating the noncontiguous service MARKET _ C 
the service area (a) area ( 1 ); other (0) 
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H l l  (+) 
H J 2  (+) 
Data sources :  a = InterStudy Competitive Edges (as of January 1 994 and 1 995); b = GHAA 
directory ( 1 994, 1 995); c = County Business Patterns ( 1 993); d = County and City Data Book 
( 1 994); e = Area Resource File ( 1 996); f= 5-year AAPCC master file; g = wage index tape; h = 
monthly reports of Medicare managed care plans, HCFA. 
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Competitive Market Structure 
In one study of an organization's survival in the minicomputer industry 
(Romanelli, 1 989), market demand was measured as a three-year average of percentage 
changes in unit sales. Feldman et al. ( 1 995) used two measures of the HMO's growth: 
the raw enrollment change and the percentage enrollment change. In this analysis, the 
market demand for the HMO services, or the potential enrollment growth, is measured by 
the three-year ( 1 992, 1 993, 1 994) average of percentage changes in HMO enrollment. 
HMO penetration is usually defined, from the HMO perspective, as the total 
HMO enrollment in the service area divided by the total population in the same area 
(Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Feldman, et aI. ,  1 996; McLaughlin, 1 987; Morrisey & 
Ashby, 1 982; Porell & Wallack, 1 990; Wholey, et aI . ,  1 990; Wholey, et aI. ,  1 992) . One 
alternative measure of market penetration defines the total HMO market as the number of 
the insured population (Bergsten & Palsbo, 1 993 ; Goldberg & Greenberg, 1 980). Due to 
data limitations of the availability of the number of insured people, HMO penetration in 
this analysis is reflected by the total HMO enrollment in the service area as the 
percentage of total population in the same area. 
Structural competition is often specified by concentration measures. The 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), or the Herfindahl Index, is widely used to represent 
competitive vigor in market research (Melnick & Zwanziger, 1 988 ;  Melnick, et aI . ,  1 992; 
Phibbs & Robinson, 1 993;  White & Chirikos, 1 988). It has been used as well in HMO 
studies (Feldman, et aI . ,  1 993;  Porell and Wallack, 1 990; Wholey, et ai, 1 990). In this 
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study, an index i s  constructed as the sum o f  the squared market shares for all HMOs in 
HMO:s service area, similar to an HHI. An HMO is considered to be a competitor of 
HMOj if its service area overlaps that of HMOj by at least one county. HMOs with 
smaller market shares in HMOj' s  service area contribute relatively less to HMOj ' s  index. 
Rather than the more usual competition definition, analysis of the construction of this 
measure indicates that it may be better interpreted as dominance of each HMO (that is, 
HMO) in its unique service area. Thus, it is referred to as a market dominance index 
(MDI) in this analysis (see Appendix C). 
The concept of the uniqueness of HHI , or market dominance in this study, for an 
organization has been employed in previous studies that defined unique market areas for 
organizations such as hospitals (for example, Melnick & Zwanziger 1 988 ;  Melnick, et aI . ,  
1 992) and HMOs (for example, Feldman, et  a . ,  1 993;  Feldman, et  aI . ,  1 996; Wholey, et 
aI . ,  1 995). The major difference between this study and previous studies exists in how 
the index is calculated. In previous HMO studies, a county-level HHI is first calculated. 
A weighted average of the index over all counties in the service area is then calculated, 
with an HMO's enrollment in a county divided by its total enrollment over all counties 
constituting the service area of the HMO as the weight. Comparatively, the approach 
used in this study is simpler and more straightforward, avoids weighting procedures, and 
directly uses service area-level data to construct the indices.  It merits notice that county­
level HMO enrollment data are not available either from InterStudy or ARF but 
calculated from the prorating process (see Appendix C) in which measurement inaccuracy 
may be inevitable. The use of county-level HMO enrollment as the weight to construct 
the MDI may further introduce measurement errors. This difference in calculation also 
applies to the measurement of HMO penetration. 
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It has been argued that the use of HHI to measure market structure is not 
appropriate when organizations in the industry, such as HMOs practicing product 
differentiation, do not produce a standardized commodity with a single price (Feldman, 
Finch, Dowd, & Cas sou, 1 989; Wholey, et aI . ,  1 995). Thus, another measure of 
competitive structure used in some HMO studies (Feldman, et aI . ,  1 996; Schlesinger, et 
aI . ,  1 986; Wholey, et aI . ,  1 990; Wholey, et al . ,  1 992) is the number of HMOs in a service 
area. In this study, the weighted number of HMOs in the service area is included as a 
measure of structural competition. 
An individual HMO's market share is calculated as the individual HMO's  
enrollment divided by the total HMO enrollment in  the service area (see Appendix C). 
Similar to the measure of the growth rate of HMO enrollment, the growth rate of HMO 
Medicare enrollment in the service area is measured by a three-year average of percentage 
changes in Medicare HMO enrollment under risk contracts. Competition in a Medicare 
risk market is measured by the number of Medicare risk-contract HMOs in the service 
area. 
Resource Availability 
The measurement of resource availability is based on the previous studies 
(summarized in Tables 1 and 2). Resource measures are also somewhat limited by data 
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availability. The elderly population eligible for Medicare and able to participate i n  a risk-
contract HMO is measured by the proportion of population aged 65 or over in the service 
area. Two variables are used to reflect a physician-patient relationship: the proportion of 
the foreign-born population and the proportion of in-migrants. The foreign-born 
population is expected to have a less stable physician-patient relationship, and thus is 
more likely to join HMOs. An in-migrant population is less likely to have a regular 
physician but its impact on an HMO's entry into a Medicare risk contract remains to be 
empirically tested. To control for the potential effect of gender on the physician-patient 
relationship, the proportion of female population aged 65 or over is included. Wage 
index-adjusted per capita income of the service area is used as a proxy measuring the 
income level of Medicare beneficiaries. A squared term of adjusted per capita income is 
created to examine a non-linear relationship between the income level and market entry. 
The use of a squared term to test a non-linear relationship has been adopted in a prior 
empirical study on diversification (Ingham & Thompson, 1 995). The existence of large 
employers who are more likely to offer health insurance as a benefit is measured by the 
proportion of employers with 250 or more employees in the service area. To measure 
primary care physicians per 1 ,000 population, physicians who are in either general 
practice or family practice and are involved in patient care are included in the numerator; 
the denominator is total population in the service area; then the measure is multiplied by 
1 ,000. 
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Market Price 
Adamache and Rossiter ( 1 986) used the sum of Part A and Part B AAPCC rates to 
represent the AAPCC rate in a county. The county-level combined value was then 
aggregated to the service area which an HMO applied to serve as a risk plan, using the 
number of county-level Medicare beneficiaries as a weight. Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) 
measured the AAPCC rate by the Medicare wage-adjusted AAPCC in an MSA, but there 
is no explanation how Part A and Part B AAPCCs were summed and how the county­
level AAPCCs were aggregated to the MSA-level AAPCC. In a study of HMOs' 
premiums for Medicare supplemental benefits, Feldman et al . ( 1 993) calculated weighted 
AAPCC for a Medicare HMO using the share of its total enrollment in the county as the 
weight. 
In this analysis, the Medicare payment rate is the wage index-adjusted sum of 
Part A and Part B aged AAPCCs, weighted by the number of county-level Medicare 
beneficiaries over all counties in the service area of an HMO. The pitfall of using county­
level HMO enrollment as the weight was explained in the previous section. The 
weighted average of Part A (or Part B) AAPCC for HMOj in Service Are� is :  
Medicare beneficiaries in County i 
AAPCC j = L AAPCC i x ---------------
Total Medicare beneficiaries in Service Area j 
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Organizational Attributes 
Organizational attributes are measured at the individual HMO level. HMO model 
type is measured by two dummy variables indicating two model types, respectively: 
open-panel and mixed types. Closed-panel HMO is the reference group because it 
accounts for the smallest proportion in the study sample. Organizational age is measured 
as the number of years an HMO has been in business. Total HMO enrollment reflects the 
size of an HMO. The number of physician contracts, both for primary care and specialty 
service, captures the size of the physician pool in an HMO. The size of an HMO's  
physician pool may be  highly correlated with enrollment size. To avoid collinearity, the 
number of physician contracts is divided by total enrollment and then multiplied by 
1 ,000. Tax exempt status of an HMO is measured by one dummy variable: I indicating 
those that are for-profit HMOs, and 0 for others. 
Prior Medicare experience is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether 
an HMO had a cost contract or Health Care Prepayment Plan before entering into a risk 
contract. A continuous variable, the size of Medicare enrollment as the proportion of 
total HMO enrollment, is an alternative measure of prior Medicare experience. Another 
dummy variable denotes whether an HMO offers Medicare supplemental insurance. If an 
HMO is federally qualified, the value of 1 is coded, and 0 for those not federally 
qualified. 
About 66% of total HMOs are affiliated with national managed care firms, which 
would violate a regression assumption (i .e . ,  independence of observations). To control 
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for this, n- l dummy variables (plus one reference group) that reflect n national chains 
should be included in a regression model (Friedman & Shortell, 1 988) .  There are 37  
national managed care firms recognized in  the InterStudy survey. Each of  37 national 
managed care firms accounts for less than 1 0% of the total HMOs in the 1 995 InterStudy 
census, except the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association which accounts for 1 4 .2% of 
the HMOs. In this analysis, two dummy variables are created: one for HMOs affiliated 
with the Blue CrosslBlue Shield Association and the other for those affiliated with other 
national managed care firm, respectively, with the independent HMOs as a reference 
group. This approach has been adopted by previous HMO studies (Feldman, et a!. ,  1 996; 
Wholey, et a! . ,  1 992). 
An HMO's operating locations are defined as the HMO's  self-claimed service 
area, which is not necessarily contiguous. Since this may reflect a difference from a 
closely contained market, a dummy variable is included in the models indicating the 
service areas that are noncontiguous. 
Analytical Methods 
The primary analytic strategy for this investigation is multivariate logistic 
regression. A logistic regression model is an appropriate technique when the dependent 
variable is binary. Additionally, logistic regression has the advantage of being less 
affected when basic assumptions for multiple regression, particularly multivariate 
normality, are violated (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1 992, p. 9 1 ) . This 
investigation begins with a univariate analysis of the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample and 
bivariate analyses of both 1 994 cross-section sample and panel sample. That is, a 
comparison will be made between HMOs that had Medicare risk contacts and those that 
did not. Factor analysis and multiple regression analysis will be employed to examine 
multicollinearity problems among continuous independent variables. Factor scores will 
be used in place of groups of correlated variables in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
Before discussing the logistic model, one analytical concern regarding model fitting is 
discussed first. 
Model Fitting Issue 
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In multiple regression, the desire to avoid a Type I (false positive) error is an 
important reason for choosing a parsimonious model (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 
1 988) .  A Type I error in a regression analysis is caused by including a predictor that has 
a zero regression coefficient. In contrast, there is also a good reason to choose a large 
model in order to avoid making a Type II (false negative) error (Kleinbaum, et a! . ,  1 988) .  
A Type II error corresponds to omitting a predictor that has a truly nonzero regression 
coefficient in the population. Model underfitting will lead to biased estimates of 
regression coefficients. However, model overfitting does not introduce bias. In general, 
the smaller sample size, the smaller the model should be. 
There are different criteria with regard to the concern of sample size and the 
number of the independent variables. One loose requirement is for a minimum of 1 0  
degrees of freedom (Kleinbaum, et a!. ,  1 988) such that: 
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n - k - l � 1 0 or k s n - l l  
where, 
n is sample size; and, 
k is the number of predictors. 
Another rule of thumb used in multiple regression is to have at least 5 or 1 0  
observations per predictor (Norman & Streiner, 1 994, p .  1 1 6) .  The third, and the most 
stringent requirement specific to the logistic model is that the number of independent 
variables should be less than 1 0% of the number of subjects that experience the event of 
interest (Daley & Shwartz, 1 994), that is for this analysis, HMOs that participate in a 
Medicare risk contract. There is no absolute standard regarding which criterion discussed 
above is most appropriate. 
Due to the nature of the HMO industry that less than 600 HMOs existed and much 
fewer HMOs started a Medicare risk contract in 1 995, model overfitting is inevitable, if 
the third criterion is adopted. If the first two criteria are employed, model overfitting will 
not cause a serious concern in this analysis. Since this analysis is based on a theoretical 
framework, it is not to select a relatively small set of variables among a large number of 
variables through factor analysis. 
Multivariate Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression estimates the probability of an event occurring (i .e . ,  entry into 
a Medicare risk contract for this analysis) . The specification of the logit model is as 
follows: 
k 
In [P/( l -P)] = �o + L �i X; 
i=1 
The probability function is specified as: 
Where, 
In is a natural logarithm; 
P is the probability of entering into a Medicare risk contract; 
�o and �i are coefficient estimates; 
Xi refers to the dependent variables; and, 
e is the base of the natural logarithm. 
In a more straightforward way of understanding the coefficient estimate (�;), the 
probability of an event occurring can be written as an odds ratio :  
I f  � i  i s  positive, the odds ratio will be  greater than one, o r  vice versa, i f  � i  i s  
negative i t  will be  less than one. I f  � i  i s  statistically significantly, the upper and lower 
limits of the confidence intervals of an odds ratio do not span one. An odds ratio is 
1 3 6  
1 37 
interpreted as : for one unit increase in the independent variable (x;), an HMO is eJ3; times 
more or less likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. For a discrete independent 
variable (x;), the estimated coefficient (13;) means that compared to the reference group 
(x;=O) HMOs that have x; =1 are 13; times more likely to enter into a Medicare risk 
contract. 
If the estimated coefficient of the independent variable corresponding to the 
respective hypothesis has the expected sign and is significant at the p value of 0 .05,  it is 
confident to conclude that the hypothesis is statistically supported. 
Summary 
This chapter describes the study design, data sources, the measurement of the 
variables, and analytical method used in this investigation. This study differs from 
previous work on an HMO's  entry into a Medicare risk contract in the aspect of study 
design, market definition, and measurement of variables. A non-experimental, time­
lagged panel design, rather than cross-sectional design, is used in this investigation. The 
HMO market is defined as a unique service area, rather than an MSA as in prior analyses. 
An individual HMO is the unit of analysis. The study sample is comprised of HMOs that 
do not have Medicare risk contracts as of January 1 994 and continue to exist in business 
as of January 1 995 .  
Several sources provide data for better measurement of variables. The InterStudy 
January semi-annual census of HMOs is the primary data source for the variables of the 
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competitive market structure and organizational attributes.  Variables that measure the 
environmental resources are extracted from the 1 994 ARF and 1 994 County Business 
Patterns. The AAPCC rate is available in the AAPCC master file from the RCF A. 
Multivariate logistic regression is the analytical method in this study where the dependent 
variable is binary. 
The results of this study are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, study findings 
are discussed with their implications, limitations, and applicability to future research. 
CHAPTER S 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the findings of the study, including descriptive statistics of 
the study sample and results from the bivariate analyses for both the 1 994 cross-section 
sample and 1 994- 1 995 panel sample. Before model building, factor analysis and mUltiple 
regression for several independent variables are conducted to examine the 
multicollinearity among the independent variables and, subsequently, to modify the 
analytic model. The findings of the multivariate logistic regression from the two 
approaches are then presented. 
Study Sample 
The unit of analysis is the individual HMO. To be included in this study, the 
HMO had to be operational as of January 1 994 and remained in business as of January 
1 995 .  For HMOs that appeared in the 1 994 InterStudy census but disappeared in the 
1 995 census, several possibilities might provide an explanation. The HMO may have ( I ) 
terminated its operation; (2) merged into other HMO under a different name; (3) 
consolidated its operation or combined data reporting to the 1 995 InterStudy census with 
other HMOs in different operating locations but under the same national firm; or (4) did 
not respond to the 1 995 InterStudy census. The InterStudy directories provide 
information on HMO termination, merger, and consolidation activities. Information on 
1 3 9  
1 40 
the fourth group was obtained through cross-validation with the 1 995 GHAA directory. 
If an HMO appeared in the 1 995 GHAA directory but not in the 1 995 InterStudy census, 
it was considered a nomespondent to the 1 995 InterStudy survey. HMOs that terminated 
or merged-"disappeared" were dropped from the sample. HMOs in the last two groups 
were retained. 
Alternatively, some HMOs appeared only in the 1 995 census. This may be 
because that the HMO ( 1 )  reported to InterStudy for the first time even though it had been 
in business for several years; (2) disaggregated combined data reporting in 1 995;  or (3) 
started its operation in 1 994. For HMOs in the first two groups, GHAA directories were 
used to supplement and proportionally allocate 1 994 emollment data to HMOs under the 
same national firm. Forty HMOs that became operational after January 1 ,  1 994 were 
excluded from the sample. When compared to the panel sample of this study with regard 
to tax-exempt status, national firm affiliation, and model type, no significant difference 
was observed between these 40 new HMOs and those in the panel sample. 
In total, 535 HMOs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia were identified 
for the 1 994 cross-sectional sample. Out of the 535 HMOs, 95 had Medicare risk 
contracts as of January 1 ,  1 994. That is, the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample retained the 440 
HMOs that did not have Medicare risk contracts as of January 1 ,  1 994. Of these 440 
HMOs in the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample, 43 HMOs started a new risk contract as of January 
1 ,  1 995 .  
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Univariate Analysis 
Since the primary study sample is the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample, this section 
reports the results from the univariate analysis of this sample. Descriptive statistics of the 
continuous independent variables are first described, followed by frequency of the 
discrete independent variables. 
Continuous Independent Variables 
The results from the univariate analysis of the continuous independent variables 
for the panel sample are divided into four major groups and presented in Table 6 .  
Competitive Market Structure 
The average enrollment growth an HMO faced in its service area was 1 0% from 
1 994 to 1 995 .  Some service areas experienced a decline in HMO enrollment. HMO 
penetration ranged from 1 % to almost 70%. The maximum value for the market 
dominance index or market share was equal to 1 ,  reflecting that there was no other 
competing HMO in the service area. The mean number of competitors of a local HMO 
was 1 3 ,  although this average was reduced to 8 when it was weighted to reflect the 
market share of each competitor in the service area. 
The growth rate for Medicare enrollment in HMOs in a service area demonstrates 
a greater degree of variability, compared with that of HMO general enrollment. The 
number of HMOs with a Medicare risk contract in a typical service area was 2.4, 
spanning from 0 to 1 6 . 
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Table 6 
Univariate Analysis of Continuous Variables: 1 994- 1 995 Panel SamQle 
Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elderly Market 
Growth in HMO enrollment 0 . 1 0  0.09 -0. 1 5  0 .44 
HMO penetration 0 .30 0 . 1 3  0 .0 1  0.69 
Market dominance index 0.24 0 . 1 4  0.06 1 .00 
Number of competitors 1 3 .3 1  7 .59 1 .00 48.00 
Weighted number of competitors 8.07 6.35 0.52 34 .82 
Market share 0 . 1 6  0 . 1 9  0.00 1 .00 
Competitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
Growth in Medicare enrollment 1 .65 1 1 .59 -0.50 1 0 1 .25 
Number of risk plans 2 .35  2 .80 0 .00 1 6 .00 
Resource Availability 
% elderly population 1 2. 1 8  2 .35  7.24 24.77 
% foreign-born population 6.87 7.43 0.66 45 . 1 0  
% in-migrants 9.98 4.5 1 2.42 3 1 .20 
% female elderly 7.3 1 1 .39  4.32 1 3 .4 1  
Income 2 1 423 3402 1 3 755 32777 
Wage index adjusted income 2 1 490 220 1 1 4697 27664 
Large employers (x 1 ,000) 0. 1 7  0 .04 0.00 0.36 
Physicians per 1 ,000 population 0.06 0 .03 0 .0 1  0.23 
Market Price 
Part A AAPCC 246.08 44.03 145 .82 427.83 
Part B AAPCC 1 3 7.09 32.69 75 .6 1  283.52 
Part A+B AAPCC 3 83 . 1 7  69.95 232.9 1 604.49 
Adjusted Part A AAPCC 248.65 37 .5 1 1 5 8 .65 367.53 
Adjusted Part B AAPCC 1 26.90 27.86 75 . 1 6  26 1 .99 
Adjusted Part A + B AAPCC 375 .55  57 .08  233 . 8 1  555 .46 
Organizational Attributes 
Age 9.90 7.62 0 .0 1  65 .00 
Log (age) 2 . 1 7  0 .72 O .o I  4 . 1 9  
Size 94458 20 1 874 0.00 2426746 
Log (size) 1 0.41  2.02 0.00 1 4 .70 
Physician pool 1 734 2020 1 1 .00 1 7204 
Physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees 1 97 .55  760.47 0. 1 0  1 2 1 77 
Medicare enrollment in an HMO 1 272 1 0 1 43 0.00 204986 
% Medicare enrollment 1 .22 4 .55 0 .00 59 .50 
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Resource Availability 
As to resource availability, a typical HMO operated in a service area where 1 2% 
of the population were the elderly, or 7% were the female elderly; foreign-born and in­
migrant population counted for almost 7% and 1 0% of the total population, respectively. 
The average wage-index adjusted per capita income was higher than the unadjusted value. 
In addition, the minimum adjusted per capita income was higher than the minimum 
unadjusted per capita income, and the opposite was true for the maximum values. On 
average, there were 6 primary care physicians per 1 00,000 population in a typical service 
area. 
Market Price 
In general, the average Part A AAPCC rate was higher than the average Part B 
AAPCC rate, adjusted or unadjusted. The standard deviations of Part A AAPCC rates 
(44.03 and 37.5 1 )  were also greater than those of Part B AAPCC rates (32.69 and 27.86) ,  
meaning that the distribution of Part A AAPCC rate was more disperse than that of Part B 
AAPCC. On average, the adjusted Part A AAPCC rate (248.65) was slightly higher than 
the unadjusted AAPCC rate (246.08), but the adjusted Part B AAPCC rate ( 1 26.90) was 
lower than the unadjusted value ( 1 3 7.09). Overall, the adjusted combined (Part A+B) 
AAPCC rate (3 75.55) was lower than the unadjusted combined rate (383 . 1 7) .  
Organizational Attributes 
The average age of HMOs in this study was 1 0, with a wide range between 
minimum and maximum values. This wide variation is due to the fact that there were 
several true outlier HMOs which have stayed in business for a long time. The same 
situation is true for HMO enrollment size. To control for extreme data skewness, the 
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natural logarithm of both HMO age (LN_AGE) and size (LN_SIZE) was used. The total 
enrollment in an HMO was composed of 1 .2% of Medicare enrollment in the HMO, with 
a wide range from 0% to nearly 60%. 
On average, a typical HMO had 1 734 physician contracts, or almost 200 physician 
contracts per 1 ,000 enrollees in the HMO. Dial, et al . ( 1 995) reported that full-time 
equivalent (PTE) physicians per 1 00,000 enrollees in closed-panel HMOs were 1 9 1 .5 ,  or 
87.6 PTE primary care physicians per 1 00,000 enrollees. The physician ratio found in 
this study is 1 00 times higher than that reported in the study by Dial et al . ( 1 995). This 
difference is mainly due to the variable measurement that includes open-panel HMO 
physician contracts. 
It should be noted that a clinical staffing pattern is often calculated as an PTE 
staffing ratio. In the HMO industry, however, accurate data on staffed physicians are 
only available in closed-panel HMOs (staff- and group-models) which account for a small 
proportion of the study sample. In contrast, open-panel HMOs (IPA- and network­
models) do not employ physicians but contract with physicians who may contract with 
several HMOs, and do not report accurate working hours for each HMO. The calculation 
of PTE physicians in open-panel HMOs, therefore, is not feasible with available data. In 
addition, the GHAA directory was used to provide information on physician contracts for 
1 9  HMOs in which such information was missing from the InterStudy directory. The 
GHAA directory does not report physician contracts separately for primary care and 
specialty care. Therefore, total physician contracts (both primary and specialty care), 
instead of FTE staffing, are used in this study. 
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With regard to the calculation of physician contract ratio, further adjustment was 
made. Ten new HMOs that just started their operation yet had no enrollment reported a 
number of physician contracts as of January 1 ,  1 994. In order to obtain a non-missing 
value for the physician contract ratio, physician contracts reported, rather than physician 
contracts divided by enrollment, were used as physician contract ratio for these 1 0  
HMOs, reflecting the fact that there existed "idle" physicians in HMOs that did not have 
any enrollment. This approach introduced a upward bias to the physician contract ratio. 
In addition, an extreme outlier for the physician contract ratio was created from this 
approach, which is shown as the maximum value in Table 6. Deletion of this HMO from 
the study sample did not generate much statistical difference in the bivariate comparison 
and regression analysis, even though the value of physician contracts per 1 ,000 enrollees 
would decline to 1 70. Thus, this HMO was retained. 
Discrete Independent Variables 
The frequency of discrete independent variables is presented in Table 7. Among 
all HMOs in the panel sample, 72% were in a service area in which plans with risk 
contracts already existed. About 70%of all HMOs were open-panel HMOs and 70% 
were for-profit. It should be noted that these two 70%s were not composed by the same 
mix of HMOs. About 77% of all for-profit HMOs were open-panel HMOs, and 77% of 
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all open-panel HMOs were for-profit (not shown in Table 7). Though the percentage 
( 1 5 .7%) of HMOs with any Medicare experience was the same for those with a Medigap 
product, less than three percent of all HMOs had both. Having Medicare experience 
means that HMOs already have a Medicare contract, either on a cost or Health Care 
Prepayment Plan (HCPP) basis, before they participate in Medicare risk programs. A 
Medigap product refers to a Medicare supplemental insurance policy. 
Table 7 
Frequency of Discrete Variables: 1 994- 1 995 Panel Sample 
Variables 
Service area with any existing risk plan 
Model type: 
closed-panel 
open-panel 
mixed 
Tax-exempt status 
Medicare experience 
Medigap product 
Federal qualification 
Affiliation: 
independent 
BeBS 
other national firms 
Noncontiguous service area 
Number 
3 1 6  
56 
308 
76 
308 
69 
69 
198 
1 56 
7 1  
2 1 4  
5 7  
Bivariate Analysis 
% 
7 1 . 8 
12 .7  
70.0 
1 7 .3 
70.0 
1 5 .7 
1 5 .7 
45 .0 
35 .2 
1 6 . 1  
48.6 
1 3 .0 
The results for the 1 994 cross-section sample are first presented to provide a basic 
picture of association between the dependent and independent variables, before reviewing 
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the bivariate analysis for the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample. Organizational attributes are also 
compared for HMOs with risk contracts by sample year. 
The 1 994 Cross-Sectional Sample 
A comparison was done between HMOs that had Medicare risk contracts as of 
January 1, 1 994 (RISK94= 1, n = 95) and those that did not (RISK94=0, n = 440). These 
results are presented in Table 8 for continuous variables and in Table 9 for discrete 
variables. 
HMOs with risk contacts in the 1 994 cross-sectional sample signed an agreement 
with the HCF A prior to January 1 994. Variables that use 1 994 data do not reflect the 
situation in the previous year when HMOs decided to participate in a Medicare risk 
program. In addition, becoming a risk plan can result in Medicare enrollment and 
Medicare experience for the year 1 994. Thus, the differences in variables such as 
number of risk plans in a service area, percentage of Medicare enrollment in an HMO 
(Table 8), any existing risk plans in the service area, and having any Medicare experience 
and federal qualification (Table 9) are subject to endogeneity in a cross-sectional sample 
and are not discussed, though they appear statistically significant. 
Competitive Market Structure 
HMOs having Medicare risk contracts were found to exist in the service areas 
with higher HMO penetration, a lower market dominance index, and more competitors. 
The differences in these three competitive market measures were statistically significant 
(at least p < 0.05). No significant differences were detected between the two groups in 
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Table 8 
Bivariate Analysis of Continuous Variables by Risk Contract Status: 1 994 Cross-Sectional 
Sample 
Variables RlSK94=0 RlSK94= 1 T Statistic 
(n = 440) (n = 95) 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elderly Market 
Growth in HMO enrollment 0 . 1  0 (0.09) 0 . 1 0  (0.05) 0 . 1 5  
HMO penetration 0 .30 (0. 1 3 )  0 . 3 8  (0. 1 9) 3 .92 * * *  
Market dominance index 0.24 (0. 1 4) 0.22 (0. 1 0) 2.07 * *  
Weighted number o f  competitors 8.07 (6.35) 1 2 . 1 5  (9 .53)  3 .99 * * *  
Market share 0 . 1 6  (0. 1 9) 0 . 1 8  (0. 1 7) 0 .86 
COPlpetitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
Growth in Medicare enrollment 1 .65 ( 1 1 .59) 2.4 1 ( 14 .24) 0.49 
Number of risk plans 2 .35  (2.80) 5 .95 (4 .23) 7.94 * * *  
Resource Availability 
% elderly population 1 2 . 1 8  (2 .35) 12 .25 (2.75) 0.22 
% Foreign-born population 6.87 (7.43) 1 0.80 (8 .55) 4 .55  * * *  
% in-migrants 9.98 (4 .5 1 )  1 1 .2 1  (5 .88) 1 .93 * 
% female elderly 7.3 1 ( 1 .39) 7.26 ( 1 .6 1 )  0.28 
Income 2 1 423 (3402) 2 1 723 (27 1 4) 0.93 
Wage index adjusted income 2 1 490 (2200) 20452 (2 1 3 0) 4. 1 9  * * *  
Large employers (x l ,OOO) 0 . 1 7  (0.04) 0 . 1 5  (0.03) 4.90 * * *  
Physicians per 1 ,000 population 0.06 (0.03) 0.07 (0.02) 2 .57  * *  
Market Price 
Part A AAPCC 246.08 (44.03) 255 .42 (48.70) 1 . 84 * 
Part B AAPCC 1 3 7.09 (32.69) 1 53 .69 (33 .55) 4 .47 * * *  
Part A+B AAPCC 3 83 . 1 7  (69.95) 409. 1 1  (72 .56) 3 .26 * * *  
Adjusted Part A AAPCC 248.65 (37.5 1 )  240 .55 (36.46) 1 .92 * 
Adjusted Part B AAPCC 126.90 (27.86) 1 3 6 . 1 5  (29. 1 1 ) 2.9 1 * * *  
Adjusted Part A + B AAPCC 375 .55  (57.08) 3 76.70 (55 .38) 0 . 1 8  
Organizational Attributes 
Log (age) 2 . 1 7  (0.72) 2 .59 (0.57) 5 .28 * * *  
Log (size) 10 .4 1  (2.02) 1 1 .79 ( 1 .20) 8 . 82 * * *  
Physician pool 1 734 (2020) 3 766 (4889) 3 .98 * * *  
Physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees 1 97 .55 (760.47) 36 .07 (66.08) 4.38 * * *  
% Medicare enrollment 1 .22 (4 .55)  1 6 .20 (25.27) 5 .64 * * *  
Note . Standard deviation i n  parentheses. 
* p < 0. 1 0 . ** P < 0.05. * * *  P < 0.0 1 .  
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Table 9 
Bivariate Analysis of Discrete Variables by Risk Contract Status: 1 994 Cross-Sectional Sample 
Variables Percentage RISK94= 1 Likelihood Ratio X':1 
Service area with any existing risk plan 
risk plan exists 23 . 1 1  56 .0 1 * * *  
n o  risk plan exists 0.00 
HMO model type 
I .  open-panel 1 1 .49 25 .58  * * *  
all others 29.4 1 
2. mixed 3 5 .D4 27. 1 4  * * *  
all others 12 .92 
Tax-exempt status 
for-profit 1 7 .43 0 .09 
non-for-profit 1 8 .52 
Medicare experience 
with Medicare experience 57 . 1 4  245 .60 * * *  
n o  Medicare experience 0 .80 
Medigap product 
with Medigap product 1 8 .82 0.08 
no Medigap product 1 7.56 
Federal qualification 
federally qualified 27.2 1 3 5 .59 * * *  
not federally qualified 7.98 
National finn affiliation 
I .  BCBS affiliated 1 0 . 1 3  4 . 1 5  * *  
a l l  others 1 9 .08 
2 .  non-BCBS national finn affiliated 23 .02 1 1 .2 1  * * *  
all others 1 2 .06 
Noncontiguous service area 
contiguous service area 1 9 .72 0.2 1 
noncontiguous service area 1 7 .46 
* p < O. I O .  * * p < 0.05 .  * * * p < O.O I .  
the growth rate of HMO enrollment or market share. Concerning the measures for 
Medicare market structure, the difference in the growth rate of Medicare enrollment in 
the service area was not statistically significant. 
Resource Availability 
1 5 0  
Regarding resource availability, risk plans appeared i n  the service area where 
there were a higher proportion of foreign-born population and more physicians per 1 ,000 
population, but a lower adjusted income level and a lower proportion of large employers . 
Market Price 
Risk plans were in the service areas with higher AAPCC rates, indicating market 
price differences. In addition, risk plans were in areas that had higher Part B AAPCC 
rates but lower Part A AAPCC rates after being adjusted for wages. The significant 
difference was no longer observed in the combined sum of Part A and Part B rates.  
Organizational Attributes: Continuous Variables 
HMOs with risk contracts were significantly older (2 .59 vs. 2 . 1 7) and had 
proportionately larger enrollments ( 1 1 .79 vs. 1 0 .4 1 ) .  In addition, risk plans contracted 
with more physicians (3766 vs. 1 734), but had fewer physician contracts per 1 ,000 
enrollees (36.07 vs. 1 97.55) .  
Organizational Attributes :  Discrete Variables 
Table 9 reflects the percentage of HMOs observed with Medicare risk contracts 
given a discrete attribute. The likelihood ratio x 2 statistics test whether the association 
exists between having a risk contract and a given discrete variable. 
1 5 1  
About 35% of mixed-type HMOs had Medicare risk contracts, compared to 1 3 %  
o f  all other HMOs. I n  contrast to HMOs affiliated with Blue Cross Blue Shield which 
had a lower percentage of being a risk plan, those affiliated with other national firms had 
a higher percentage of being a risk plan when compared to all other HMOs (23 .02% vs. 
1 2 .06%). No significant differences were observed in tax exempt status, having a 
Medigap product, or having a noncontiguous service area. 
The 1 994- 1 995 Panel Sample 
The results from the bivariate analysis for the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample are 
illustrated in Tables 1 0  and I I . The significance of results from the bivariate comparison 
is generally consistent with what was observed in the 1 994 cross-section sample. 
However, there are some interesting differences. 
Competitive Market Structure 
Similar to the results from the 1 994 cross-section sample, new risk plans existed 
in the service areas with higher HMO penetration, a lower market dominance index, and 
more competitors (see Table 1 0) .  New risk plans also confronted a higher number of 
HMOs that already had a Medicare risk contract in the service areas. 
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Table 1 0  
Bivariate Analysis of Continuous Variables by Risk Contract Status:  1 994- 1 995 Panel Sample 
Variables RlSK95=0 RlSK95=1 T Statistic 
(n = 397) (n = 43) 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elderly Market 
Growth in HMO enrol lment 0 . 1 0  (0.09) 0.09 (0.05) 1 . 5 1  
HMO penetration 0.29 (0. 1 3 )  0 . 3 3  (0. 1 3 )  1 .98 * *  
Market dominance index 0.24 (0. 1 4) 0 .2 1  (0.09) 2.09 * *  
Weighted number o f  competitors 7 .74 (6.08) 1 1 . 1 2  (7. 84) 2 .74 * * *  
Market share 0 . 1 6  (0. 1 9) 0 . 1 7  (0. 1 7) 0.25 
Competitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
Growth in Medicare enrollment 1 .53  ( 1 1 . 1 1 ) 2 .73 ( 1 5 .45) 0 .50 
Number of risk plans 2 .22 (2.68) 3 .47 (3 .57) 2.21 * *  
Resource Availability 
% elderly population 12 . 1 5  (2.28) 12 .47 (2.90) 0 .69 
% foreign-born population 6 .59 (7.28) 9.46 (8 .35)  2 .42 ** 
% in-migrants 1 0 .06 (4.5 1 )  9.23 (4.46) 1 . 1 4  
% female elderly 7.29 ( 1 .34) 7 .5 1 ( 1 .73) 0 .80 
Income 2 1 3 4 1  (3368) 22 1 77 (3653) 1 . 53  
Wage index adjusted income 2 1 5 1 1  (2 1 93)  2 1 296 (2289) 0 .6 1  
Large employers (x 1 ,000) 0 . 1 8  (0.04) 0 . 1 6  (0.04) 0.76 
Physicians per 1 ,000 population 0.06 (0.03) 0 .063 (0.02) 0.96 
Market Price 
Part A AAPCC 243 .88  (44.53) 266.33 (33 . 1 9) 4.06 * * *  
Part B AAPCC 1 3 5 .36  (33 .0 1 )  1 5 3 . 1 4  (24 .67) 4.33 * * *  
Part A+B AAPCC 3 79.24 (70.94) 4 1 9.47 (46 .8 1 )  5 .04 * * *  
Adjusted Part A AAPCC 247.52 (37 .49) 259.08 (36.50) 1 .93 * 
Adjusted Part B AAPCC 125 .68 (27 .83) 1 3 8 . 1 2  (25 .87) 2 .80 * * *  
Adjusted Part A+B AAPCC 373 .2 1 (57. 1 3 )  397.20 (52 .42) 2 .64 * * *  
Organizational Attributes 
Log (age) 2 . 1 5  (0.72) 2 .36  (0.70) 1 .85 * 
Log (size) 1 0.28 (2 .05) 1 1 . 56 ( 1 .33)  5 .61  * * *  
Physician pool 1 604 ( 1 820) 293 5 (3 1 27) 2.74 * * *  
Physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees 2 1 2 . 1 4  (797.63) 62.78 ( 1 60.06) 3 . 1 9 * * *  
% Medicare enrollment 1 .22 (4.65) 1 . 1 7  (3 .46) 0.09 
Note. Standard deviation in parentheses 
* p < 0. 1 0 . * * p < 0.05 . * * * p < O.O I .  
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Table I I  
Bivariate Analysis of Discrete Variables by Risk Contract Status: 1 994- 1 995 Panel Sample 
Variables Percentage RlSK95= 1  Likelihood Ratio X'l 
Service area with any existing risk plan 
risk plan exists 1 1 .39  3 .68 * 
no risk plan exists 5 .65 
HMO model type 
I .  open-panel 9.09 0.53 
all others 1 1 .36  
2 .  mixed 1 1 . 84 0.43 
all others 9.34 
Tax-exempt status 
for-profit 1 0 .39 0 .46 
non-for-profit 8 .33  
Medicare experience 
with Medicare experience 1 0 . 1 4  O .o J  
no Medicare experience 9 .70 
Medigap product 
with Medigap product 1 1 .59 0.30 
no Medigap product 9.43 
Federal qualification 
federally qualified 1 4.65 9 .74 * * *  
not federally qualified 5 .79 
National firm affiliation 
I .  BCBS affiliated 9 .86 0.00 1 
all others 9.76 
2 .  non-BCBS national firm affiliated 1 0 .28 0 . 1 2  
all others 9.29 
Noncontiguous service area 
contiguous service area 14 .04 1 .23 
noncontiguous service area 9 . 1 4  
* p < O. I O . * * * p < O.O I .  
Resource Availability 
The only significant difference in resource availability was observed in the 
percentage of foreign-born population. New risk plans operated in the service areas 
which the foreign-born population counted for a higher percentage of total population. 
The significant differences in income level, the proportion of large employers, and 
physician per 1 ,000 population were no longer found for the panel sample. 
Market Price 
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New risk plans had significantly higher AAPCC rates, either Part A or Part B, or 
the combined sum of Part A and Part B. The significant differences persisted for Part B 
and the combined sum of Part A and Part B AAPCC rates after being adjusted for wages .  
Organizational Attributes :  Continuous Variables 
The differences in enrollment size, physician pool, and physicians per 1 ,000 
enrollees were statistically significant. For example, new risk plans contracted fewer 
physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees, compared with those that did not have a risk contract (63 
vs. 2 1 2) .  
Organizational Attributes :  Discrete Variables 
As Table 1 1  indicates, the significant association between having a Medicare risk 
contract and discrete variables only held for federal qualification for the panel sample. 
About 1 5% of HMOs that were federally qualified as of January 1 ,  1 994 signed on 
Medicare risk contract as of January 1 ,  1 995, compared to 6% of HMOs that were not 
federally qualified. Since HMOs cannot participate in risk contracting without federal 
qualification, these 6% HMOs might be applying for federal qualification and risk 
contracting at the same time. 
Comparison in Organizational Attributes by Sample: RISK94=1 vs. RISK95=1 
The results from comparing the organizational attributes for HMOs with risk 
contracts in the cross-sectional sample and panel sample are presented in Table 12 .  The 
differences in two variables, percentage of Medicare enrollment and any Medicare 
experience, are subject to endogeneity as explained in the previous section. The only 
significant differences were found in the natural logarithm of age and HMO model type. 
On average, HMOs that had risk contracts before January 1 994 (RISK94=1 )  were in 
business longer than new risk plans (RISK95= I ) .  The predominant model type was the 
open-panel type for new risk plans, compared with an almost equal share of open-panel 
and mixed-model types for older risk plans. 
Model Building 
Before presenting the results of the multivariate logistic regression, 
multicollinearity problems are discussed. Afterwards, results of the modeling are 
presented. 
Detection of Multicollinearity 
The results from the factor analysis and regression analysis are reported to 
examine multicollinearity problems among subsets of continuous independent variables. 
Discrete independent variables are reflective of organizational attributes which are 
included in model building mainly as control variables. Thus, multicollinearity among 
these discrete variables is not a major concern in this analysis. Simple correlation tests 
I SS 
were also used to supplement relevant information. Based on these diagnostic tests, 
modified approaches for model building were employed. 
Table 1 2  
Bivariate Analysis of Organizational Attributes by Sample :  RISK94= 1 vs .  RISK95=1  
Continuous Variables 
Log (age) 
Log (size) 
Physician pool 
Physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees 
% Medicare enrollment 
Percentage of Observing a Given Discrete Variable= 1 
RISK94= 1 RISK95= 1 T Statistic 
(n=95) (n=43) 
2 .59 (0.57) 2 .36 (0.70) 
1 1 .79 ( 1 .20) 1 1 . 56 ( 1 .33)  
3 766 (4889) 293 5 (3 127) 
36 .07 (66.08) 62.78 ( 1 60.06) 
16 .20 (25 .27) 1 . 1 7  (3 .46) 
1 .99 * *  
0.99 
1 .20 
1 .05 
5.57 * * *  
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Discrete Variables 
RISK94= 1 RISK95=1 
(n=95) (n=43) 
Likelihood 
Ratio X2 
Model type: 
closed-panel 
open-panel 
mixed 
Tax-exempt status 
Medicare experience 
Medigap product 
Federal qualification 
Affiliation: 
independent 
BCBS 
other national firms 
14 .74% 
42. 1 1 % 
43 . 1 6% 
68 .42% 
96.84% 
1 6 .84% 
77.89% 
24.2 1 %  
8.42% 
67.37% 
Noncontiguous service area 14 .74% 
Note . Standard deviation in parentheses. 
* p < 0 . 1 0 . ** P < 0.05.  *** P < 0 .0 1 .  
Factor Analysis 
1 3 .95 
65 . 1 2% 
20.93% 
74.42% 
1 6 .28% 
1 8 .60% 
67.44% 
32 .56% 
1 6 .28% 
5 1 . 1 6% 
1 8 .60% 
7 .5 1 * *  
0 .52 
99 .49 * * *  
0.06 
1 .66 
3 . 6 1  
0 .32 
The results from the initial factor analysis for continuous independent variables 
that measure market and resource characteristics indicate four groupings among these 
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variables. For less ambiguous results, a 6-factor solution with Varimax-rotation was 
applied. As Table 1 3 . 1  indicates, three variables, the number of risk plans (N_RlSK94), 
the percentage of foreign-bom population (FOREIGN), and physicians per 1 ,000 
population (MD ]OP), especially the last two, had high loadings on Factor I .  Factor 1 
might represent the availability of primary care physicians in the service area and was 
then labeled as F _AVAIL because of high loadings of FOREIGN and MD]OP on 
Factor 1 ,  though N _RlSK94 had a moderate loading. As expected, both the proportion of 
elderly population (OLD) and the proportion of female elderly population (OLD]) 
loaded highly on Factor 2 which reflected the aging of the population in the service area. 
Thus, Factor 2 was labeled as F _OLD. The market dominance index (MDI) and market 
share (SHARE) converged on Factor 3 ,  which could be explained as market control of a 
given HMO, and thus is labeled as F _CONTROL. Both adjusted income level 
(A_INCOME) and the proportion of large employers (EMPLOY) had high loadings on 
Factor 4,  labeled as F _PROSP, which could be reflective of the prosperity of the service 
area. The weighted number of competitors (N) loaded highly on Factor 5 (labeled as 
F _COMPETE), and HMO penetration (PENE) loaded on Factor 6 (labeled as F ]ENE). 
Other variables also had moderate loadings on these two factors, reflecting moderate 
correlation with N and PENE, which were examined in the subsequent regression 
analysis. About 88% of total variance in the 1 1  independent variables in this model was 
explained by the 6-factor solution, on which basis factor scores were used to determine 
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subsequent logistic regression modeling. The use of factor scores in model building can 
help avoid multicollinearity which leads to inefficient, unstable estimates of coefficients. 
Table 1 3 . 1  
Factor Analysis for Continuous Indegendent Variables: Market and Resource Characteristics 
Factor Loading * Communali!), 
Variables Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 hj2 
N 0 . 1 69 0.0 1 7  -0.272 0 . 1 63 0 .848 1 0 . 1 92 0 .885 
N RISK94 0 .584
1 
0.020 -0.205 -0.306 0.455 0.306 0 .779 
FOREIGN 0.868 -0.0 1 0  -0. 1 99 -0.036 0.232 0 . 1 9 1  0 .885  
MD POP 0.9 1 9  0 . 1 45 0.090 -0.080 -0.047 -0.0 1 8  0 .884 
OLD 0.085 0.988 1 0.094 -0.042 0.034 0 .03 1 0.995 
OLD F 0.048 0.992 0.055 0 .022 0.0 1 4  0.047 0 .992 
MOl 0.045 0.095 0 .863 1 -0.008 -0.3 1 1  -0.057 0 .855  
SHARE -0. 1 7 1  0.07 1 0 .883 -0. 1 1 1  -0.033 -0. 1 89 0 . 863 
A INCOME -0.058 0.059 O.o l 5  0 .893 1 0. 1 97 -0. 1 3 7  0 . 862 
EMPLOY -0. 148 -0. 1 07 -0. 1 89 0.770 -0. 1 1 5  0 .359 0 .805 
PENE 0.200 0.095 -0. 1 99 0.074 0.229 0 .869 1 0.90 1 
Label F_AVAIL F_OLD F_CONTROL F]ROSP F_COMPETE F]ENE 
Eigenvalue 3 .244 2 .380 1 .772 1 .03 1 0 .649 0.63 1 
Variance 
Explained 29.5% 2 1 .6% 1 6 . 1 %  9.4% 5 .9% 5 .7% 
Cumulative 
variance 29.4% 5 1 . 1 %  67.2% 76.6% 82.5% 88 .3% 
* Vertical lines indicate large loadings. 
Table 1 3 .2 presents the results of factor analysis of the continuous independent 
variables on HMO characteristics. Both the natural logarithm of HMO age (LN_AGE) 
and enrollment size (LN_SIZE) grouped together on Factor 1 ,  labeled as F _SIZE. 
Physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees (DOC_EN) and the percentage of Medicare enrollment 
(MCR]) had unambiguously high loadings on Factor 2 (labeled as F _%DOC) and 
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Factor 3 (labeled as F _%MCR), respectively. About 90% of variance in these four 
variables were explained by this 3-factor solution. 
Table 1 3 .2 
Factor Analysis for Continuous Independent Variables: HMO Characteristics 
Factor Loading * Communality 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 h 2 
0.99 1 I I MCR P 0 .071 -0.023 0 .988 
LN AGE 0 .886 1 -0.063 0. 1 74 0 .820 
LN SIZE 0 .837 -0.278 -0.063 0.783 
DOC EN -0.203 0 .973 I -0.027 0 .988 
Label F SIZE F %DOC F %MCR 
Eigenvalue 1 . 866 0 .994 0.720 
Variance explained 46.6% 24.9% 1 7.9% 
Cumulative variance 46.6% 7 1 .5% 89.5% 
* Vertical lines indicate high loadings .  
Multiple Regression 
A set of multiple regression models was constructed to examine potential 
multicollinearity problems among variables : HMO penetration (PENE), market 
dominance index (MDI), the weighted number of competitors (N), and market share of 
the individual HMO (SHARE). As Table 1 4 . 1  indicates, both N and SHARE 
significantly predicted PENE and MDI. Similarly, both PENE and MDI were significant 
predictors for N and SHARE. It appears that multicollinearity existed among these 
variables, which raises concern for subsequent logistic regression analysis. That is, 
inclusion of these four variables in one logistic regression model should be avoided. 
Alternatively, factor scores can be used as previously described. 
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Table 1 4 . 1  
Results o f  Multiple Regression for Four Independent Variables : Market Characteristics 
Dependent Variable 
Predictors PENE MDI N SHARE 
PENE 0.035 1 5 .04 * -0.295 * 
MDI 0.047 - 1 4.60 * 0.778 * 
N 0.007 * -0.005 * -0.00 1 
SHARE -0.2 1 0  * 0.4 1 6  * - 1 .895 
R-square 0.25 0.47 0 .30 0.47 
* p < 0.000 1 .  
Table 1 4 .2 reports the results of the regression analysis for HMO attributes : age 
(LN_AGE), enrollment size (LN_SIZE), Medicare enrollment as percentage of total 
enrollment (MCR_P), and contracted physicians per 1 ,000 enrollees. The regression 
results confirm the existence of multicollinearity among these continuous variables. The 
alternate approach using factor scores in the logistic regression suggested above also 
applies to HMO attributes.  
Logistic Regression 
Two approaches were used for model building. The first approach was to select 
one variable among those that are multicollinear for model building. The second 
approach was to use factor scores for correlated variables. The dependent variable was a 
discrete variable reflective of an HMO's  market entry into a Medicare risk contract 
during 1 994. It was coded as 1 for Medicare market entry and 0 for others. 
Table 1 4 .2 
Results of Multiple Regression for Four Inde.pendent Variables: HMO Characteristics 
Dependent V ariable 
Predictors LN AGE 
LN AGE 
LN SIZE 0. 1 82 * *  
MCR P 0.026 * *  
DOC EN -0.0008 * 
R-square 0.34 
* p < 0.05 .  * *  p < 0.000 1 .  
LN SIZE 
1 .365 * *  
-0.024 
-0.0007 * *  
0.36 
First Approach' Using Original Variables 
MCR P DOC EN 
1 .456 * *  - 1 1 4. 1 3 4  * 
-0. 1 80 - 1 23 .273 * *  
-2.204 
-0.00009 
0 .04 0 . 1 6  
In the first approach, three groups of correlated variables were identified: ( 1 )  
PENE, MDI, SHARE, and N ;  (2) N_RISK94 and FOREIGN; and (3) LN_SIZE, 
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LN_AGE, DOC_EN, and MCR]. Two other correlated sets of variables, OLD-OLD_F 
and A_INCOME-EMPLOY, were not used in combination for model building, since 
previous studies on either HMO development or Medicare risk contracting found them 
redundant or lacking in empirical specification (see Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 2). 
Instead, the solitary variables , OLD and A_INCOME, were included for model building. 
Additionally, MD]OP was correlated with N_RISK94IFOREIGN and was not used for 
model building based on the empirical results from prior studies (Adamache & Rossiter, 
1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990). 
A total of 32 (4 x 2 x 4) logistic models were constructed. That is, if sorted by 
variables of market attribute PENE, MDI, SHARE, and N, there were 8 models which 
differed from one another by the combination ofN_RISK94IFOREIGN and 
LN_SIZEILN_AGEIDOC_ENIMCR]. Among those 8 models, only the results from 
the model with "best fit" are presented. Model fit was assessed by the -2LogL statistic, 
often referred to as the likelihood ratio X2 statistic, of a model that includes the intercept 
and the covariates. The lower the value, the more satisfactory model fit. In a similar 
manner, a X2 difference test offers information how covariates improve model fit, or 
reduce the X2 statistics, relative to the model only containing the intercept. 
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Table 1 5  shows the results from the four models that fit best. Each differs from 
one another slightly by the variables included. Consistency of statistical significance was 
found in four variables across the four models. The positive coefficients of AAPCC, 
LN_SIZE, and FEDQUAL were statistically significant at least at the p value of 0.05, and 
GROW was moderately and negatively significant (p < 0. 1 ) . In general, the correct 
classification rate for each of the four models was almost 70%. It merits notice that the 
sample used for model building was the same sample used to validate the model built. 
Thus, all the correct classification rates reported in this study were inevitably upwardly 
biased. 
Three variables that did not appear in the best-fit models were LN_AGE, 
DOC_EN, and MCR]. In other models, LN_AGE had a positive coefficient and the 
other two had negative coefficients. None of these three variables ever reached statistical 
significance at the p level of 0 . 1 in any of 24 models in which these variables were 
included. 
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Table I S  
Four Models with the Best Fit to Predict HMO Risk Contracting for the Panel Sample: Inclusion 
of Original Variables 
Variables Model l Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Competitive Market Structure : Non-elder Market 
GROW -5 .676 * -5 .788 * -5 .862 * -5 .694 * 
PENE 0.326 t 
MDI -0.5 1 5  t 
SHARE - 1 .773 
N 0.032 t 
Competitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
G_MCR 0.0 1 3  0 .0 1 5  0 .0 1 3  0 .0 1 4  
N RISK94 0.048 t 0.0 1 0  t 0.02 1 t 
Resource Availability 
OLD 0.090 0.094 0. 1 1 0 0 .094 
FOREIGN 0.03 1 
MOVER -0.0 1 2  t -0.0 1 3  t -0.0 1 5  t -0.0 1 5  t 
A INCOME -0.00 1 t -0.000 -0.005 t -0.00 1 t 
A INCOM2 0.000 t 0.000 0.000 t 0.000 t 
Market Price 
AAPCC 0.009 * *  0 .007 * 0.008 ** 0.008 * *  
Organizational Attributes 
OPEN -0.340 t -0.37 1  t -0.540 t -0.499 t 
MIX -0.4 1 0  t -0.394 t -0 .536 t -0 .504 t 
LN_SIZE 0.732 * * *  0 .755 * * *  0 . 873 * * *  0 .688 * * *  
TAXSTAT 0.758 0 .801 0 .804 * 0.782 * 
ROLLCARE -0.5 1 3  t -0 .530 -0.576 -0 .572 
MEDlGAP -0. 1 68 t -0. 1 80 t -0.254 t -0. 1 65 t 
FEDQUAL 1 .073 * * *  1 . 1 30  * * *  1 .067 * * *  1 . 1 08 * * *  
AFFIL l -0. 1 0 1  t -0.075 t -0. 1 69 t -0.202 t 
AFFIL2 -0.604 -0.6 1 2  -0.7 1 3  -0.653 
MARKET C 0 .302 t 0.394 t 0.3 8 1  t 0 .2 1 6  t 
-2LogL (df= 1 9) 227.54 226.4 1 226.03 226.70 
X2 difference test 54. 1 2  * * *  55 .25 * * *  55 .62 * * *  54.95 * * *  
Classification rate 69.8% 69. 1 %  69. 1 %  69.8% 
t standard error greater than parameter estimate. 
* p < 0. 1 0 . ** p < 0.05.  * * *  p < 0.0 1 .  
1 64 
The magnitude of the coefficients for several variables such as PENE, MDI, N, 
and N_RlSK94 was smaller than that of their standard errors. This indicates residual 
multicollinearity not detected in the factor analysis. A simple correlation test (the last 
two rows in Table 1 6) indicates that N_RlSK94 and LN_SIZE were significantly 
correlated with variables of market attribute. 
Table 1 6  
Correlation Matrix o f  Selected Variables Involved i n  Multicoll inearity 
PENE MDI SHARE N N RlSK94 LN SIZE 
PENE 1 .000 
(0.0) 
MDI -0.299 1 .000 
(0.000 1 )  (0.0) 
SHARE -0.398 0.65 1 1 .000 
(0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0) 
N 0.43 7 -0.450 -0.3 9 1  1 .000 
(0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0) 
N RlSK94 0.439 -0.304 -0 .299 0.448 1 .000 
(0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.0) 
LN SIZE 0. 1 2 1  -0. 1 43 0.273 0.225 0.098 1 .000 
(0.0 1 1 )  (0.0026) (0.000 1 )  (0.000 1 )  (0.040) (0.0) 
Note. p-value in parentheses. 
To further correct this problem and obtain more stable coefficient estimates, 
stepwise logistic regression was employed to obtain a more parsimonious model, forcing 
only one of four market attributes (PENE, MD!, SHARE, and N) to be included in 
separate models .  Thus, another 32 models were constructed, and only the four best-fit 
models are reported in Table 1 7 . 
Table 1 7  
Four Models with the Best Fit Using a Stepwise Logistic Procedure to Predict HMO Risk 
Contracting for the Panel Sample: Inclusion of Original Variables 
Variables Model l Model 2 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
GROW -4.832 -5 .264 * 
PENE 1 .339 t 
MDl 
SHARE 
N 
Resource Availability 
OLD 
A INCOME -0.0002 * 
Market Price 
AAPCC 0.0 1 0  * * *  
Organizational Attributes 
LN SIZE 0 .7 1 6  * * *  
TAXSTAT 0 .779 * 
FEDQUAL 0.942 * * *  
AFFIL2 -0.534 
- 1 .279 t 
0 .095 
-0.0002 * 
0.009 * * *  
0 .747 * * *  
0 .8 1 0  * 
0 .964 * * *  
-0 .552 
-2LogL 23 1 .78 230.83 
X2 difference test 49 .88 * * *  50 . 8 1 9  * * *  
Degrees o f  freedom 8 9 
Classification rate 69.3% 70.0% 
t standard error greater than parameter estimate. 
* p < O . I O .  * * p < 0.05.  * * * p < O.O I .  
Model 3 
-5 .444 
- 1 .559 
0 .093 
-0.0002 
0 .009 
0 .84 1  
0 . 807 
0.980 
-0.604 
229 .5 1 
52. 1 4  
9 
69.8% 
Model 4 
* -4.796 
0 .033 
* -0.0002 
* * *  0 .009 
* * *  0 .662 
* 0 .778 
* * *  1 .007 
-0 .565 
23 1 .29 
* * *  50 .36 
8 
69.8% 
Compared with the initial four full models reported in Table 1 5, four reduced 
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* 
* * *  
* * *  
* 
* * *  
* * *  
models i n  Table 1 7  generate similar results i n  terms o f  sign and statistical significance of 
estimated coefficients. Though the full models fit the data better, which was reflected by 
smaller X2 statistics and larger results of the X2 difference test, there was no significant 
gain in classification rate. From the results of the other models not reported in Table 1 7, 
if neither N nor LN_SIZE was included in a specific model, N_RlSK94 carried positive 
coefficients in 9 models, 6 of which were statistically significant at the p level of 0 .05 .  
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Based on the above discussion, two revised best-fit models were constructed, each 
of which included either LN _SIZE (Model l )  or N (Model 2) as seen in Table 1 8 .  The 
largest standardized coefficient in Model l was found in LN_SIZE (0.933), followed by 
AAPCC (0.282) and FEDQUAL (0.269). The odds ratio for FED QUAL was 2 .664. 
Having federal qualification is a necessary condition for HMOs to participate in a 
Medicare risk program. The odds ratio of GROW reflects that given a one percent 
increase in overall HMO enrollment in the service area, it was 5% less likely that an 
HMO would enter into a Medicare risk market. The odds ratio of AAPCC indicates that 
a $ 1 0  increase in the AAPCC would result in 9% higher likelihood of an HMO entering 
into a Medicare risk contract. Opposite to what is observed in the bivariate analysis 
(Table 1 0), the coefficient of SHARE was negative, though not statistically significant. 
IfN, instead of LN_SIZE, was included in the model (Model 2 in Table 1 8) ,  
FEDQUAL had the largest standardized coefficient (0.346),  followed by N (0.279) and 
AAPCC (0.266). In addition, the coefficient of SHARE became positive and significant 
(p < 0.05) .  If the Part A (or Part B) AAPCC rate was substituted for the combined sum of 
AAPCC rates, it  was found statistically significant at the p value of 0.05 in both Models 1 
and 2. Comparatively, Model l in Table 1 8  had a correct classification rate better than 
Model 2, and performs almost as well as the four best-fit models in Table 1 7 . 
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Table 1 8  
Revised Models with the Best Fit to Predict HMO Risk Contracting for the Panel Sample:  
Inclusion of Original Variables 
Variables Beta Standardized Odds 
Estimate Ratio 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
GROW -5 .446 * -0.257 0 .947 a 
[0 . 89, 1 .0 1 ]  
PENE 0.082 0 .006 1 .00 1 a 
[0.97, 1 .03] 
SHARE - 1 .522 -0. 1 59 0.99 a 
N 
Resource Availability 
OLD 0.092 
A INCOME -0.0002 * 
Market Price 
AAPCC 0.0090 * * *  
Organizational Attributes 
LN_SIZE 0.837 
TAX STAT 0 .806 
FEDQUAL 0.980 
AFFIL2 -0.602 
-2LogL 
X2 difference test (df) 
Classification rate 
* * *  
* 
* * *  
[0.96, 1 .0 1 ]  
0. 1 1 9 1 .00 1 
a 
[0 .999, 1 .002] 
-0. 1 82 0 .861  c 
[0 .73,  1 .02] 
0.282 1 .094 b 
[ 1 .03,  1 . 1 7] 
0 .933 2 .309 
[ 1 .57, 3 .39] 
0.204 2 .240 
[0 .9 1 , 5 .49] 
0.269 2 .664 
[ 1 .30, 5 .45] 
-0. 1 66 0 .548 
[0 .25, 1 .2 1 ]  
229 .5 1 
52. 1 4  ( 1 0) 
69.3% 
Note . 95% confidence limits are in parentheses. 
Beta Standardized Odds 
Estimate Ratio 
-5 .478 * -0.258 0 .947 a 
[0 .89, 1 .0 1 ]  
2 .065 0 . 1 53 1 .02 a 
[0 .99, 1 .05]  
2 .262 * *  0.236 1 .023 a 
[ 1 .00, 1 .04] 
0.080 * * *  0.279 1 .083 
[ 1 .03 ,  1 . 1 4] 
0 .029 t 0 .038 1 .000 a 
[0 .999, 1 .002] 
-0.000* * -0.206 0 .844 c 
[0.72, 0 .99] 
0 .008 * * *  0.266 1 .09 b 
[ 1 .02, 1 . 1 6] 
0.492 0 . 1 24 1 .635 
[0 .70, 3 . 83]  
3 .525 
[ 1 .7 1 , 7 .25]  
0 .808 
[0 . 38 ,  1 .70] 
1 .259 * * *  0.346 
-0.2 1 3  t -0.059 
244 .55 
37 . 1 0  ( 1 0) 
67.5% 
a denotes odds ratio based on one percent change in the predictor. 
b denotes odds ratio based on ten units change in the predictor. 
c denotes odds ratio based on 1 000 units change in the predictor. 
t standard error greater than parameter estimate . 
* p < O. I O . * * p < 0.05 . * * * p < O .O I .  
If two revised models in Table 1 8  were applied to the 1 994 cross-sectional 
sample, some interesting results were observed. In Model 1 that included LN _SIZE, 
PENE became at least moderately significant. The importance of the combined sum of 
AAPCC rates was no longer found. If the Part B AAPCC rate was in place of the 
combined sum of AAPCC rates, it was significant at the p level of 0 .05 .  LN_SIZE still 
had the largest standardized coefficient. Similar results were also found in Model 2 that 
excluded LN_SIZE but included N. Appendix D presents the detailed results from the 
models including the Part B AAPCC rate instead of the combined sum of AAPCC rates. 
Second Approach: Using Original Variables and Factors 
The second approach was to include both the original variables and factor scores 
for model building. Table 1 9  presents the results from three full models .  
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Model 1 was identical to Model 2 except that ROLLCARE was used in place of 
F _%MCR in Model 2. ROLLCARE was a dummy variable indicating that an HMO had 
any Medicare enrollment. This replacement led to a three percent increase in correct 
classification rate. Thus, the third model included ROLLCARE rather than F _%MCR 
and excluded F _SIZE, since moderate correlation (r =0.3 ,  p < 0.000 1 )  between F _SIZE 
and F _COMPETE was found in a simple correlation test. Model 3 was one percent less 
accurate in prediction than Model 2. 
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Table 1 9  
Models Predicting HMO Risk Contracting for the Panel Sample: Inclusion of Original Variables 
and Factors 
Variables/Factors Model I Model 2 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
GROW -5 .587 -5 .33 1 
F PENE 0. 1 99 t 0.202 t 
F _CONTROL -0.056 t -0.095 t 
F COMPETE 0.403 * *  0.432 * *  
Competitive Market Structure : Non-elder Market 
G_MCR 0.0 1 1 t 0 .0 1 1 t 
Resource Availability 
F OLD 0.43 1 t 0. 1 77 
F AVAIL 0.034 t 0.050 t 
MOVER -0.02 1 t -0 .220 t 
F PROSP 0 . 1 3 5  t 0.059 t 
A INCOM2 -5 .02E-9 t -3 .89E-9 t 
Market Price 
AAPCC 0.009 * *  0.008 ** 
Organizational Attributes 
OPEN -0.206 t -0 .336 t 
MIX -0.4 1 4  t -0.484 t 
F SIZE 0.945 * *  0.983 ** 
F %DOC -2.296 * -2.3 1 4  * 
F %MCR - 1 1 .524 t 
ROLLCARE -0 .501  t 
TAXSTAT 0.779 0 .742 
MEDJGAP 0.083 -0.020 t 
FEDQUAL 1 .088 * * *  1 . 1 08 * * *  
AFFI L I  -0.049 t -0.092 t 
AFFIL2 -0.363 t -0.3 8 1  t 
MARKET C 0.3 1 3  t 0.297 t 
-2LogL 23 1 .69 23 1 .0 1  
X 2 difference test 49.96 50.64 
Degrees of freedom 22 22 
Classification rate 65 .2% 68% 
t standard error greater than parameter estimate. 
* p < 0. 1 0 . ** p < 0.05.  * * *  P < 0.0 1 .  
Model 3 
-5 .485 * 
0.3 1 0  
0.050 t 
0.578 * * *  
0.008 t 
0. 1 53 t 
-0.0 12  t 
-0.024 t 
0. 1 6 1  t 
-5 . 1 9E-9 t 
0.0 1 0  * *  
-0.562 
-0.504 t 
-0.949 
-0 .372 t 
0.5 1 9  
0. 1 74 t 
1 .390 * * *  
0.086 t 
-0 . 1 77 t 
0.438 t 
237.33 
44.33 
21  
67% 
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Across the three models, some consistency is observed. F _COMPETE, AAPCC, 
F _SIZE, and FEDQUAL were positive, significant predictors. In addition, higher 
standard errors for several predictors were found, reflective of the multicollinearity 
among predictors. Thus, a stepwise procedure was employed again to obtain more 
parsimonious models .  
The models using the stepwise logistic procedure did not demonstrate much 
difference from the full models in Table 1 9, and are presented in Appendix E. The only 
differences in terms of statistical significance occurred in the squared term of income 
level (A_INCOM2) and F ]ENE. A_INCOM2 became moderately significant (p < 0. 1 ) . 
F _PENE was significant at the p level of 0 . 1 if F_SIZE was not included in the model. 
Compared with the full models in Table 1 9, the reduced models did not lose much in the 
correct classification rate. 
Summary 
The empirical results of this study were presented in this chapter. Analyses of the 
sample data were performed using univariate descriptive statistics, bivariate comparison 
(t statistics and Likelihood ratio X2 statistics), exploratory factor analysis, multiple 
regression, and multivariate logistic regression. 
Univariate Analysis 
Based on the results of univariate analyses for the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample 
(Tables 6 and 7), the measures for HMO age and size were transformed by taking the 
1 7 1  
natural logarithm o f  each due to the extremely skewed distribution o f  these two variables. 
Open-panel HMOs were the predominant HMO model type among the panel sample. 
For-profit HMOs accounted for a majority of the study sample. 
Bivariate Analysis 
The results from the bivariate comparison for the panel sample (Table 1 0) indicate 
that HMOs with a risk contract were significantly distinct from those that did not have a 
risk contract in regard to competitive market structure and market price. HMOs with a 
new risk contract were in the service areas with higher HMO penetration, a lower market 
dominance index, more competitors, more HMOs that already had a risk contract, and 
higher AAPCC rates. Risk plans also tended to be older, larger in enrollment size, and 
have less physician contracts. Most of variables measuring resource availability did not 
demonstrate statistical importance in distinguishing between the two groups of HMOs in 
the panel sample. The major difference between results from the 1 994 cross-section 
sample (Tables 8) and those from the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample lies in the significance of 
variables measuring resource availability and certain AAPCC rates .  These differences 
might be attributable to endogeneity inherent in a cross-sectional sample. When cross­
comparing the results from Tables 9 and 1 1 , the significant differences in model type and 
national firm affiliation disappeared in the panel sample. Based on the bivariate 
comparison of these two samples, it appears that market factors contributing to previous 
market entry did not differ much from those contributing to new market entry. 
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A comparison between the previous market entrants (RISK94=1 )  and new market 
entrants (RISK95=1)  indicates no obvious differences in organizational attributes except 
for HMO age and model type (Table 1 2) .  That is, the new market entrants were similar 
to the previous market entrants. Furthermore, 40 HMOs that were excluded from this 
study because they started their operation after January 1 ,  1 994 did not significantly differ 
from the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample in organizational attributes. This finding implies that 
the results from this study may be generalized to HMO samples in the future. 
Model Building 
Due to multicollinearity among several independent variables, two approaches 
were used for model building. The first approach used the original variables for model 
building, and the second approach combined the original variables and factor scores. As 
shown in Tables 1 8  and 20, HMO size was the most influential variable, in a relative 
sense, to predict a market entry decision. Other significant measures included the 
AAPCC rates and federal qualification status of the HMO. If the measure for HMO size 
was excluded, the importance of several measures for competitive structure, such as 
market share and weighted number of competitors was unveiled, which was probably due 
to correlation of HMO enrollment size and these market attributes. Models combining 
the original variables and factor scores (second approach) did not lose nor gain much in 
the classification rate, though the models using original variables had a slightly better 
model fit and classification rate, especially when the measure for HMO enrollment size 
was included. 
Chapter 6 first summarizes the results of hypothesis testing. Implications from 
this study are then explored. Finally, limitations of this study and directions for future 
study are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of the new entry of an 
HMO into a Medicare risk contract by using a resource dependence-diversification 
framework. The previous empirical study of this topic is very limited and is conducted 
before 1 990. Organizational theory has not been adopted by previous studies to 
investigate a market entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. In addition, prior 
research·reflects several methodological weaknesses. 
Thus, this study employs a panel design and analyzes recent data with a focus of 
identifying factors associated with the new entry of HMOs into a Medicare market. The 
assumption based on resource dependence theory is that an HMO's decision to diversify 
depends on the stability and availability of environmental resources. 
This chapter first summarizes the results of hypothesis testing and discusses 
responses to research questions. Implications from this study are then explored. Finally, 
limitations of this study and directions for future study are addressed. 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
This study tests twelve hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 -4 address the competitive 
structure in an HMO's  commercial market. Hypotheses 5 and 6 are concerned with the 
competitive structure in an HMO's  Medicare market. The importance of resource 
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availability is tested through the analyses of Hypotheses 7- 1 1 .  Hypothesis 1 2  is proposed 
to test how market price affects a market entry decision. Organizational attributes are 
included in logistic models mainly as control variables based on prior evaluation (see 
Table 2). Due to multicollinearity among independent variables, some hypotheses are 
tested by an alternate approach using factor scores for model bUilding. Results of 
hypothesis testing based on the revised models with the best fit using two approaches are 
summarized in Table 20. 
HI : Holding other variables constant, in a service area with low growth rate of 
HMO enrollment, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk 
contract. 
H I is moderately supported (p < 0. 1 )  across the parsimonious models that include 
original variables (first approach presented in Table 20). The negative coefficients 
indicate that a high growth rate of HMO enrollment in a service area discourages HMOs 
from signing Medicare risk contracts. Favorable conditions such as positive enrollment 
growth at the industry level in the existing commercial markets allow HMOs to remain 
self-sufficient and undiversified, rather than seeking other environmental niches such as 
diversification into a Medicare market in which restrictions are imposed by the HCF A on 
the size of Medicare enrollment, premiums charged, retainable profit, and marketing 
activities. Perhaps there is a reticence of HMOs to increase the size of elderly enrollment 
when they are still trying to enroll the nonelderly and assimilate them to managed care. 
1 76 
Table 20 
Entry of HMOs into Medicare Risk Contracts: Results of Hypothesis Testing Using Two 
Approaches 
Expected 1 st Approach 2nd Approach 
Variables/Factors sign S ign P value Sign P value 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
HI Growth in HMO enrollment - - p < 0 . 1  - NS 
[- P < 0 . 1 ] 
H2 HMO penetration t + + NS + NS 
[+ P < 0 . 1 ] 
H3 Market dominance index t - - - - - - - - - ---- ----
Weighted number of competitors t + [+ p < 0 .0 1 ] + p < 0.05 
[+ p <  0 .0 1 ] 
H4 Market share t ? - NS - - - - - - - -
[+ p < 0.05] 
Competitive Market Structure: Elder Market 
HS Growth in Medicare enrollment + - - - - ---- ---- - - - -
H6 Number of risk plans t ? - - - - - - - - ---- - - - -
Resource Availability 
H7 % of elderly population t + + NS - - - - - - - -
HS % of foreign population t + - - - - - - - - ---- - - - -
H9 (adjusted per capita income)2 - - - - - - - - - - P < 0 . 1  
HIO Large employers t + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Hn Physician per 1 ,000 population t + - - - - - - - - ---- - - - -
H12 Adjusted AAPCC rate + + p < 0 .0 1  + p < 0 . 0 1  
Note. Revised models With the best fit m the first approach mclude ongmal vanables 
(summarized from Table 1 8) and revised models with the best fit in the second approach include 
a combined set of both original variables and factor scores (summarized from Appendix D). 
Results in parentheses are from models which do not include the measure of HMO enrollment 
size. 
t indicates that the factor score instead of the original variable is used for the specific 
hypothesis testing in the second approach .  
denotes that variables/factors are not selected into models during the process of model 
building. 
NS denotes that variables/factors are selected into models and their coefficients are not 
significant at least at the p value of 0. 1 .  
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H2 : Holding other variables constant, in a service area with higher HMO 
penetration, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
H2 is not statistically supported, though the expected positive sign of the 
coefficient is observed. If the measure for HMO size is excluded from the model, the 
factor reflective of HMO penetration (F ]ENE) is moderately significant (second 
approach in Table 20). HMO penetration can be interpreted as either community 
receptivity or competition. That is, with a higher level of community receptivity of the 
HMO concept, or a higher level of competition among HMOs in a service area, an HMO 
is more likely to participate the Medicare risk program. 
H3 : Holding other variables constant, in a service area where enrollment 
concentration is high, an HMO is less likely to enter into a Medicare risk 
contract. 
H4 : Holding other variables constant, an HMO 's entry into a Medicare risk 
contract is associated with its market share. 
H3 and H4 are proposed to test the importance of an HMO's  control over 
enrollment in its service area. If competitive concentration is reflected by the market 
dominance index (MDI) which is derived from the concept of the Herfindahl Index, H3 is 
not supported, since the MDI is not included in the revised models with the best fit. 
Alternatively, if the concept of competitive structure is operationalized as the weighted 
number of competitors (N), H3 is statistically confirmed (p < 0.05) .  Consistent with the 
results from the first approach, the results from the second approach indicate that a large 
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weighted number of competitors in the service area encourages market entry of an HMO 
into risk contracting. The significance of an HMO' s market share proposed in H4 is 
supported only by the model that does not include a measure of HMO enrollment size . 
HS : Holding other variables constant, in a service area where the growth rate of 
HMO Medicare enrollment is higher, an HMO is more likely to enter into a 
Medicare risk contract. 
H6 : Holding other variables constant, the number of Medicare risk plans in a 
service area is associated with an HMO' s  entry into a Medicare risk contract. 
These two hypotheses regarding how the competitive structure of an HMO' s  
Medicare market influences a new market entry decision d o  not receive empirical 
support. The corresponding variables (G_MCR and N_R1SK94) are not included in 
models using original variables (first approach) or in models combining original variables 
and factor scores (second approach). 
H7: Holding other variables constant, in a service area where the size of elderly 
population is large, an HMO is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk 
contract. 
HS : Holding other variables constant, in a service area where immigration 
activity is higher, an HMO is more likely to enter into Medicare risk 
contract. 
H9 : Holding other variables constant, the income level in a service area is non-
linearly related to the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract. 
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The above three hypotheses are concerned with the availability and access of 
buyers, that is, Medicare beneficiaries. H7 is not statistically supported, though the sign 
of the estimated coefficient is positive as expected (first approach). Neither is Hg 
empirically supported. 
H9 is moderately confirmed by the second approach, since the coefficient of 
income level (A _ INCOM2) is negative at the p value of 0 . 1 .  This result offers moderate 
evidence that there is a non-linear relationship between the income level in the service 
area and the new entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. For the dually eligible 
(Medicare and Medicaid), the option may not exist to permit coverage of the elderly 
Medicaid population in HMO risk contracting arrangements, though Medicaid managed 
care enrollment is accelerating (Gold, Sparer, & Chu, 1 996) and becoming more available 
for the elderly. Welch ( 1 996) finds that the dually eligible are less likely to be enrolled in 
HMOs than other Medicare beneficiaries, and low enrollment of this population could be 
attributed to administrative difficulties. On the other hand, the elderly with higher 
incomes have possibly been under fee-for-service their entire life and can afford 
Medicare supplemental insurance, or may not be aware of the choice to enroll in HMOs.  
These two segments of the Medicare population are less likely to join HMOs. 
Consequently, HMOs are less likely to enter the service areas with a larger proportion of 
low- and high-income population. 
HI O :  Holding other variables constant, a n  HMO's entry into a Medicare risk 
contract is positively associated with the existence of large employers in the 
service area. 
Hl l : Holding other variables constant, an HMO's entry into the Medicare risk 
contract is positively associated with primary care physicians per 1 ,000 
population in the service area. 
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The above two hypotheses are proposed to test the importance of availability of 
payers (large employers) and suppliers (primary care physicians). Neither is empirically 
supported in this analysis. Perhaps the existence of large employers has little impact on 
the choice of a health plan by retirees, and consequently no effect on an HMO's  entry into 
a Medicare risk contract. If retirees move out of local areas where their prior employers 
were located, there may be no association with a local HMO and the HMO's market entry 
decision. Information from a survey study indicates that large firms are more likely to 
offer retirement benefits, but managed care plans are less available to retirees (Morrisey, 
et a! . ,  1 990). There is evidence that Medicare beneficiaries with health insurance 
subsidized by employers are less likely to enroll in HMOs (Dowd, et a!. ,  1 994). It seems 
the existence of large employers inhibits retirees joining HMOs. It is also possible that 
the new F AS 1 06 that requires the accounting of future retirement benefits as liabilities 
does not impact large employers' behavior of purchasing health care benefits for their 
retirees, or does not show an effect during the time frame of this analysis. Also, it seems 
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that an adequate supply of primary care physicians does not impact an HMO's  decision to 
risk contract. 
H12 : Holding other variables constant, an HMO in a service area with higher 
AAPCC rates is more likely to enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
This hypothesis is statistically confirmed across different models in two 
approaches. The results indicate that higher AAPCC rates encourage a new market entry 
into a Medicare risk contract, consistent with the findings from prior studies. Thus, it 
appears that price that is based on the fee-for-service market is an important factor for 
HMOs. As the managed care environment continues to lower the amount reimbursed for 
care in the commercial market, the rate determined by the HCF A may be favorable in 
light of other payers. 
Summarv of Hypothesis Testing 
The results of hypothesis testing indicate that HMOs that enter into a Medicare 
risk contract were more responsive to the competitive market structure and market price 
than to resource availability in the service areas. The importance of competitive structure 
in the HMO commercial market (HI -H4) receives at least moderate support. The 
significance of market price in the service area is strongly supported (H1 2) .  However, 
the competitive structure in a Medicare market (H5 and H6) and resource availability 
(H7-HJ 1 ) have little effect on a diversification decision by HMOs. 
Not hypothesized, HMO enrollment size is found to be a predominant, positive 
factor in predicting a new market entry of an HMO into a Medicare risk contract. This 
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finding is consistent with the assertion of resource dependence theory that the need for 
environmental linkage increases as firm size increases. In addition, the positive effect of 
an HMO's  enrollment size on risk contract participation supports the argument made by 
Porell and Wallack ( 1 990) that large HMOs could capitalize on economies of scale if they 
enter into a Medicare risk contract. 
Responses to Research Questions 
This study addresses three research questions. The first two research questions 
inquire how market structure and munificence of environmental resources affect the 
participation of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract. Results from hypothesis testing 
suggest that competition encourage new market entry. However, munificence of 
resources perceived as the size of the elderly population, a mobile population, large 
employers, and more physicians is not found to have statistical significance in this 
analysis and thus seems to have relatively little impact on the decision of an HMO to 
enter a risk contract. Alternatively, it seems only when other resources such as HMO 
enrollment in the commercial market were in less abundance that HMOs turned to 
Medicare risk contracting. The number of HMOs has tripled (see Figure 1 )  and HMO 
enrollment has increased tenfold (see Figure 4) since the late 1 970s. Managed care is no 
longer an alternative health delivery system. Given the profound changes in the health 
care system, it is not surprising to observe that factors important for a market entry 
decision in the 1 990s differ from those in the 1 980s. New factors not operationalized in 
this analysis may contribute to market entry. 
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The third research question addresses the impact of AAPCC rates on market 
entry. As odds ratios in Table 1 8  indicate, given a $ 1 0  increase in AAPCC rates, the 
probability of a new market entry rises by almost 1 0%. It is reported that an HMO' s  
income per member per month for the elderly may b e  four times that o f  the under-65 
population (Bell, 1 987). Therefore, as higher capitation rates for caring for the elderly 
under Medicare are available, particularly as other reimbursement rates are being lowered 
through efforts of managing costs, HMOs increase entry into risk contracting, probably to 
subsidize commercial products with Medicare products. 
Implications 
Based on the results of this study, implications can be drawn from different 
perspectives :  methodological, theoretical, and health policy. 
Methodological Implications 
This study methodologically differs from prior studies of Medicare risk 
contracting in three aspects: study design, study sample, and market definition. 
This study employs a panel design to better verify cause-effect relationships in a 
way such that the measurement of independent variables precedes the occurrence of 
dependent variable. Comparatively, the cross-sectional design which is used in prior 
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studies (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) can at best demonstrate an 
association. 
Furthermore, the study sample includes only HMOs that do not have a Medicare 
risk contract at the first point of time of this analysis (January 1 994) .  The separation of 
renewing HMOs and all others results in a more homogeneous sample which enhances 
the internal validity of study results. In contrast, prior studies include both renewing 
HMOs and all others in cross-sectional samples. Endogeneity bias is inevitable. That is, 
an HMO' s  market entry may itself contribute to differences in market structure and 
market price (Medicare fee-for-service expenditure in the service area). 
These methodological differences may explain why some variables are found 
statistically important in previous studies but not in this study. This discrepancy 
demonstrates the importance of using an appropriate study design and sample specific to 
an investigation. A panel design should be employed instead of a cross-sectional design 
in order to indicate causality. A dissimilar sample should be avoided unless adequate 
statistical control is ensured. It is also hard to compare this analysis with prior studies, 
given the fact that the health care system has undergone tremendous transformation. 
The third methodological difference exists in the definition of market area for an 
HMO. This study defines an HMO's market as all counties the HMO claims to serve, 
instead of the single county where the HMO office is based or an MSA. The use of 
service area as an HMO's market has recently been adopted in HMO research (for 
example, Feldman, et aI . ,  1 996; Wholey, et aI . ,  1 995). This market definition implies that 
an HMO has control over the configuration of its market. An HMO is sensitive to the 
change in market structure and can affect its market dominance, or market share, and its 
exposure to competition by expanding or condensing its self-declared service area. The 
definition of an HMO's geographic configuration remains to be a pragmatic issue and 
methodological challenge, given data limitations. Policy consideration is needed in the 
way that a geographic unit is used to determine AAPCC rates, and this study shows the 
applicability of using designated service areas as an HMO's market. 
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As Table 1 6  indicates, HMO enrollment size is significantly correlated with 
variables measuring the market structure such as HMO penetration, market dominance, 
market share, the weighted number of competitors, and the number of risk plans. It 
appears that rather than a mere measure of HMO size, HMO enrollment may represent 
constructs reflective of market structure or market competition when an HMO's  market is 
defined as the entire area it purports to serve. 
Theoretical Implications 
Prior studies of the entry of HMOs into a Medicare risk contract have not been 
conducted from a perspective of organizational theory. This investigation is a unique 
empirical study adopting a resource dependence-diversification framework to explain an 
HMO's decision to diversify into Medicare risk contracting. A classification rate of about 
70% from the results of model building demonstrates the utility of a resource 
dependence-diversification model in HMO research. 
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The resource dependence theory posits that diversification is encouraged by a 
dependency situation that is related to resource availability and concentration. Modified 
from the diversification literature, this study measures the competition of HMO market 
structure by several variables, such as HMO enrollment growth rate, HMO penetration, 
market share of the individual HMO, and the weighted number of competitors. These 
variables are found to be at least moderately significant in predicting market entry. Thus, 
the relation of market competition to diversification is empirically supported. However, 
the importance of resource availability receives little empirical support. This may be in 
part due to the way resource availability is measured and operationalized, which will be 
discussed in the section concerning study limitations. 
Health Policy Implications 
With concern about the budget deficit, the federal government appeals to the 
success of the private sector that has been moving toward an integrated, capitated care 
system. The HCFA is aggressively promoting Medicare managed care through risk 
contracting. A positive response has been elicited from the HMO industry that in the 
1 990s is still in transition out of its infancy. Correspondingly, the adequacy of current 
AAPCC rates an HMO with a risk contract receives for providing services to Medicare 
beneficiaries has received much political attention and methodological criticism. 
Previous studies suggest that the AAPCC rate is the most important determinant 
of HMO market entry in the early years of TEFRA implementation (Adamache & 
Rossiter, 1 986; Porell & Wallack, 1 990) and in a rural area (Serrato, Brown, & Bergeron, 
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1 995) .  From a different perspective, however, Welch ( 1 996) observes that at the MSA 
level, general HMO penetration rather than the AAPCC rate is the most important 
predictor of HMO share of the Medicare market. This study finds that HMO enrollment 
size is a more predominant predictor of HMO market entry, and the AAPCC rate is the 
second most important factor in the 1 990s. With the growth of HMO enrollment, which 
may be interpreted as a construct of structural competition as discussed previously, an 
HMO is motivated to seek external linkages, asserted by a resource dependence 
perspective, though HMOs are still sensitive to the level of AAPCC rates. This finding 
may relieve some of the worry of policy makers who are concerned about favorable 
selection experienced by risk plans and are consequently in favor of adjusting or lowering 
AAPCC rates without discouraging HMO's participation in the Medicare program to a 
large extent. 
As Table 1 2  indicates, the new market entrants are similar to previous market 
entrants. A further comparison between the 1 994- 1 995 panel sample and new HMOs that 
became operational after January 1 ,  1 994 reveals no significant difference in 
organizational attributes. This observation enhances the generalizability of this analysis 
to a future sample. That is, the results from this study convey a positive signal to policy 
makers that as long as an individual HMO, or the entire HMO industry continues to 
evolve and compete intensively, the entry into a Medicare risk contract seems to be a 
strategic step that HMOs would take as they strive to survive. 
Limitations of the Study 
This section discusses the limitations of this study due to study design, data 
availability, and variable measurement. 
1 88 
This study employs a panel design with only a one year time lag. In formulation 
of the study, staff in the HCFA and certain HMOs were consulted as to the length and 
appropriateness of the lag time needed to arrange a risk contract. A one year time lag 
might still be arbitrary, recognizing that the entire application-approval legal process 
varies by HMO as well as by geographic area in which an HMO is located. In addition to 
the legal process, it takes time to develop network. In order to accommodate the needs of 
Medicare beneficiaries different from the non-elderly population, HMOs need to expand 
their provider network, rather than using the existing network, to be successful in the 
Medicare business. Thus, a longer lag time might be appropriate given the importance of 
enrollment size, legal process, and network development. 
Another issue consequent to the use of one year as the time lag for this study, and 
also in part due to the nature of risk contracting, is the small number of events, that is, 
new market entrants in this study. One restrictive rule proposed by Daley and Shwartz 
( 1 994) states that in order to obtain reliable coefficients, the number of predictors in a 
logistic regression model should not be more than 1 0% of the number of events. In this 
study, there are 43 new market entrants during the 1 994- 1 995 time period, and thus no 
more than 5 predictors should be included in the logistic regression model, if the above 
rule is followed, which is not always necessarily the case. As a matter of fact, 1 0  
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predictors are included in the final revised models (Table 1 8) .  The low incidence of new 
market entry of HMOs during the 1 994- 1 995 time period might explain in part why the 
correct classification rate is moderately high around 70%. These limitations could be 
overcome to a certain extent by adopting a wider time span and utilizing a survival 
technique which is able to account for censored cases.  
The sample used for model building is the same sample used for validating the 
model built in this analysis. Thus, the correct classification rate is upwardly biased. A 
hold-up sample is not employed for validating the derived model in this study with a 
concern of declined statistical power due to a reduction of an effective sample size. 
It could be argued that strategic adaptation by HMOs is possible in response to 
environmental changes and organizational performance. However, this study addresses 
only one of several strategic responses, diversification into a Medicare risk market. It 
would be desirable to include other organizational changes as dependent variables using 
multinomial logistic regressions to assess various responses to the environmental 
changes. 
The level of Medigap premiums has long been descriptively suggested to have an 
impact on HMO's market entry into a Medicare market. However, the lack of 
consistently available information on Medigap premiums prevents Medicare 
supplemental insurance from being empirically tested in this study. 
One major category of independent variables omitted from this study is the 
financial performance of HMOs.  Financial data could provide better indicators reflective 
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of organizational slack or internal resources that either afford an HMO the ability to 
diversify or buffer it from getting involved in any organizational change. Though 
commercially available from Health Care Investment Analysts of Baltimore, Maryland, 
HMO financial data are not affordable for this study. Without inclusion it is not known if 
those variables would have been accurate and would have matched the sample in this 
analysis. Omission of important variables such as HMO financial indicators in this 
analysis may lead to inefficient estimates of the included variables (Kmenta, 1 986). That 
is, it is less likely to find significant coefficients for the variables included. 
Another data limitation is associated with the content of secondary surveys used 
in this study. Neither InterStudy nor GHAAlAAHP in its annual or semi-annual census 
asks managed care plans about their organizational goals and strategic orientation. As 
Evan and Klemm ( 1 980) suggest, an organizational goal is critical in determining 
whether an organization will respond to environmental opportunities given certain 
internal resources or slack. 
Omitting the variables discussed above, in addition to the low incidence rate of 
new market entry during the one year period of time studied, may offer some explanation 
why the correct classification rate is not as high as it might have been. 
As discussed in the previous section, there is little support for the hypotheses 
proposed to investigate the importance of resource availability in the service area. It is 
possible that measurement of some variables is not without problems but limited due to 
data availability. For example, a foreign-born population does not necessarily represent 
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immigrants who are less likely to have a regular physician. A physician-patient 
relationship for an immigrant is also contingent upon how long ago one immigrates into 
the U.S .  and to the degree to which one is acculturated. In addition, it may be far from 
ideal to operationalize in-migration activity, or geographic mobility of local residents by 
the percentage of population aged 5 or over who reside in different states within the past 
five years. However, these measures are the ones publicly available from the County and 
City Data Book. 
Another concern regarding the construct validity of the foreign-born population is 
that this variable may not operationalize a physician-patient relationship. Among all 
HMOs in the panel sample, those in California and Florida have the highest percentage of 
foreign-born population in their service areas. Thus, it appears that the measure of the 
foreign-born population represents a regional effect. Furthermore, when examining the 
regional distribution of new market entrants, 6 out of 43 new risk plans are in California, 
and 4 in Florida and Pennsylvania, respectively. Among the 48 states that HMOs in the 
panel sample are identified with, new risk contracting does not take place in 30 states. 
The regional effect on market entry is possible but not hypothesized nor tested in this 
study. 
Suggestions for Future Study 
Future study could be conducted based on the findings and limitations of this 
study. Several different directions are considered. 
Study Design 
The lagged panel design used in this study can better reveal cause-effect 
relationships between predictors and an HMO's diversification decision. As discussed 
above, however, expanding the time window to more than one year is preferred in order 
to capture a more realistic, long-term situation and increase the number of events. 
Alternatively, a longitudinal design covering more than a one year cross-section sample 
with a concomitant survival analytic technique might better explore the issue. 
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HMO development in general, or Medicare risk contracting in particular, in the 
rural areas has received little empirical attention. HMO research has focused primarily 
on metropolitan areas. This may be due to the fact that HMOs have historically 
concentrated in certain urban areas, but that does not obviate the necessity of studying the 
pattern of service provision by HMOs in the rural areas. If feasible in terms of statistical 
power (that is, a reasonable sample size), it would be desirable to conduct a separate 
investigation for HMOs that primarily serve rural areas, or geographically expand into 
rural areas. Similarly, analysis of subset samples by the level of HMO penetration in the 
service areas may provide a more homogeneous sample and subsequently enhance the 
internal validity of the study. To improve the classification rate or predictive accuracy, 
the use of a hold-up sample to validate the model derived is preferred in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of classification rates. 
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�easurement Issues 
Resource concentration is an important construct predicting organizational change 
as proposed by the resource dependence theory. However, operationalization of resource 
concentration, or structural competition, varies among prior health service-related studies 
in general, or H�O studies in particular. Variation in measurement results from 
differences in the research focus, unit of analysis, the definition of market (or service 
area), and data availability. Thus, these inconsistencies may lead to different 
interpretation of results as well as different implications which could be drawn from the 
studies. 
The Herfindahl Index has often been used as a measure of resource concentration. 
The utility of Herfindahl Index in H�O research has been questioned and criticized (for 
example, Feldman, et aI . ,  1 996; Wholey, et al. ,  1 995). Instead, the number of H�Os in 
an H�O's operating area has been used to measure the competitive structure in the H�O 
industry (Feldman, et aI . ,  1 996; Wholey, et aI . ,  1 995). To measure competitive 
concentration confronted by an H�O, this study uses both the weighted number of 
H�Os in an H�O's service area and a modified Herfindahl Index which is interpreted as 
a market dominance index. The results reflect that the weighted number of H�Os in the 
service areas is a better predictor of a new market entry than the market dominance index. 
This finding lends some support to the critics that the Herfindahl Index is not an 
appropriate measure of competition in the H�O industry. Based on empirical evidence, 
future H�O studies may use a weighted number of H�Os to measure competitive 
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concentration. Moreover, the validity of these two measures should be subject to further 
exploration, varying the unit of analysis and the market definition. The quantitative 
comparison of market structure measurement among different market definitions, such as 
headquarter county, a single MSA, multiple MSAs, state of operation, and the service 
area, is also desirable. 
Conclusions 
This study is guided by a resource dependence-diversification framework to 
explain why HMOs entered into a Medicare risk contract. About 1 0% of HMOs in the 
1 994- 1 995 panel sample diversify into a Medicare risk market after January 1 994. The 
results of this study demonstrate the appropriateness of a panel design to verify a cause-
effect relationship and the applicability of the service area as the definition of an HMO's  
market in  health services research. This study also contributes to  the theoretical 
understanding of HMO's market entry and illustrates the utility of organizational theory 
in describing HMO behavior. The status of federal qualification is a necessary condition 
for market entry as required by law. HMOs are sensitive to the level of AAPCC rates in 
making a market entry decision. As HMO enrollment size grows, the need for 
environmental linkages increases, motivating HMOs to diversify, as indicated by resource 
dependence theory. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Comparison of the Different Market Definitions for HMOs 
There are multiple ways that one can define the market area of an organization. 
As part of the measurement analysis for this investigation, a number of variations are 
examined to represent the market an HMO serves. An HMO' s  market has been 
empirically defined as headquarter county (Adamache & Rossiter, 1 986), MSA(s) 
(Christianson, et aI . ,  1 99 1 ;  Cromley & Shannon, 1 983 ;  McLaughlin, 1 987; McNeil & 
Schlenker, 1 975;  Morrisey & Ashby, 1 982; Porell & Wallack 1 990; Schlesinger, et aI . ,  
1 986; Welch, 1 984; Wholey, e t  aI . ,  1 990; Wholey, e t  al . ,  1 992), state (Ginsberg & 
Buchholtz, 1 990), or service area (Feldman, et aI . ,  1 993 ; Feldman, et aI . ,  1 995;  Wholey, 
et aI . ,  1 995).  
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In this study, only 3 3 ,  or 6 %  of the 535  HMOs in the 1 994 cross-sectional sample 
serve only one county. The phenomenon that the state where an HMO is headquartered is 
not the state(s) the HMO claims to serve is observed for 1 2  HMOs. By defining the 
headquarter county as the market that an HMO serves understates the operating locations 
for most of the HMOs. Headquarter county also misrepresents the service location for 
some HMOs. 
Of all the HMOs in the 1 995 InterStudy census, 22% of the HMOs report that 
they serve rural counties only. Thus, the use of an MSA definition is biased against rural 
HMOs or those primarily serving a rural area. The MSA definition also does not 
accurately reflect the market configuration for HMOs serving urban-rural mixed areas. 
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The remainder of this appendix presents a graphic comparison between MSA(s) 
and service area as an HMO's  market definition using county representations. For simple 
demonstration, Arizona and 5 HMOs in Arizona are selected for the following discussion. 
According to the U.S .  General Accounting Office ( 1 996), Arizona is the third largest state 
with regard to the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in risk-contract HMOs as of 
August 1 995, following California and Florida. In the 1 994 cross-sectional sample, 1 0  
out of 535  HMOs (2%) are in Arizona. Of 95 HMOs with Medicare risk contracts, 5 
HMOs (5%) operate in Arizona. That is, the participation rate in Medicare risk 
contracting is 50% in Arizona, second to Oregon and New Mexico (67% for each state) . 
Figure Al  pictorially illustrates the 4 MSAs in Arizona, which comprise 5 
counties in Arizona. The Las Vegas metropolitan area also covers two counties in 
Nevada. The shaded areas in Figures A2-A6 reflect the self-declared service areas of 5 
HMOs that serve Arizona. HMO! (see Figure A2) serves two counties which constitute 
the Phoenix-Mesa MSA. For this HMO, the market definition of a single MSA is the 
same as that of the reported service area. The service area of HM02 (see Figure A3) 
covers 5 counties, only one of which constitutes entire the Tucson MSA. In the case of 
HM02, the use of a single MSA understates the market configuration. Figure A4 shows 
that HM03 ' s  service area includes two counties which compose the entire Tucson MSA 
and part of the Phoenix-Mesa MSA. Neither a single MSA nor two MSAs are accurate to 
reflect HMO/ s service area. The self-declared service area by HM04 (see Figure AS) 
spans 3 urban counties (two MSAs, Phoenix-Mesa and Tucson) and 6 other rural 
counties. HM05 covers the entire state of Arizona, that is, 4 MSAs and all other rural 
counties (see Figure A6). For these two HMOs (HM04 and HMOS), even multiple 
MSAs underdefine their service areas. 
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Through this very simple representative analysis it becomes clear that among 
several possible definitions for an HMO's  market, such as a headquarter county, a single 
MSA, multiple MSAs, state of operation, and the service area, only the service area 
definition can better approximate the true operating area of an HMO. As a matter of fact, 
the market definition of self-declared service area implies that HMOs interact with the 
environment and have control over the configuration of their market. HMOs can not only 
modify their exposure to environmental opportunities and threats, but also affect market 
competition by expanding or shrinking their service areas. Thus, the service area is a 
more logical and pragmatic definition for an HMO's  market than other market 
definitions. 
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Fif.!ure A3 . Reported Service Area of HM02. 
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Figure A4. Reported Service Area of HM03. 
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Appendix B 
Methods of Data Aggregation: 
Independent Variables Measuring Market Structure and Resource Availability 
Components of the variable Aggregation 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-Elderly Market 
Growth in enrollment 
HMO enrollment for a given year sum of HMO enrollment across counties in the service 
area for a given year 
HMO penetration across the market 
total HMO enrollment sum of HMO enrollment across counties in the service 
area 
market population sum of total population across counties in the service 
area 
Market share of the individual HMO 
individual HMO enrol lment 
total HMO enrollment 
Competitive concentration 
market share of the HMO 
the enrol lment of the individual HMO reported to 
InterStudy survey 
(see above) 
(see above and Appendix C) 
Competitive Market Structure: Medicare Market 
Growth in Medicare enrollment 
Medicare enrollment for a given 
year 
sum of Medicare enrollment under risk contracts 
across counties in the service area for a given year 
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Resource Availability 
Population aged 65 or over 
elderly population sum of population aged 65 or over across counties in the 
service area 
Migration activity 
foreign-born population 
Female elderly 
female aged 65 or over 
sum of foreign-born population across counties in the 
service area 
sum of female population aged 65 or over across 
counties in the service area 
Income 
Large employers 
number of large employer 
total establ ishment 
Physicians per 1000 population 
number of physicians 
Market Price 
AAPC C  
Part A (or B) aged AAPCC 
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Appendix B (continued) 
sum of per capita income across counties in the service 
area, weighted by county population and adjusted for 
wage index 
sum of employers with 250 or more employees across 
counties in the service area 
sum of establishments across counties in the service area 
sum of primary care physicians across counties in the 
service area 
sum of Part A (or B) aged AAPCCs across counties in 
the service area, weighted by the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries in the county, adjusted for wage index 
Appendix C 
Process of Prorating an HMO's  Enrollment over Counties in its Service Area and 
Measurement of HMO Enrollment-Based Variables 
Prorating Process 
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The prorating process in this study follows the approach adopted by Christianson, 
Sanchez, et al . ( 1 99 1 ). The first step is to use InterStudy census and GHAA directories to 
define an HMO' s  enrollment. The second step is to use county population as weights to 
allocate enrollment over all counties in the HMO' s  service area. For example, an HMO 
with total 1 000 enrollees operates in County A and County B. The population size for 
County A and County B is 1 0,000 and 30,000, respectively. One quarter of the HMO 
enrollment, or 250 enrollees are allocated to County A, and three quarters (750 enrollees) 
are allocated to County B. 
The Appropriateness of Using County Population as the Prorating Weight 
Wholey et al . ( 1 995) argued that the method used by Christianson, Sanchez, et al. 
(1 99 1 )  might cause measurement errors if HMO enrollment does not distribute in the 
same proportion as county population. Instead, they used the information from the 1 994 
InterStudy survey to allocate HMO enrollment to MSAs served. They used county 
population as the weight only to allocate enrollment to counties within a MSA. This 
method is still not without measurement errors. 
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First, it should be noted that InterStudy asked HMOs to list MSAs served and to 
estimate the proportion of their enrollment from each MSA. This estimation would 
introduce errors in allocating enrollment to MSAs. Second, HMOs may not operate in all 
counties constituting a MSA. Using MSAs as the unit of market area and then allocating 
enrollment to MSAs would bias against HMOs that operate in an urban-rural mixed area, 
or primarily in rural counties. Moreover, prorating enrollment over counties in a MSA 
causes the same possible errors as Christianson, Sanchez, et al . ( 1 99 1 )  do, as critiqued by 
Wholey et al . ( 1 995). 
Without any validation effort, one cannot be sure that the method developed by 
Wholey et al . ( 1 995) is superior to that used by Christianson, Sanchez, et al ( 1 99 1 ) . In 
fact, Wholey' s  method involves more steps in calculation and probably may be exposed 
to more sources of measurement error. In this study, an effort is made to try to validate 
Christianson's  approach, rather than to prove the superiority of either method. 
Since county-level HMO enrollment data are not available, there is no direct way 
to demonstrate that HMO enrollment distributes in the same proportion as county 
population. Instead, there is evidence that states with higher total HMO enrollment have 
higher Medicare enrollment in HMOs (U.S .  General Accounting Office, 1 996), though 
the association at the county level is neither clear nor testable. In addition, Welch ( 1 996) 
reports that on the MSA level general HMO market penetration is a significantly positive 
variable in predicting HMO penetration in the Medicare market. 
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In the first step of validation, thus, county-level Medicare enrollment in HMOs is 
used as the weight to prorate an HMO' s  enrollment over all counties in its service area. 
(Data on county-level Medicare enrollment in HMOs are available from the HCF A and 
are assumed to be accurate, since this data set is linked to the HCFA's  financing 
function.) The resulting county-level HMO enrollment is denoted as ENROLL) ,  and the 
county-level HMO enrollment calculated by using the method of Christianson, Sanchez, 
et al. ( 1 99 1 )  is denoted as ENROLL2• The second step is to correlate ENROLL) with 
ENROLL2• The high correlation between ENROLL) and ENROLL2 (r = 0.96) sheds light 
on the appropriateness of using county population as the weight. 
Measurement of HMO Enrollment-Based Variables 
1 .  Total HMO enrollment. Total HMO enrollmerit in Service Are� which is unique to 
HMOj is calculated by adding the enrollment of all HMOs (including HMOj and others) 
in Service Are�. 
2 .  HMO penetration. HMO penetration in Service Are� is calculated by total HMO 
enrollment in Service Are� divided by total population in Service Are�. 
3. Market share. The market share of HMOj in Service Are� is HMOj' s  enrollment 
divided by total HMO enrollment is Service Are�. The market share of HMOj in Service 
Are� is the enrollment contributed by HMOj to Service Are� divided by total HMO 
enrollment in Service Are�. 
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4 .  Market dominance index (MDI). The MDI for Service Are� or HMOj is the sum of 
squared market share for each HMO in Service Are� . HMOs with smaller market shares 
in HMOj ' s  service area contribute relatively less to HMOj ' s  MDI. 
5. Weighted number of competitor. HMOj is considered to be a competitor to HMOj if 
HMO/ s service area overlaps that of HMOj by at least one county, with HMO/ s 
enrollment proportion in service are� as the weight. For example, there are three HMOs 
(HMO] ,  HM02, and HMO)) in Service Area] . HM02 and HMO) have 60% and 30% of 
their enrollment in Service Area] , respectively. Thus, the number of competitors in 
Service Area] is I (HMO] ) plus 0.9 (0.6 + 0 .3) .  
Appendix D 
1 994 Cross-Sectional Model of HMO Risk Contracting Activity 
Variables 
_
_ --'M""'o"'d""el'--'--I ____
_ 
_ Model 2 
Beta Standardized 
Estimate 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
GROW -0 .591  t -0.026 
PENE 
SHARE 
N 
Resource Availability 
OLD 
A INCOME 
Market Price 
Part B AAPCC 
1 . 829 * 
-0. 1 05 t 
0.008 t 
-0.0002 * * *  
0.0 1 0  * *  
Organizational Attributes 
LN SIZE 0.625 * * *  
0 . 1 5 1  
-0.0 1 1 
0 .0 1 0  
-0.276 
0 . 1 5 7  
0 .68 1 
Beta 
-0.806 t 
2 .740 * * *  
2 .490 * * *  
0.076 * * *  
-0.023 t 
-0.0002 * * *  
0 .009 * *  
TAXSTAT 0.045 
FEDQUAL 1 . 1 3 7  
AFFIL2 0.595 
t 
* * *  
* 
0.0 1 1 
0 .3 1 4  
0 . 1 64 
-0. 1 05 t 
1 .40 1 * * *  
0.777 * *  
-2LogL 385 .05 396 .36 
X2 difference test 1 1 5 . 38  * * *  1 04.07 * * *  
Degrees o f  freedom 1 0  1 0  
Classification rate 7 1 .8% 70.3% 
Standardized 
Estimate 
-0.036 
0.226 
0 .255 
0 .300 
-0 .030 
-0.286 
0 . 1 3 9  
-0.027 
0 .386 
0.2 1 4  
Note. I f  the combined sum o f  AAPCC rates instead o f  the Part B AAPCC rate was included in 
the models, it was not statistically significant. 
t standard error greater than parameter estimate. 
* p < O . I O . * * p < 0.05 .  * * * p < O .O I .  
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Appendix E 
Models Using Stepwise Procedure to Predict HMO Risk Contracting: Inclusion of Original 
Variables and Factors 
Model l Model 2 
Variables/ Beta Standardized Odds Beta Standardized Odds 
Factors Estimate Ratio Estimate 
Competitive Market Structure: Non-elder Market 
GROW -4.923 -0.232 0.952 a -5 .045* -0.23 8 
[0.90, 1 .0 1 ]  
F PENE 0.267 0 . 1 47 1 .306 0 .352* 0 . 1 94 
[0 .90, 1 .90] 
F COMPETE 0.392* *  0 .2 1 6  1 .480 0.547* * *  0 .302 
[ 1 .07, 2 .04] 
Resource Availability 
A INCOM2 -3 .5E-9* -0. 1 7 8  1 .000 c -3 .5E-9* -0. 1 8 1  
[ 1 .00, 1 .00] 
Market Price 
AAPCC 0.0 1 0* * *  0 .3 1 5  1 . 105  b 0 .0 1 0* * *  0 .3 2 1  
[ 1 .04, 1 . 1 8] 
Organizational Attributes 
F SIZE 0.837* *  0.46 1 2 .3 1 0  
[ 1 .07, 4 .97] 
F %DOC -2.200* - 1 .2 1 3  0 . 1 1 1  - 1 .002 -0 .552 
[0 .0 1 , 1 .2 1 ]  
TAXSTAT 0.54 1 0 . 1 3 6  1 .7 1 7  0 .288 0 .073 
[0 .75, 3 .92] 
FEDQUAL 0.990* *  0.272 2.692 1 .263* * *  0.347 
[ \ .25, 5 .78] 
-2LogL 23 5 .27 24 1 .2 1  
X2 difference test (dt) 46.39 (9) 40.34 (8) 
Classification rate 67.5% 66.4% 
Ratio 
0 .95 1 a 
[0.90, 1 .0 1 ]  
1 .422 
[0.99, 2 .04] 
1 . 728 
[ 1 .29, 2 .32] 
1 .000 c 
[ 1 .00, 1 .00] 
1 . 1  07 b 
[ 1 .04, 1 . 1 8] 
0 .367 
[0 . 1 0, 1 .3 1 ]  
1 .3 34  
[0.6 1 , 2 .94] 
3 . 5 3 8  
[ 1 .7 1 , 7 .34] 
Note . Model 2 differed from Model I only in one aspect that F _SIZE was not included; 95% 
confidence limits are in parentheses; a denotes odds ratio based on one percent change in the 
predictor; b denotes odds ratio based on ten units change in the predictor; c denotes odds ratio 
based on 1 000 units change in the predictor; since the magnitude of the coefficient for 
A_INCOM2 was very small, the odds ratio approached zero. 
* p < 0 . 1 0 . * *  P < 0 .05 .  * * *  P < 0.0 1 .  
23 1 
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